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This thesis explores a psychoanalytic understanding of depression from the 
perspective of Fairbairn’s object relations theory, something Fairbairn did not himself 
undertake. Highlighting the historical and political contexts of the development of 
psychoanalysis in Fairbairn’s time, I underline the marginalization of Fairbairn’s theory, 
which I attribute primarily to his lifelong endeavour to challenge the orthodoxy of the 
time: instinct theory. I chart a theoretical trajectory from the instinct theory (Freud, 
Klein) to object relations theory (Fairbairn), to contextualise my argument for the 
potential of Fairbairn’s theory. My argument aligns with Rubens’ (1994, 1998) view that 
an extension of Fairbairn’s theory beyond what Fairbairn himself originally proposed on 
the subject of depression is not only advantageous but also necessary. 
The Fairbairnian understanding of depression at the heart of this inquiry is 
illustrated through my personal engagement with psychoanalytic theory and framed by 
my subjective experiences and interpretations. Contending that theory requires personal 
voices to make sense and be relevant, I engage creatively and personally using the 
method of letter-writing to an imaginary companion - Virginia Woolf. The Virginia 
Woolf I construct and with whom I engaged in the research process is based on factual 
information about Virginia Woolf along with her published texts. In this process I blur 
the boundary between the real Woolf and my imaginary Woolf. Troubling the edge of 
reality and fantasy, I use the Woolf of my imagination to stage a process of getting to 
know Woolf personally, working to develop a trusting relationship and engaging her in a 
conversation about theory. My letters to Virginia Woolf trace an unfolding dialogue in 
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which we tell and hear each other’s most intimate stories, once unthinkable and 
unsayable. The letters trace the transformation of my own understanding of the nature of 
depression, and through them I seek to establish a line of theoretical argument about 
depression running through the claims of Freud and Klein before turning to the 
Fairbairnian version of object relations theory. In so doing this thesis complicates 
psychoanalytic knowledge of the nature of depression, and argues that, framed in 
Fairbairn’s system, depression can be understood as an actively organised psychic 
manoeuvre to defend against changes to the endopsychic structure. In other words, and 
as elaborated through the letters constructed in this thesis, I argue that depression can be 
understood as a defence against the disintegration of a particular sense of self sponsored 





























The completion of this thesis would have been impossible without several relationships, 
personally and professionally.  
 
My first thanks go to my principal supervisor, Liz Bondi, for her tireless support, 
knowledge, and encouragement throughout the writing of this thesis. Every meeting was 
an invitation to think independently and play creatively as I needed, whilst her consistent 
presence grounded me whenever I found myself lost. I could not have asked for a better 
supervisor.  
 
I am also greatly indebted to my second supervisor Seamus Prior, for the insightful 
critiques he so generously offered me, and his unfailing faith in me, which induced 
hopes in me with which I was able to survive the challenging moments of self-doubts, 
fears, and disorientation in the final stage of my thesis.  
 
I would like to thank Lindy Barbour who, together with Seamus, deepened my 
psychodynamic exploration of myself through the interpersonal dialogue they facilitated 
throughout the course “From Two Person to Three Person to the Group: A 
Psychodynamic Perspective”. The course had been a significant learning journey for me 
in establishing myself as a psychodynamic thinker.  
 
I am grateful to Rose Cameron, a warm and invigorating presence during my training to 
become a psychotherapist, and who, in the Interpersonal Learning Group, always gave 
me space to experience voicing and hearing myself. I am also tremendously grateful for 
the editorial support she has provided for this thesis.  
 
I am also grateful to Tessa Wyatt, my art teacher and a dear friend, who indulged me 
with a generous provision of paints and brushes and who was never worried about me 
making a mess. She has been an essential part of my emotional support throughout the 
working on this thesis.   
 
My deepest debt, and the one I fear I could never acknowledge enough, is to my fiancé 
William Kerr, whose love has been my best ally in all difficulties. Our relationship has 
been my secure base from which I gathered enough robustness to venture into the most 
unsettling questions about love and hate, and to practice loving and hating ever so 
fearlessly. Without his love this thesis could not have survived its infantile stage. 
 
Finally, my most grateful acknowledgement is made to my mother, Hui-Li, for being 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 2 
 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 4 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction  ................................................................................................................ 6 
 
Chapter 2 – Constructing a Psychoanalytic Dialogue with My Imaginary Virginia Woolf ......... 15 
 
 Performing Psychoanalytic theory .................................................................................... 15 
 The Wounded Storyteller, and Story-listener .................................................................... 19 
 Sketch of The Past ............................................................................................................. 29 
 Ethical Considerations ...................................................................................................... 30 
 
Chapter 3 – Depression Within Psychoanalytic Perspectives: From Freud, Klein to 
Fairbairn ........................................................................................................................................ 32 
 
 Depression in a Freudian system ....................................................................................... 33  
 Depression in a Kleinian system ....................................................................................... 43  
 Depression in a Fairbairnian system ................................................................................. 49  
 
Chapter 4 – Virginia Woolf and Depression ................................................................................. 63 
 
 Virginia Woolf and Depression ........................................................................................ 63 
 Woolf in The Context of Psychoanalysis .......................................................................... 71 
 
Chapter 5 – Letters to My Imaginary Virginia Woolf .................................................................. 78 
 
 Letter 1 – ‘For They Know Not What They Have Lost’ ................................................... 80  
 Letter 2 – ‘For We Think Back Through Our Mother’ ..................................................... 99  
 Letter 3 – ‘Thinking Back Through My Mother’ ............................................................ 117  
 Letter 4 – ‘From Instinct to Self’ .................................................................................... 126  
  
Chapter 6 – From Freud to Klein to Fairbairn, a Conclusion  .................................................... 148 
 









Chapter One, an Introduction  
 
This doctoral thesis is rooted in psychoanalytic thinking. It is about theories that 
enable a close understanding of depression with an unconscious origin. Through making 
personal engagements with the psychoanalytic perspectives developed into the 
distinctive Freudian, Kleinian, and Fairbairnian lines of thought, I bring into focus the 
limitations of the Freudian and Kleinian theories, and the potential of Fairbairnian object 
relations theory in reconceptualising the nature of depression. The theoretical trajectory 
takes off from Freud, to Klein, and finally culminates with Fairbairn. I agree with Ogden 
(1989), who points out that it is not only impossible to appreciate Klein’s work without 
having understood Freud’s work, but it is also impossible to understand Freud without 
having read Klein’s work because Klein’s theory expands and realizes some of the 
potentials that were latent in the Freudian theory. Following Ogden’s argument, I 
contend that the same could be said of Fairbairn; that it is impossible to understand the 
full implications of what he has achieved, the potential for understanding human 
psychology his theory brings, without first looking into what Freudian-Kleinian instinct 
theory has established.  
Ronald Fairbairn (1889-1964) spent his life working in the geographically 
remote position of Edinburgh from the then central psychoanalytical community in 
London. This geographical isolation enabled him to stand against the mainstream 
Freudian formulations and form his own unique thinking (Pereira & Scharff, 2002: 1-2). 
Fairbairn was a rare psychoanalytical theorist who radically rethought and extended 
Freudian theory beyond what the dominant psychoanalytical climate of the time could 
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allow. For almost half a century Fairbairn remained relatively unknown (Birtles & 
Scharff, 1952: xi) 
On the subject of depression, Fairbairn initially took his theoretical departure 
from Melanie Klein, and inherited Klein’s ideas of “positions”(paranoid-schizoid, 
depressive) and internalized objects (Rubens, 1994: 151). This influence from the 
classical Kleinian thinking gradually became faint in the face of increasingly 
irreconcilable divergences. Even though Fairbairn had not devoted himself to developing 
his own theory of depression I believe that his original theoretical formulations, such as 
“object-relatedness” (1946) and “endopsychic structure” (1944), have the potential to 
grow into a unique line of thought on depression, as they have proved to be important 
and crucial in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking on psychic process and defence. 
Rubens (1994, 1998), who was the first scholar to extend Fairbairn’s theory in 
reconceptualising the phenomenon of depression, puts forward a Fairbairnian 
understanding of depression that was never taken further by Fairbairn himself. In this 
thesis I largely draw from contributions made by Rubens (1994, 1998). Even though 
Rubens gives a new theoretical take on depression from a Fairbairnian perspective, he 
did not provide illustrations via case examples, subjective accounts or applications that 
demonstrated how this extension could be highly valuable. In addition, he did not 
contextualize this extension of Fairbairnian depression with the core arguments 
developed by Freud and Klein, which I believe is important both in arguing for the 
uniqueness and strength of a Fairbairnian lens into depression as well as calling into 
question the Freudian and Kleinian frameworks. In addressing these issues, my thesis 
seeks to produce knowledge by answering the questions: what can an extended 
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Fairbairnian understanding offer to the psychoanalytic knowledge of depression that 
contests the Freudian and Kleinian understanding, and what would a Fairbairnian 
understanding of depression look like?  
Drawing attention to the place of depression in the theoretical understanding 
developed by Freud, Klein, and Fairbairn, I present the visions they each have of 
depression and establish a coherent thread of theoretical arguments by elucidating 
controversies within the psychoanalytic knowledge of depression. Within the historical 
context I emphasise the divergences there have been in the development of their theories 
and shine light on the Fairbairnian way of thinking on human psyche. Seeing 
psychoanalytic theory as inseparable from the subjective practice of meaning making 
(Ogden, 1990; Schafer, 1992; Bondi, 2013), the theoretical explorations in the research 
process encompass a subjective engagement with the theory through which I explored 
the full meanings of the theoretical implications of the Freudian, Kleinian, and 
Fairbairnian depression in the context of my life experiences. To bring theory to life I 
use a personal voice, contextualising the theory through my own lived experiences and 
witnessing how personal meanings and self-knowledge evolve in the course of living the 
theory. Arthur Frank’s (2013) statement that “theory awaits further living and the stories 
of those lives” (xxi) underlines how I use, and relate to, the theory in this thesis.  
A significant element of my personalising of theory is represented by the process 
of ‘constructing’ an imaginary Virginia Woolf as my companion in inquiry. The purpose 
of this is two fold: firstly, it enables a creative imaginative dialogue through which to 
undertake a psychoanalytic exploration with another person, a ‘sister soul’ with whom I 
empathised, valuing the resemblances between our life experiences, position in our 
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families as daughters, and the shared experiences of depression. Secondly, it is to 
enliven the historical context of the marginalisation of Fairbairn in the time of Woolf 
and Fairbairn. Woolf’s highly ambivalent attitude towards psychoanalysis, compounded 
by a personal distaste of Freud and Freudian psychoanalysis, lent poignancy to my 
recognition of her attempts to probe into her past and her depression, as it signified a 
potentiality that she was searching beyond Freud. Woolf’s intimate yet troubled 
relationship with psychoanalysis is examined to foreground what kindled a desire within 
me for an imaginative dialogue with her. 
Drawing from Woolf’s written texts, her novels, autobiographical work, diaries 
and personal letters, and the biographies of her life, I construct a version of Virginia 
Woolf using imagination founded on factual information about Virginia Woolf. I 
intentionally blur the boundary of the real Woolf and my imaginary Woolf, troubling the 
edge of reality and fantasy of what is constructed internally. In the theoretical dialogue 
with my imaginary Woolf, we explore theory in the contexts of personal experiences, 
subjectively re-examining what the Freudian, Kleinian, and Fairbairnian theory 
contended as the nature of depression. Re-stating the research aim, I seek to illustrate a 
subjective vision of the Fairbairnian depression as personally relevant distinct from the 
Freudian and Kleinian systems. Beyond that, the more general aim I have in mind is to 
establish a place for Fairbairn in on-going psychoanalytic debates on depression. By 
looking to explore the potential of Fairbairn’s work I do not wish to privilege Fairbairn’s 
theory. Rather I wish to illustrate that his theory can provide invaluable insights and an 
alternative understanding to Freud and Klein’s much better known theories in 
understanding depression. The intrinsic originality of this thesis lies in the juxtaposition 
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of my performative evocation of Fairbairn’s theory and the personal reflexive voice with 
which the theoretical implications are illustrated. Moreover, it is also in my creative 
construction of an imaginary Virginia Woolf as my partner in inquiry with whom I 
embodied a relational approach to allow expressions of subjectivity and personal 
agencies, as opposed to positioning Woolf as an object of study.  
 
The origin of the interest in this research sprouts from a personal desire to search 
for a psychoanalytic understanding of my depression. The knowledge that I sought to 
produce in this thesis was highly subjective, as I engaged with psychoanalytic theory 
through self-reflection. Reflecting alongside psychoanalytic theory opened up for me a 
deep interest in the psyche, synchronizing with an interest to read Virginia Woolf, who 
explored the complexities of the inner world through her fictional creations. From 
reading her novels, I recognized the inner horrors brought about by familial, historical 
and personal distress intertwined with the issues of selfhood and identity. Like Lily 
Briscoe, in To The Lighthouse, who gravitated towards the Madonna of the maternity 
Mrs Ramsey, yet was conflicted also by a need to protect her individuality and not be 
lured onto the same path. Like Rachel Vinrace in The Voyage Out, who came to meet 
the world for the first time and develop her opinions through the people she met on the 
voyage out to South America, only to find her voice constantly shut out from the male-
dominated world in which her untimely death at the end, perhaps, communicated an 
impossibility for her to go on existing. Like Septimus Warren Smith in Mrs Dalloway, a 
severely damaged veteran who despaired in isolation, chose death as his final destiny to 
 11 
protect the ownership and dignity of his life. Woolf’s novels provided me with a 
doorway into the inner lives hidden underneath the symptoms.  
As a reader I participated in these stories and enriched the un-written by 
projecting my own thoughts and feelings onto the characters in a transferential manner. 
As a psychotherapist, I found the characters profoundly moving and could not help but 
be absorbed in their maddening chaos, helpless confusion about lives, and a search for 
ultimate resolutions to their struggles. Intrigued as I was by her characters, I went on to 
read about Woolf’s life, and the strangest feeling dawned on me: Woolf and I, across 
generations, have orbited around a similar inner universe, that we were different yet the 
same, each burdened by the vicissitudes of loss, of being a daughter, of an extreme 
difficulty of finding a place of one’s own. Reading Woolf, I found myself also 
recollecting what I had lost, the memories that I have long forgotten, the multiple selves 
in the past that encountered the similar dilemmas engendered by the uncertainties 
between self and others, between love and hate, and, to put it psychoanalytically, how 
our old horrors were integrated into present wanting and shadowed future hope.  
Although my life experience is not identical to that of Woolf there are thematic 
similarities that lend themselves to being examined together, insomuch as she and her 
characters seek to probe into, to work through, the unresolved sense of loss situated in 
the tapestry of their most intimate relationships. Woolf’s life stories put mine in 
perspective, and I realized that reading others’ lives helps us to see aspects of our own 
that we had not noticed or previously considered. So I am aware that my transferential 
feelings in reading Woolf derive not only from purely an aesthetic experience, but from 
several personal identifications with her. In the process of becoming emotionally 
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immersed in my study of Virginia Woolf’s life and engaging her as an imaginative 
partner in this inquiry, a sense of there being an empathetic bond between us permeated 
into the imaginative dialogue. Within this empathetic bond, albeit imaginative, the deep-
seated insecurity in writing about my depression was alleviated by a sense of 
participating in something shared with Virginia Woolf. 
Using what we have in common in terms of life history, I weave together a 
theoretical study of Woolf’s depression with a study of mine, in a reflexive and personal 
way. Attending to history, I address our differing responses to the psychoanalytic theory, 
which unnerved and, at times, anguished Woolf but stimulated insights for me and 
helped me in making sense of my depression. Valuing her knowledge of herself and her 
personal agency, I do not to seek to “analyse” or “examine” her as a subject of study 
from a third person perspective or an authoritative stance, but to relate to her and to 
engage her, using what we have in common to enable resonance and mutual 
identification. I engage with Virginia Woolf, in order to engage readers who might 
already know Freud and Klein, but are interested to know what Fairbairn can offer our 
thinking of depression.  
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. The second chapter, entitled 
“Constructing a Psychoanalytic Dialogue with My Imaginary Virginia Woolf”, explains 
how I came to make my methodological choices for examining and contextualizing the 
issues that this thesis raises and engages. I also seek to justify why I think that the 
performative methodology, that of writing letters to a fictionalized Woolf, was the best 
means of evoking the theory.  
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The third chapter titled “Depression Within Psychoanalytic Perspectives: From 
Freud, Klein, to Fairbairn”, presents a close reading of the Freudian, Kleinian and 
Fairbairnian frameworks of depression. I start with Freud in the spirit of establishing the 
context for subsequent debates. For this reason I present a Kleinian account next, then 
turn to Fairbairn’s contributions, drawing attention to differences from what Freud and 
Klein had proposed.  
In the fourth chapter I introduce Virginia Woolf and her depression and provide a 
brief biography to give some insights into her lifelong experience of depression, her 
relationship with her depression, and my understanding of it. I also introduce the 
historical scenes of Woolf’s relationship with psychoanalysis, which in her time was the 
heyday of Freudian and Kleinian psychoanalysis in London, with Fairbairn far away in 
Scotland. This is important not only for the historical context it provides for her 
relationship with psychoanalysis but also for understanding the progression of the letters 
that I write to her. The purpose of this is to enable me to further strengthen the rationale 
and the aim of my doctoral thesis within the literature of psychoanalysis. 
The fifth chapter, “Letters to Virginia Woolf” consists of four letters I write to 
Virginia Woolf. Before every letter I provide a short introduction that gives a historical 
context to what she has gone through in a specific phase of life. The historical contexts I 
provide also set the theme for the letters. My first letter, “For They Know Not What 
They Have Lost”, engages with Freudian concepts of depression where my analysis of 
Woolf and personal reflections are made through the Freudian theory of depression. The 
second letter, “For We Think Back Through Our Mother” explores the Kleinian account 
of depression whilst looking into the hidden themes in Woolf’s most autobiographical 
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novel, To The Lighthouse. In this letter I present explorations around the theoretical 
divergence between Klein and Freud. The third letter, “Thinking Back Through My 
Mother” foregrounds my personal reflections on Kleinian theory and the theoretical 
insights I gain from it. I conclude this letter by arguing that my narratives cannot be 
contained within the Freudian-Kleinian drive theory and my search must continue.  The 
fourth and final letter, “From Instinct to Self”, centres Fairbairn’s theory whilst I present 
the controversies between instinct theory and object relations theory. In this letter I let 
Fairbairn’s theory impact my understanding of what I have come to learn about my past 
and depression through Freud and Klein’s work. Herein I expand and enrich the context 
of how I have come to find Fairbairn’s object relations theory as the most helpful 
framework for understanding my depression and that of Woolf’s.  
The sixth chapter, “From Freud to Klein to Fairbairn, a Conclusion”, provides a 
summary where I review what I have learned from Freud, Klein and Fairbairn in relation 
to depression. This chapter reaffirms the arguments I have made about the necessity to 
reframe depression from the Fairbairinian object relations theory and to understand it as 
an organized defence against loss and change. I use an extract of Virginia Woolf’s 
suicide note to her husband to further support my argument. Finally I recount what I 








Constructing a Psychoanalytic Dialogue with My Imaginary Virginia Woolf 
 
In the first part of this chapter I explain how I came to settle on a performative 
presentation of my theoretical engagement in this thesis. In the second part I clarify my 
position as a researcher in relation to psychoanalytic theory and to Woolf in my making 
use of them. I explain the methodological rationale for dialoguing with the imaginary 
Woolf in addressing the research questions, and elaborate on the process of constructing 
my imaginary Woolf. I also explain how the letters were composed within which 
specific theoretical perspectives were integrated. The third part of this chapter gives 
further information regarding the particular phase of Woolf’s life that I chose for the 
task of engaging her in a psychoanalytic dialogue. The final part discusses ethical 
considerations informing this thesis. 
 
Performing Psychoanalytic Theory 
As I outlined in the previous chapter, this doctoral thesis seeks to explore a 
Fairbairnian understanding of depression in the contested territory of psychoanalytic 
knowledge. Through the process of surveying relevant psychoanalytic literature, I 
recognized the limited amount of engagement with Fairbairn compared to Freud and 
Klein (which I will elaborate in chapter three). I came to see that in the realm of 
psychoanalysis, some views and theorists tended to be more referenced and engaged in 
addressing a certain psychological reality, for example depression, than others. 
Compared with Freud and Klein, Fairbairn’s theory suffered a marginalization on the 
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subject of depression, leading to a minimal application and consideration in practice. 
This influence has persisted beyond his time. It would not be truthful if this part of the 
history was left out of the discussions, nor would it be plausible to justify my rationale 
of promoting a Farbairnian understanding of depression without giving the background 
on why Fairbairn had less of an audience. So in my research I sought to shine light on 
how and why Fairbairn became less known and the consequences of it since his time.  
But even though I found Fairbairn’s work useful in self-reflection, I also kept in 
mind to not make the same mistake that Fairbairn himself made, some half a century ago, 
when he had presented his theory in an arcane and tedious writing style that partly 
contributed to the lack of appreciation or understanding of his ideas (this was a point 
raised by Mitchell, 2000: 80; re-iterated by Celani, 2010: 210). The presentation of a 
theory can determine how well it is engaged with. Difficult or obtuse writing can prevent 
understanding and so impede a wider diffusion. This was the case with Fairbairn, who 
was not an accomplished writer like Freud (Whelan, 2014), or a celebrated writer like 
Virginia Woolf. Musing on ways that could allow me to transform the dry prose of 
Fairbairn’s theory into a more engaging piece of writing, I considered the possibility of a 
more performative way of evoking the theory. My wish is to beckon a confluence of 
theoretical and emotional engagements in my readers, rather than being stifled by 
Fairbairn’s writing. Psychoanalytic theory, which acknowledges ‘the unconscious’, 
abounds with potential for a performative expression of ‘exposing, challenging, and 
performing the repressed and supressed experience’ (Garoian, 1999: 101). I contend that 
Fairbairn’s theory is particularly imbued with the performative potential, as his original 
theory of the endopsychic structures (Fairbairn, 1944) conjure the psychological drama 
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of the interplay of internalised objects and repressed aspects of self. However, to its 
great disadvantage, it was not realised or fulfilled by Fairbairn himself in his 
presentation of his theory. Performing theory through a theoretical dialogue with my 
imaginary Virginia Woolf in the format of letters became my strategy to evoke the 
theory.  
I was drawn towards a method of performative presentation of theoretical 
engagement by my reading of Sophie Tamas’ (2011), Life After Leaving: The Remains 
of Spousal Abuse, where Tamas brings her personal narratives into imaginative 
conversations with various authors and researchers and so constructs the meanings of the 
spousal abuse she experienced. Aligning with the advantage of such a method, I 
presented theory in a performative style and in a reflexive voice, as if the letters to 
Virginia Woolf were constructed after my theoretical dialogues with Freud, Klein, and 
Fairbairn. The letters became “a site of transformation” (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000: 
41), tracing how my understanding of depression evolved, and through them I 
established a line of theoretical argument about depression by treading through the 
claims of Freud and Klein before turning to the Fairbairnian version of object relations 
theory. Although, unlike Tamas (2011), I did not present the theories in a flow of 
conversations, out of a consideration that some discourse carried more power than the 
others, and in the case of my selection of the theorists, I felt Freud, the father of 
psychoanalysis, would most certainly overpower Fairbairn. This underrepresenting 
Fairbairn’s work would then defy the purpose of my promoting Fairbairn from his 
neglect. Engaging with Fairbairn in a dialogue, I made space for his theoretical 
comments to flow unrestrainedly as I attentively considered them. This could be seen as 
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my way of paying tribute to Fairbairn, to prevent, in this thesis, his theory from falling 
victim to the hierarchy of power within the psychoanalytic community. 
Coming to understand the historical context of the lack of engagement with 
Fairbairn’s work, I considered how I could animate this part of the history in my inquiry 
in a truthful and engaging way. The possibilities of inviting Virginia Woolf (who 
witnessed the climate of the psychoanalytic politics at the time), into my theoretical 
dialogues felt like an effective way to do so. As I outlined in the introduction, I 
recognized that on top of the shared experience of depression, the differences between 
Wolf and myself remained that her own theoretical engagement did not go beyond the 
instinct theory proposed by Freud and Klein, whilst I take issue with instinct theory and 
find Fairbairnian object relations theory more personally relevant and helpful in 
reflecting my depression. Furthermore, Woolf’s own accounts of her psychoanalytic 
encounter enabled me to glimpse into what it was like to speak to Freud in person, to sit 
next to Klein and hear her talk (this part of the context will be provided in chapter four). 
It also helped me understand why psychoanalytic engagement had been a wounding 
experience for her. The possibilities of engaging Woolf creatively in a psychoanalytic 
dialogue appealed to me as I imagined a different story if I could transport Fairbairn’s 
work to Woolf, which she had never engaged with or possibly heard of. I embraced the 
idea, through my reading of Tamas’ (2011), that dialogues could be imaginative, but still 





The Wounded Storyteller and Story-listener 
Psychoanalytic theory is embedded in the interpretations of intimate personal 
experiences and should not be treated as generalised truth claims (Guntrip, 1971; Bondi 
& Fewell: 2016). Psychoanalytic theory finds its relevance through personal contexts 
that were once lived through, embodied and experienced subjectively and intimately. In 
this thesis, theory provides a way of thinking, and a language of telling, the most 
complex of all stories about the internal world alienated from the self once “unsayable 
and unavailable for the telling” (Speedy, 2008: xiv). What could not immediately be 
made sense of, such as depression, found a home in psychoanalysis, where it could be 
understood, contained, and transformed.  
As mentioned in the introduction, my motives for undertaking this research about 
depression and my motives for taking issue with the lack of engagement with Fairbairn, 
were deeply rooted in a personal reflection catalysed by psychoanalytic theory. 
Exploring theory experientially through story-telling and narration was my way of 
addressing the research questions, which seek to explore an extended Fairbairnian 
understanding of depression and the unique perspective it could provide. Interpreting my 
depression in the theoretical threads Freud, Klein, and Fairbairn orchestrated, I traced 
the transformation of my own understanding of the nature of depression and established 
a line of theoretical argument about depression.  
This works in the same spirit as Frank’s (2013) argument in The Wounded Story-
teller: Body, Illness, and Ethics, that theory not only affords elaborations of personal 
stories, but also in turn being shaped and lived by personal lives. This thesis’ 
relationship with theory takes a similar approach in that it uses theory to elaborate the 
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personal experiences of depression that did not immediately make sense, enlivening the 
theoretical implications through personal reflections. I echo Frank (2013) that, “theory 
awaits further living and the stories of those lives” (ibid: xxi). In addition, Frank (2013) 
offered a reassuring validation for me of the difficulties in recapturing one’s emotional 
landscape through theory, which I came face to face with in the process of authoring a 
subjective account of depression. Mainly this was because my experience of depression 
bore limited distance from my current position of telling it, as it happened only a few 
years ago. Approaching it still made palpable a certain sense of rawness of my 
psychological wound. Theory may have offered me a theoretical language with which I 
could begin to describe; it did not promise emotional security in my giving voices to 
some of the messiest feelings and chaos intrinsic in my lived experience of depression. 
Theory allowed me to make meanings out of the chaos, but it did not promise the safe 
distance that I needed to re-claim chaos and the emotional turbulence in the wake of the 
“ontological instability of subjecthood” (Stanley, 2013: 11) aroused by the researcher’s 
position of enacting both the analytical self and the story-telling self. 
Depression harbours a space for what Frank (2013: 98) terms, “anti-narrative”, in 
that it brought about an ontological impasse because its indissoluble complexities of 
unconscious origin suspended the coherence in the telling of a psychoanalytic tale about 
depression. Writing about depression is an excruciating demand on the emotional level. 
It entailed the process of juggling the tasks of interpreting the subjective truth and 
research ethics of avoiding demonizing the significant relationships inseparable from the 
dynamics of inner life. Consequently I felt prohibited by the internal censor going over 
every sentence I had written about my significant others. Despite being guided by Freud, 
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Klein and Fairbairn in understanding depression, the universe of theoretical logic and 
reasoning alone did not provide me with emotional “holding” (Winnicott, 1990[1960]). I 
realised then I needed a different kind of reassurance beyond the help of theoretical 
knowledge.  
In order to explore the territory of my inner life mapped by the theoretical 
trajectory I have drawn from engaging with Freud, Klen, and Fairbairn, to ‘walk the talk’ 
as a “wounded story-teller” (ibid: 98), I needed the reassurance of there being someone 
who could share my experiences and receive me to feel “less alone” (Frank, 2013: xi). 
“To tell one’s stories, one needs others’ stories”, as Frank puts it (ibid). Searching for 
“others’ stories” (ibid) became necessary for me to feel less alienated and isolated so I 
could gather the strength to bring myself out of the insecurity of my own story waiting 
to be told through theory. Searching for others’ stories led to the encounter with Virginia 
Woolf, who had never spoken publicly about her depression but only found the freedom 
to do so through her fictional creations or in the private space of her diary. In reading 
Virginia Woolf’s life I became a witness to the durability of Virginia Woolf’s early 
traumatic relationships. In deep resonance, I found myself wanting to get to know Woolf 
as a person, to talk to her, and to share with her the theoretical insights I have gained 
through reflecting alongside psychoanalytic theory especially Fairbairn’s work, which 
she had never encountered. I let that desire take over me and constructed an imaginary 
Virginia Woolf, as it was not realistic to meet Woolf, to be my companion in inquiry 
with whom I entered into a dialogical relationship. This allowed a dialogical interplay 
with my imaginary Woolf in which I shared my theoretical reflections with her as a way 
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of evoking the emotional depth of theory and painting a subjective illustration of a 
Fairbairnian depression. 
In the course of this research, I came to know, identify and empathise with my 
imaginary Woolf and formed an empathetic bond with her. Therefore, to make it clear, 
the Virginia Woolf that I engaged with was the Virginia Woolf of my mental creation 
whom I had access to and who I brought to life through a reflective grasp of Woolf’s 
published texts that remained available for the subjective interpretation in the wake of 
“the death of the author” (Barthes, 1967; citied in Gallop, 2011), combined with the 
biographical information that I felt relevant to this study. My engagement with Woolf’s 
published texts embraced the poststructuralist premise, which Barthes (1967) proposed, 
that it is not the author who speaks to the readers, but the text itself. The possibility of 
turning the author, Virginia Woolf in this case, from the non-fictional figure who 
belongs to the past, to a fictional figure who lives in the present, was liberated by the 
death of the author. In addition, by ‘creating’ my imaginary Woolf I do not mean make 
up things that cannot be located in a historical context. My construction of Woolf was 
based in a blurring of the boundary between the real Woolf and my imaginary Woolf, 
who would still be the Virginia Woolf that was born in the post-Victorian time of 1882, 
and died in the midst of the Second World War and the possibilities of changes in 1941. 
My approach of creating an imaginary Virginia Woolf for a theoretical dialogue 
aligned with Susie Orbach’s (1999) method in The Impossibility of Sex, where Orbach 
offered engaging psychoanalytic tales of her therapeutic encounters with the ‘imaginary 
clients’ that she fictionalised using materials of her real clients. Those encounters may 
not have happened, but the “emotional truths" (Orbach, 1999: 196-7) and theoretical 
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reflections arising from the process of engaging with her fictional clients, nonetheless, 
represents an authentic experience of her being a psychotherapist that she seeks to 
convey to her readers. Troubling the edge of reality and fantasy, the process of my on-
going engagement with my imaginary Virginia Woolf in a dialogue opened up, as Harris 
(1992: 131) conceptualised in a Winnicottian sense, a ‘potential space’ in which self and 
the not-me subject object (transitional object) could be creatively explored in the holding 
presence of another person (Harris, 1992: 131; italics added). In order for the theoretical 
dialogue to progress, I imagined it to be a dialogical collaboration founded on trust and 
relationship where my imaginary Virginia Woolf resonated with my experience and 
reflections. My creation of the imaginary Woolf was inevitably ‘omnipotent’, essentially 
motivated by my “wishes, needs, defences, assumptions, biases, and everything else” 
(Coen, 1982: 12) as a researcher. 
As a psychotherapist I am highly sceptical of how far an onlooker can explore 
into the inner tensions of the person who lived through the despair of depression. I 
believe, on the contrary, that it is relational intimacy and empathy rather than a distant, 
authoritarian stance that can eventually open up a close understanding of the unresolved 
relational conflicts the person has been through and the present paradox experienced by 
the person. This informed the way I engaged with my imaginary Virginia Woolf which 
was by positioning myself as an intimate, a close other who was ready to relate to her, to 
hear attentively what she had left out unsaid, and to also reciprocate with her by telling 
her my own experiences of depression and life stories, as someone who knew enough 
about the strains of depression on the person and their relationships. Bearing in mind 
that relationships matter from Fairbairn’s view, I took a first person perspective in my 
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dialogue with Woolf that would allow me to relationally engage her, rather than 
analysing her in an authoritarian way, hence risk intruding into her understanding of the 
self. Also, based on my knowledge of Woolf, I was aware that an authoritative voice 
wouldn't have allowed my comments to reach her heart but only to cause further 
resistance towards psychoanalysis.  
Dialogue embedded in the context of psychoanalytic theory relies primarily on 
the “capacity for interpretation” (Ogden, 1990: 3; italics added). Ogden (ibid) sees 
interpretation as a transformative process of creating new meanings in the retrieval of 
the alienated self-experiences or thoughts. In this thesis, the dialogue transpired in two 
ways; firstly, in dialoguing theoretically between instinct theory (Freud, Klein) and 
object relations theory (Fairbairn) on the nature of depression, I closely examined their 
arguments in constructing my own reflective comments by virtue of personal 
interpretations of their theory. This, then, enabled me to establish a line of theoretical 
argument I was to illustrate through an intersubjective dialogue with Virginia Woolf. I 
explored the meanings and the truthfulness of my theoretical interpretations in the 
frames of life experiences shared between us, and my private, yet alienated, psychic 
reality could come to light and be re-claimed into self-knowledge.  
The process of dialogue also helped me to recognize the importance of dialogue 
itself, in that it generated a venue where personal voice can be empowered and a sense 
of participation strengthened (Phillips, 2011: 11). The sense of participation with my 
imaginary Woolf enabled a reflective distance for the practice of “I observe me” (Ogden, 
1990: 128), as the dialogue was composed out of a joined reality, albeit fictional, where 
two narratives merged, two subjectivities intersected. Engaging in a theoretical dialogue 
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with my imaginary Woolf from a place of intersubjectivity created an atmosphere of 
safety and intimacy that led me to recapturing the internal dimension of the lost and 
found where lodges the estranging pieces of self transiently but not irretrievably lost 
touch with through repression. The felt sense of relationship that I was able to feel with 
my imaginary Woolf lifted temporarily “the veil of repression” (Lomas, 2000: 97) from 
the obscure resistance of externalizing the innermost struggles by virtue of what that 
process might bring.  
 
Katie Gentile’s (2013) work Creating Bodies: Eating Disorders as Self-
Destructive Survival, takes off in a similar direction: through the course of her 
interpreting the diaries of her subject, Hannah, she became aware that her own narratives 
became subsumed by Hannah’s penetrating narratives. She realized in Hannah’s text she 
was encountering herself, the unexamined selves residing in the unconscious. The 
emotional impact from engaging with her subject led her to make autobiographical 
disclosure of her past,  
Both Hannah’s texts and my texts provided a space within which to create 
transitional bodies that were neither inner or outer, self nor other, mind nor body. 
[…] As I watched her create time, I learned to create it by theorizing it in the 
analysis. She literally pulled me along (pp. 7) 
 
 
In Gentile’s work, I saw enrichment to both stories as they relied on each other to 
give rise to a greater transparency, by means of bringing together the subject’s diaries, 
Gentile’s subjective interpretations of them, and her own reconceptualization of her 
personal narrative as she was ‘pulled along’ by Hannah into a joint reality where she 
greatly let her guard, censorship, and prohibition down. This made it possible for Gentile 
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to look into, start telling and analysing the shared dimension of their life experiences. 
Embodying intersubjectivity in the dialogical process with my imaginary Woolf, “I 
claimed to know something about Virginia Woolf, and in this knowing I take her over, 
claiming to “know” what happened in the diaries, to know what was best for her at 
times”1. 
Furthermore, my appreciation of Virginia Woolf’s in novels offered me an 
interpretive glimpse into what could be said of her most hidden emotions around her 
significant relationships through her fictional creations. Woolf’s writing style of stream 
of consciousness exemplifies that fictions can provide a doorway into the writer’s inner 
landscape, an argument several others have made (c.f. Abel, 1989; Panken, 1987; Briggs, 
2005). As such, I decided to integrate one of her novels in my letters to my imaginary 
Virginia Woolf. I chose To The Lighthouse with which to make in-depth engagement not 
only because it exemplifies Woolf’s writing style but it also represents an important 
work for Woolf, which she acknowledged as having the greatest personal meanings to 
her (Wolf & Wolf, 1979: 37). As a semi-autobiographical novel, it captured an 
unfolding series of moments and transitions in the drama of Woolf’s family life and 
provided a rich text for the psychoanalytic retelling to accentuate their psychological 
significances. Moreover, my reading experience of the novel was emotional, as I found 
my feelings entangled in the process of getting to know Lily Briscoe’s life, whose 
                                                
1 This sentence is adapted from Gentile (2007: 12), as it captured perfectly what I 
wanted to say about my own connection with Virginia Woolf. The original passage 





narratives called back to my mind some very primitive mental contents that were self-
alienated and made them available to reflect upon. Being shaken by Lily’s psychological 
turbulence was messy but it was reciprocal. My third letter to Virginia Woolf, which 
explored my relationship with my mother, was composed after I had looked into 
Woolf’s relationship with her mother through inspecting the relevant themes in her 
novel, To The Lighthouse.  
 
Compositionally I structured my story to mirror Woolf’s and let our stories run in 
parallel and unfold together in order to create a sense of shared dimension of space and 
time. This furthered a sense of co-existence and co-construction in this imaginative 
dialogical collaboration. I divided Woolf’s life into three phases marked by significant 
events of losses, which changed her immediate relational landscapes – losses of her 
mother then of the mother figure. The latter compounded the loss of the mother.  The 
last phase was the loss of the father. I then composed a series of letters tailored to these 
specific times in her life that accorded best with thematic elements of the Freudian, 
Kleinian, and Fairbairnian theories that were addressed in each letter. These three phases, 
although all interconnected, were chosen as they provided contexts to show how 
Virginia Woolf responded psychologically to them through intense episodes of 
depression. Those phases witnessed her “living the chaos” (Frank, 2013: 98) and 
foregrounded the letters that I wrote to Woolf in addressing the internal landscape 
psychoanalytically. 
Rose (1978) titled her study of Woolf, Woman of Letters, signifying the 
importance of letters in Woolf’s life. My decision to present the fictional dialogue in the 
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format of letters was out of respect for Woolf and was in keeping with her time and how 
a communication with her would have likely been received. The advantage of letters as a 
means of communication is that it allows space for reflection. There is time for 
reflections and for the narratives to develop between sender and recipient. Moreover, the 
space the letters created in time allowed for a negotiation with Virginia Woolf in 
discussing theories of psychoanalysis, something that she was hesitant about. This ties in 
with some of the themes of this thesis, which revolve around the need for theoretical 
retrospection on our inner lives. 
My letters to my imaginary Virginia Woolf were written to relate one-side of the 
dialogue so the readers only see my part where I discuss things that she has said or parts 
of her life experiences. The reason for this was to ensure that I did not rob Woolf of 
agency; if I were to give her lines, or reply on her behalf, they would not be her letters 
but rather my suppositions about what she would have said. Instead, I wanted to allow 
the space for the other half of the dialogue to come into life in my readers’ own private 
musing in response to reading the letters. Wherever relevant to the themes, passages of 
Woolf’s work were quoted in the letters in order to make space for her own voices 
reflecting what she has said, in her own account, giving her a voice in the dialogue even 







Sketch of The Past 
The imaginary Woolf that I engaged has just finished her autobiographical 
writings Sketch of The Past (1939) at the age of 57. Sketch of The Past (1939) was 
permeated with an attempt to make the absence of her intimate others (through 
losses/deaths) present, by composing and recounting the autobiographical accounts of 
her early experiences, emotions, and her selfhood in relation to others. She put into 
words her vivid memory of her childhood, took it as a chance to ponder the possible 
connections between her past and the present, in a way similar to the psychoanalytic 
approach of self-analysis. This evidenced that she had some understanding of how 
psychoanalysis works and was attempting to treat herself despite maintaining her 
objection to being analysed by someone else.  
Sketch of The Past led me to believe that at that time she had become intensely 
aware of the significance of the early events and an acute desire to understand them, to 
work through them, and to finally lay them to rest. As it was written and completed late 
in her life, two years before her suicide, the timing of it invited my curiosity that perhaps 
under her well-composed authorial identity laid the pressing force of the unthought 
known (Bollas, 1987) - emotional experiences that have registered and been known 
existentially, but have not yet been cognitively mentalised and linguistically represented. 
Furthermore, in contrast to her early intense objection to Freud’s work, Woolf, at this 
time, showed some appreciation of Freud’s work as she reflected  on her early 
relationships. It was not in her nature to position herself as someone needing help or 
dependent on others for rescue. She resorted to her capacity for self-reflection without 
going into psychotherapy throughout her lifetime, yet Sketch of The Past conveyed as 
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much her longing to be heard, seen, and understood as her need to preserve her 
narratives from intrusion. I chose this phase of Woolf’s life with a belief that she would 
be less resistant and most ready to go into a theoretical dialogue with me than any earlier 
time. Sketch of the Past was not merely a recollection of her important memories but it 
also marked, as Rose (1978) puts it, “a beginning” (p. 17) of framing the narratives of 
the past psychologically.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
Thinking in terms of the ethical concerns this study might invite, as it will be 
open to public scrutiny, I bear in mind that there can be potential harm, albeit not to a 
significant degree, for myself and my close family due to my act of self-disclosure that 
this study relies on. I believe I have sufficiently considered the potential harm this study 
might bring and ways to keep myself, and my close others, safe. This includes making 
sure that all information shared about my life in the thesis are responsibly selected, and 
that I always locate myself in the centre of analysis wherever others are concerned, 
whilst speaking of them with minimum negation of their characters. I am prepared to 
address any concerns my family would have about my thesis due to my disclosure of 
them. I do believe, however, that it is not necessary for me to inform my father, with 
whom I had lost contact, as my thesis accentuates my own psychological experience and 
engage theoretically with ‘the internalised father’ and my psychic interplay with it, and 
not any on-going relationship with my father.  
As the thesis draws from both the published texts and biographical information 
of Virginia Woolf and involves my own interpretations of them, I am aware that her 
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surviving family or estates might have concerns over my use of her materials and my 
interpretations of the events. I am careful to state that this is the Virginia Woolf of my 
imagination, although using real historical materials to inform my views that to the best 






















Depression Within Psychoanalytic Perspectives: From Freud, to Klein, to Fairbairn 
 
This thesis joins the psychoanalytic debates that have been going since the 
beginning of the 20thcentury on the theoretical perspectives introduced by Freud, Klein, 
and Fairbairn, and the divergences between them. Acknowledging that the strength of 
the Fairbairnian understanding of depression cannot be thoroughly appreciated without 
first recognizing Freudian and Kleinian thinking, I instigate theoretical discussions in 
this chapter by comparing and considering the multiple psychoanalytic interpretations of 
the nature of depression proposed by instinct theory and Fairbairn’s object relations 
theory. I chose Freud, Klein, and Fairbairn as the focus of my theoretical debates, and 
presented them in an order of progression, as I believed Klein opened up and extended 
from what Freud has started, as did Fairbairn from Klein. Their original and influential 
insights into human unconscious and psychopathology continue to be debated and much 
extended. 
Through my survey of the literature, I have become convinced that Freud 
represented the all-powerful Father’s view, Klein the all-powerful Mother’s, and 
Fairbairn, the Child’s view (Grotstein & Ramsay, 1994). I anchor my inquiry with their 
works, as collectively, they provide a frame to locate my inquiry in the constellation of 
family. Containing my narratives within their theoretical frameworks enabled me to 
examine the interpersonal matrix webbed between the self, as a child, and the parents, in 
relation to how depression comes into being. It is, however, impossible to include all of 
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the theorists who have offered some helpful thoughts on the subject due to the limitation 
of space and the coherence in the arguments I wish to maintain.  
I will now proceed to outline the detailed abstract of Freud, Klein, and 
Fairbairn’s theory of the psyche and the psychopathology of depression.  
 
Depression in a Freudian System 
Freud’s earliest theoretical input on the psychogenesis of melancholia dates back 
to his paper 1917 paper, Mourning and Melancholia. In this important, Abraham-
inspired2 paper, he compares the general mental features of mourning and melancholia, 
leading to a central argument that both are psychological responses to an object loss, 
despite one being normal and the other pathological. He observes that the pathology of 
depression shares some of the traits of mourning; from there he pursues a compelling 
proposition that there had to be a loss that is suffered by the patient at an unconscious 
level that sets the ground for depression.  
Mourning is the reaction to the loss of a loved person, a loved object; the person 
is consciously aware of what he has lost. The pain of loss is comprehensible to the 
mourning person and the people in their lives. Usually it can easily elicit validation and 
understanding for the emotional reactions triggered by the loss, aiding the person to 
                                                
 
2 Freud’s authorship of “Mourning and Melancholia” in many ways owed due credits to 
Karl Abraham, who made invaluable suggestions to Freud in his writing of the paper. 
Abraham was also the first psychoanalyst to treat manic-depressive patients and 
provided an initial framework for understanding it. Evidence also abounds in their 
correspondence of letters regarding the draft of the paper that Abraham had raised 
questions that proved to be influential to Freud’s thinking on depression (Sánchez-Pardo, 
2003: 28-9; Quinodoz, 2009: 179-180).    
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mourn. However, in melancholia “one cannot see clearly what he has lost” (ibid: 245). 
This is to say, in melancholia there is an unconscious mourning process undergone in 
response to an unknown loss. At the first sight, it can appear that there is not necessarily 
a logical explanation for the onset of melancholia for it is not clear as to what has been 
lost. It can be said that the loss and death experienced by the melancholic are of 
metaphorical nature, belonging to the realm of an unconscious internal world, rather 
than an actual one. In Leader's (2009) words, "if the melancholic does have an idea of 
whom he has lost, he does not know, and perhaps it is this difficulty to see the 
distinction that the mourning process is inhibited" (p. 34). In Freud’s conceptualization, 
melancholia portrays a clinical picture in which a person undergoes psychical mourning 
for what has been unconsciously lost. However, as the loss is of unconscious nature, the 
real mourning cannot take place. It is clear that Freud, up to this point, retained a stark 
and absolute opinion that mourning is either successful or unsuccessful. In a normal case 
mourning comes to a definite termination when the cathartic exhaustion eventually 
liberates the person from the emotional attachment with the lost objects; whereas in 
unsuccessful mourning, the ego’s cathexis on the lost object has been interrupted, 
resulting in a stagnation of the melancholic state (Clewell, 2004). 
If, in the constellation of melancholia, the internal reality and pain of loss does 
not necessarily correspond with the external circumstances, then where can they come 
from? This was the question Freud sought to explain by turning to the repressed internal 
world to theorize what the melancholic has really lost and subsequently mourned for 
unconsciously. He drew the distinction between the mourned object as 'what one has lost 
in them' from 'what one has lost', clarifying that it is the object-tie, or the internal 
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attachment with the object, that has been lost but cannot be mourned. 
His Mourning and Melancholia significantly extends as well as draws from some 
theoretical concepts that he had raised in his earlier paper, On Narcissism: An 
Introduction (1914). I believe a brief recapitulation of On Narcissism can aid the 
understanding of some critical points in Mourning and Melancholia. In On Narcissism 
Freud demonstrated an adherence to the doctrine of instinct theory, resorting to a 
mechanical metaphor to describe the human mind as a “mental apparatus” that seeks to 
channel libidinal energy into a range of outlets, the operation of which is akin to a 
machine seeking to release the pent-up tension. The release of the pressure brings about 
an immediate pleasure and relief. And if the mental energy gets clogged up in the system, 
psychopathology is the end result.  
He spelt out the differentiation between “ego-libido”, an inward investment of 
libido on the ego, and “object-libido”, an outward investment of libido on outside 
objects. Freud suggested that every infant starts in the state of primary narcissism (1914: 
100). Primary narcissism refers to the earliest time of life, during which the infant 
cannot distinguish between her own ego and the external object as they are both 
perceived by the ego as its sole object. Therefore, in the state of primary narcissism, all 
the emotional investment takes the form of ego-libido, directing at oneself. At a later 
developmental stage, the child comes to correctly perceive the object as outside of 
herself and the object-libido can be realistically directed outside at the external object. 
The investment of the ego-libido therefore precedes object-libido.  
In On Narcissism, Freud also brought into discussion a new concept - “the ego-
ideal”, an idea that was to be taken further as the precursor to “super-ego” in his later 
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work3. The ego-ideal is formed through the direct and immediate identification with the 
need-satisfying object, such as a mother’s breasts. In short, it represents the ideal image 
of self that one seeks to become (Freud, 1923: 31; Akhtar, 2009: 89). Engulfed in the 
bliss of primary narcissism, the infant cannot perceive the boundary between ego and 
ego-ideal. What exists within oneself is a symbiotic fusion between the ego and ego-
ideal: the ego-ideal satisfies the ego’s narcissistic desire for perfection, nourishing an 
illusion that the need-satisfying ego-ideal co-exists within itself, as part of herself. That 
is, “I am the source of the nourishment I need”. All the libidinal investment at the stage 
therefore is of ego-libido nature. 
The overcoming of primary narcissism, in terms of developmental progression, 
lies in the gradual recognition and acceptance that the need-satisfying object in fact 
exists independently of the needy self. Mature object-love requires recognition of the 
reality of separation between the loved-object and the self and of a clearly differentiated 
boundary between the ego and the ego ideal (Treurniet, 2009: 79). Whilst Freud 
undoubtedly considered primary narcissism as a normal developmental trajectory, he 
believed that secondary narcissism held the key to the clinical picture of 
psychopathology. Secondary narcissism concerns the failure in overcoming the 
terrifying task of attaining the recognition of the separation between the ego and the ego-
ideal, being unwilling to let go of the omnipotent insistence that one has within oneself 
all one needs and desires. In short, it is a failure to negotiate narcissism into object love.  
                                                
3 As Grunberger (2009) argues, there is still confusion as to whether the concept of 
“ego-ideal” Freud presented in On Narcissism is interchangeable with his later 
conception of “superego”. In his later works they seemed to be used indiscriminately, 
however in this paper ego-ideal did not represent a moral agency as did super-ego (p. 
217-8). 
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Whereas primary narcissism is carried out in the form of non-object relatedness 
as a state to be overcome developmentally; secondary narcissism involves a process of 
the ego shifting away from the object-relatedness, which may be too painful or futile, in 
a neurotic attempt to return to a state of primary narcissism. Freud underlined the 
narcissistic quality of the object relationships in his depressive patients as particularly 
fundamental. In the face of severe disappointments by the loved object, the ego is now 
confronted with the conflict of ambivalence between love and hate towards the same 
loved-object. To Freud, it is the loss of the narcisstically-loved object, the perfection of 
the un-differentiated good object and the ego dyad that lays the mental path for 
depression. He views secondary narcissism as a maneuver of desperation to recover the 
primary narcissism in order to reinvest libidinally in the internalized objects.  
In depression, the loss of the loved object cannot be and should not be 
compensated by the displacement onto a new object, but by resurrecting the loved-object 
inside the ego (Freud, 1923: 29). Through the narcissistic identification with the loved 
object, the loved object becomes introjected into the ego, residing within the 
melancholic. By becoming her loved object, she will never lose them again. She denies 
the otherness of, and the separation from, the loved-object. At the same time she refuses 
to expose herself again to the external risk of more disappointments from the actual 
loved object, whom she loved ambivalently. She withdraws the libidinal investment 
formerly directed towards the external objects and re-invested in the ego, which has now 
stored the perfection of the loved object she desired. In melancholia, the shift from 
object-libido to ego-libido often manifests in the form of a defensive withdrawal from 
people, from the external world.  
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In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud takes an important step in using his idea of 
secondary narcissism in seeking to unravel the logical impasse of the contradictory 
feature of lowering of self-esteem, or impoverishment of the ego, in depression. This 
gives the concept of narcissism a new significance in his studies of psychopathology, as 
well as an important reiteration that narcissism does not equate to self-esteem but marks 
a defensive measure. The introjection of the loved object, however, means that both the 
goodness and the badness of the loved-object are now taken in to the ego. The loss of the 
narcissistically-loved object may have been denied, but the ego is still constantly being 
haunted by the internalized persecutory side of the loved object. Hence, “the shadow of 
the object fell upon the ego” (Freud, 1917: 249). The melancholic’s endless self-
reproaches therefore are, in fact, aimed at the disappointing loved object.  
During his late years, Freud’s theory of depression went through a period of 
revision as he encountered a series of personal tragedies (Lubbe, 2011: 103-5). Several 
years after the completion of Mourning and Melancholia, he returned to the discussion 
of melancholia in The Ego and the Id (1923), where he paid due attention to the concept 
of ‘superego’ in the context of melancholia. Superego, in Freud’s formation, represents 
the critical agency, and he believed that the introjection of the mother during the first 
year of life enters into the formation of the superego (Rosenfeld, 1959: 107). The 
relationship between the ego and the superego resembles the tension of the child under 
the compulsion to obey the parents while in a state of dependence and helplessness 
(Freud, 1923: 48). Freud recognizes that in melancholia, there exists an “excessively 
strong super-ego which has obtained a hold upon consciousness rages against the ego 
with merciless violence” (ibid: 53) In The Ego and the Id, he relates the destructive 
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component entrenched in the superego to the working of the “death instinct”. The super-
ego’s endless condemnation of the ego, in his view, stems from “a pure culture of the 
death instinct, and in fact it often enough succeeds in driving the ego into death” (ibid). 
Freud sought to unravel the question, “how is it then that in melancholia the super-ego 
can become a kind of gathering-place for the death instincts?” (ibid: 54). Freud’s answer 
was that in attempting to control the aggressiveness towards the external world, it 
becomes redirected internally towards the ego. By this Freud means that a transition 
must have happened to cause a more severe expression of what their ego-ideal should be 
in the person, coercing a severe self-critical tone with regard to what their own 
behaviour should be but fails to be. This failure to become the ego-ideal is what brings 
the super-ego in. In effect, the super-ego rules the ego as a higher-being, a punishing 
figure that channels the aggression against the ego for failing to become the idealised 
version of the self. In Freud’s thinking, there are always some elements of hatred 
involved in the relationship with the caregivers. Transferred into the tripartite model, the 
ego keeps secret its hatred towards the superego due to the fear of its higher power. At 
the deeper level, this suggests that what we hate and envy is the same object that we love 
and with whom we identify. This internal conflict between love and hate, which cannot 
be resolved, and is therefore repressed, configures the climate of depression. 
British psychoanalyst Darian Leader (2009), in his book The New Black, largely 
uses Freudian thinking in his clinical work with depressed clients, contending that in 
today’s Britain depression is overly medicalized (pp. 15-7). Leader urges readers to 
think beyond the psychiatric label of depression and to explore its unconscious origin. 
He believes that the phenomenon of depression is intertwined with the psychological 
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structure that influences how the individual responds to the external change. It is 
therefore more of a psychological condition, rather than, as the medical model seeks to 
address, a biochemical disturbance. Grounding himself in the Freudian theory of 
depression, Leader argues that depression is the phenomenon caused by the haunting of 
the unconscious loss, and the symptoms of it are the evidence that the experience of loss 
has been registered psychically, and yet remains unspeakable and unexplored. As the 
experience of loss remains repressed, the actual mourning, which is necessary for the 
working through of the experience, cannot take place. He sees this as the key element in 
the prolonged stagnation of the depressive state. He also maintains the perspective, as 
Freud did, that the loss is not necessarily caused by an actual death, but more often a 
symbolic loss via the cessation of the relationship through estrangement, absence, or 
separation (p. 28). On a deeper level, the cohesion of the sense of self relies on the 
attachment to the lost-object. The internal conflicts between love and hate towards the 
object complicates the meaning of loss to the individual. Leader’s argument is consistent 
to the psychoanalytic view of the human psyche that we are feeling entities even though 
the origin of the unacceptable feelings lies in the unconscious.  
Aggression, or hatred, for instance, is often repressed in the case of depression; 
however, in the economical solution Freud proposed, the blockage of the outlet of the 
aggressive libido due to repression would trigger a misplacement of the aggressive 
libido to reduce the tension felt biologically (pp. 42-4). Leader believes the re-direction 
of the aggressive libido from the lost loved-object towards the ego to be the origin of 
self-reproach (ibid). Leader portrays a Freudian understanding of depression through a 
case: a man has lost his mother, yet is unable to mourn for her death due to the duration 
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and intensity of his unconscious anger towards her. Once he has lost his mother through 
her death, he re-directed the anger at himself with an excuse of his inability to mourn for 
her death. Anger was kept alive in him. His subsequent compulsive weeping was 
interpreted to be the psychical reaction to the loss that could not be acknowledged and 
processed (pp. 48-9). In this case, a traditionally Freudian account of the interplay 
between repression, ambivalence, and displacement of anger from lost-object to self is at 
the core of the interpretation. With reference to the Freudian concepts, Leader argues 
that the difficulties in mourning often do not stem from love but hatred. He believes that 
the main task in recovery from depression lies in transforming the unknown into known 
by a gradual recognition of what has been lost in the person. This would then open up 
possibilities for real mourning to take place.  
To sum up, the Freudian notion of depression is fundamentally a manifestation of 
psychopathology that has to be understood in terms of the libidinal cathexis of both 
narcissistic and aggressive qualities towards the narcissistically identified loved-object. 
In many ways Freudian depression embraces systematic and economic explanations in 
solving the puzzle of melancholia. Loss is central in Freudian depression. To Freud, 
there are three hidden catalysts that propel towards the mental pathway for depression: 
loss of the loved-object, ambivalence, and narcissistic pathology, i.e. a regression into 
primary narcissism. In his building up of the structural picture of the mind, the 
functioning of the unconscious was deemed as the source of mental disturbances. 
Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia proposed an important psychoanalytic 
understanding of the unconscious mourning entailed in depression. It is undoubtedly a 
landmark for the later blossoming of object-relations theory(ies) in the understanding of 
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depression (Ogden, 2002). In addition, his articulation of the notion of the “death 
instinct” and the redirection of aggression towards the ego presented a way of 
understanding the relentless expression of self-reproach in depression as the presence of 
a hyper-punitive super-ego. Many of Freud’s works have shown a beginning kernel of 
the idea of object relations theory, however it has been argued that Freud never fully 
developed a theory of object relations in his subsequent papers (Bergmann, 2009: 4). 
What Freud had started, yet was unable to take further, later theorists like Klein and 



















Depression in a Kleinian System 
In developing her theoretical explanation for depression, Klein largely embraced 
Karl Abraham’s conceptions of it (1911, 1924). In his 1924 paper, Abraham was keen to 
separate different types of mental disorders by locating their fixation points in relation to 
the libidinal development. In Abraham’s view, depression primarily concerns regression 
to the primitive mechanism of the oral-anal sadistic phase in the early libidinal 
development - a point that was assimilated by Freud into his own work, i.e. introjection. 
Abraham compared the clinical features of depression to the infantile management with 
the loved-object in the oral-anal sadistic stage. Insofar as what the child receives from 
the loved-project is gratifying, the sadistic impulse is triggered in order to introject the 
loved-object, symbolizing a cannibalistic impulse of ‘devouring’. However the 
discomfort caused by the loved-object, such as the delay of the gratification, triggered 
the anal-sadistic impulse to expel the loved-object; metaphorically this is done by 
expulsing it anally like faeces.  
Abraham agreed with Freud on the importance of ambivalence towards the 
loved-object in depression. The hostility towards the loved-object is repressed due to 
ambivalence. The repressed hostility generates anxiety and paralyzes the person’s 
capacity for love. Guilt, arisen from the repressed hostility, for the first time came to the 
fore as the leading factor for self-reproach in depression (Rosenfeld, 1959: 105-6). Many 
of Abraham’s ideas had set the theoretical foundation for Klein’s thinking. Furthermore, 
Klein adopted Abraham’s hypothesis that the primal depression of infancy was a 
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precursor to depression in adulthood. Whereas Abraham was unable to further prove 
this hypothesis, Klein provided a fuller clinical demonstration for it (Quinodoz, 2009: 
180).  
Based on her observation of early psychic life, Melanie Klein conceived of 
depression less as a pathological debility than as a normal psychological development 
with its origin in the earliest situation of loss, i.e. weaning, which symbolises the loss of 
mother’s breast. She observed that right from the beginning the infant’s psychic life is 
full of annihilating anxiety and powerful phantasies (Klein, 1923). In Kleinian terms, 
phantasy4, as opposed to fantasy, broadly suggests the unconscious mental processes of 
the inner world. The production of the phantasy is strongly linked to the infant’s bodily 
experience. Infantile phantasy includes every form of thought present in rudimentary 
form, however they are more imaginative and less rational than the word ‘thought’ 
might suggest (Klein, 1923; Isaacs, 1952). Understanding the phantastic nature of the 
infant’s inner world, the mental contents encompass the experience of reality.  
As much importance was given to the concept of phantasy in the core of her analysis of 
the human mental conditions, Kleinian depression is concerned primarily with the role 
of phantasy with internal objects, which are part of the internal world that forms part of 
the identity but differing from what the individual feels that she is  (Likierman, 2001: 
110).  
Klein argues that the capacity for depression is innate, inevitable even in the case 
of the normal limitations of maternal care. It takes departure from the infant’s first 
                                                
4 For a more detailed comparison between Freudian and Kleinian usages of the term, see 
Spillus (2001). 
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awareness of separation from the mother’s breast, culminating at the primitive sense of 
loss in the process of weaning. The mother’s breast, which is the source of nourishment 
and goodness, provides the infant a centre that grounds her in the infantile phantasy life. 
Klein observes that the sudden loss of the connection with the mother’s breast triggers in 
the child a powerful anxiety and destructive phantasies. However, the phantasy to 
sadistically attack the loved-object, namely the mother, also gives rise to the annihilating 
fear of forever losing the goodness of the breast. To Klein, this is the developmental root 
for the sense of guilt5 (Klein, 1940: 125). Klein (1946) regards guilt as a milestone for 
the child’s emotional development (p. 100). 
Klein thinks that an infant is born with readiness to develop object relations and 
to differentiate between good and bad experiences (Klein, 1946: 99). She suggests that 
the nature of an infant’s maternal care, that is the extent of the mother’s presence and 
absence, nurture and privation, builds up an inner world populated with good and bad 
beings in the infant’s psyche (Likierman, 2001: 101). She also believes that, right from 
birth, the infant suffers a great deal of anxiety, mainly concerned with the survival of the 
self. Klein placed anxiety at the central place in her theory, and saw anxiety, or the fear 
of annihilation, as deriving from the working of the death instinct that exists from the 
very beginning of life. Klein uses the term “paranoid-schizoid position” (1946) to refer 
to this state of mind in the infantile psychic life. Initially the mother’s breasts were felt 
to be two separate part-objects - the feeding breast and the content infant constitutes 
                                                
5 Diverging from Freudian Oedipus triangle conceptualization, Klein considered the 
earliest experience of guilt in infancy as the significant Oedipus situation that sets path 
for the moral development, This is much earlier than Freud’s precondition in which 
recognition of a ‘third-person’ develops first.  
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good experience, the good, gratifying object; on the other hand, the withdrawn breast 
and the hungry baby is experienced as the bad, persecuting object in infantile reality. 
This process is termed “splitting” by Klein, and is seen as the central defence 
mechanism that characterizes the paranoid-schizoid position. During the infantile 
paranoid-schizoid position, mothering is critical in determining whether or not the infant 
can gradually give up the paranoid-schizoid anxieties and defences, and proceed 
normally to the next developmental task, working through of the depressive position.  
If mothering is consistently received, the partially recognized good object and 
the bad object will have a chance to gradually come together and “synthesize” (Klein, 
1946). This leads the infant to a painful recognition that both the good object of 
unlimited satisfaction and the bad object of deprivation are in reality the same object, the 
mother. Such recognition marks the transition to the depressive state. The recognition of 
the whole mother brings not only the loss of the perfection of the loved-object, but also 
insufferable psychic pain in the wake of knowing the previously resented bad object was 
the same as the loved-object. This leaves the infant with an unresolved aggression, her 
impotent rage, towards the unforgivable bad object that is now found to be the loved-
object, which gives rise to the depressive position (Klein 1935, 1940). In other words, 
the infant loses both the bad-object, a justifiable target of hostility, and the good-object, 
the perfection of complete goodness. In Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms (1946) 
Klein describes the fluctuation in the ambivalence between love and hate as a normal 
phenomenon and precursor for the depressive state. When the hate prevails, the phantasy 
of destructive attacks on the loved-object fulfils the wish to punish the bad persecutory 
object, and to eliminate it (paranoid-schizoid position); however the subsequent fear of 
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losing the object that she relies on and loves brings about a strong guilt that she has hurt 
the loved-object, triggering an impulse for reparation, to restore the loved-object 
(depressive position). Notably, in the same paper Klein, borrowing Winnicott’s idea of 
optimal environment, also suggests that a consistent experience of mother’s love and 
care is essential to help the child to work into the depressive state by helping her to 
retain a love-hate balance. It should be sufficient to enable her to gradually overcome 
her persecutory fear and establishing a sense of security where the good-object is 
reliably present despite having its limitations (pp. 100-1). It is hence apparent that Klein 
believed in the importance of early mothering as influential to the predisposition to adult 
depression. 
It is clear that Klein (1946) not only suggests that depressive functioning is part 
of every individual’s earliest mental event, but also links the unresolved infantile 
depressive state to depression in later life. The contemporary understanding of Klein’s 
organizations of both schizoid-paranoid position and the depressive position are that 
they both play an important part in the mental constellation as an attempt to cope 
throughout life. It is evident in her writings that Klein, in her making use of the insights 
around ambivalence, introjection, separation of bad and good object, and loss of loved-
object, was influenced by Abraham, particularly his idea of oral fixation and sadistic 
impulses, and by Freud’s formulation of depression in Mourning and Melancholia. 
Where her originality lies, however, is her proposition of the depressive state from the 
angle of the ‘phantasy with the internal objects’, as the central task to overcome during 
the child’s development.  
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Despite her efforts to establish a position as a loyal disciple to Freud, Klein 
demonstrated in her thinking a more Abrahamian line of thought. Her thinking on 
depression suggests that a Freudian understanding of the human psyche as a mental 
apparatus and libidinal principles is far from enough. As Waddel (2002) points out, 
although Klein largely draws from Freud’s instinct theory in developing her own theory, 
her thinking distinctively centres on the states of mind that are characterized by anxieties, 




















Depression in a Fairbairnian System 
As mentioned in the introduction, Fairbairn drew on the ideas of Melanie Klein, 
and inherited Klein’s ideas of paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions and of 
internalized objects in his theory of depression. Over time, however, this influence 
became faint as the divergences between their thinking became irreconcilable. This is 
mainly due to Klein’s lingering adherence to the instinct theory that focuses on the 
libidinal impulses and on the survival of the self, particularly in the terms of the internal 
phantasy, as the end goal. Comparing the differences between Fairbairn and Klein, 
Ogden (2010) notes that Fairbairn consistently emphasizes the primacy of external 
reality and gives the unconscious phantasy a secondary role, whereas for Klein it is the 
opposite6 (p. 103). Fairbairn did not resonate with Klein’s emphasis on the importance 
of the depressive position in her thinking. Rather, he gave the schizoid state much more 
weight in his theory and argued that many diagnosed depressives were in fact 
misdiagnosed schizoids (Fairbairn, 1941: 91). 
One of the significant differences between Klein and Fairbairn’s theory is that 
Fairbairn sees relationships as the basic innate need from birth, and sees object 
relationships as fundamentally interpersonal, and not libidinal (Grotstein & Rinsley, 
1994: 4-5). By putting forward a relational-structure model, which reformed 
psychoanalytical thinking on primal needs of personhood, Fairbairn challenged the long-
                                                
6 Although this contrast appears irreconcilable, Ogden does not see their differences as 
contradictory, but complimentary, in the way that they enable what Bion (1962) refers to 
as a “binocular vision” in evaluating an individual’s clinical presentation (2010: 103). 
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established Freudian drive-structure model, which emphasizes the gratification of 
biologically driven desires (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 151; Rubens, 1998: 215-6). It 
is fair to say that Fairbairn was the first to systematically conceive the concept of the 
development of personality based on a relational-structural model in which the internal 
world is in constant interplay with the external relationships. 
 
He contends,  
What is meant by pleasure-seeking in the classic theory is really relief of 
libidinal tension; but my point is that such tension is inherently the tension of 
object-seeking needs. … The real libidinal aim is the establishment of 
satisfactory relationships with objects; and it is objects that constitute the true 
libidinal goals. (1946: 30-31, italics in original) 
 
Based on this fundamentally different thinking, Fairbairn (1946) understands the 
primal need of the individual as relationship-seeking, or “object-seeking” in Fairbairn’s 
own terms, rather than pleasure-seeking as classical drive theory argues. Moreover it has 
been argued that Fairbairn’s term “object-seeking” is an elusive one. Mitchell (1998), in 
response to Greenberg’s (1991) argument on the subject, suggests that the term object-
seeking does not have any signification understood on its own, as all the 
psychoanalytical theories since Freud depicting human needs as seeking an object. 
Therefore, Mitchell (1998) thinks the question to be addressed should be “what are they 
seeking objects for?”, as it is obvious that the meaning of the term ‘object’ differed for 
each of them in essence (pp. 116). It is therefore necessary to compare the paradigms of 
Freud and Fairbairn on the subject of why an individual seeks objects, and more 
fundamentally, what is the nature of the internalized objects.  
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For Freud, the objects are sought for in order to lessen the libidinal tension 
through discharge or withholding, otherwise understood in the terms of the id driven by 
the pleasure principle. The clinical picture of an individual that Freud portrays is an 
intrinsically impulsive being, seeking immediacy of gratification, as deferred 
gratification brings about insufferable pain and tension. Within Freud’s formulations of 
the economic explanation of the psychic processes, objects are primarily seen as the 
targets towards which the instinct seeks fulfilment, rather than representing the real or 
imaginary relational other7. For Fairbairn, the objects are sought for in order to meet the 
child’s need to establish and maintain relatedness with others (Mitchell, 1998: 66-80). 
Therefore, in Fairbairn’s formulation, objects need to be engaged in a personally 
meaningful way in the relational context. The social dimension of the self and the need 
for relationships with real external objects, was seen as the most crucial need in the 
development of the self in psychoanalytic thinking for the first time. Furthermore, this 
striving for relational contact with others, to Fairbairn, does not equate a libido-driven 
demand, as he does not see pleasure, or gratification of the libidinal demand as the end 
goal, but rather the need to be in relational contacts with others. In this sense a child’s 
emotional life and personality development need to be examined within a wider picture 
of the family, with the central focus being the child’s primary relationships with the 
caretakers. It is in this regard that Fairbairn’s work marks the critical re-orientation of 
                                                
7 Although some Freudian theory takes into account of the concepts of “others” or “the 
other persons”, either real or imaginary, it has been argued that Freud had never fully 
recognized the impact of the external others on the human psychological development; 
his lack or inconsistent mention of the concepts make it seem like his uses of the terms 
were merely an accident, rather than being intrinsically significant in his theory 
(Mitchell, 1998: 67; Orbach, 2008: 32).  
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the psychoanalytical perspectives on the basic human nature and its ultimate 
motivations8. It is, hence, quite clear that Fairbairn’s development of the self differs 
fundamentally to that of Freud, or even Klein. Fairbairn’s natural emotional maturation 
of the self requires essentially the quality and the complexities of the relationships with 
the objects.  
Selfhood should be understood as being constituted and defined by the 
relationships it has, remembers, desires, and creates (Rubens, 1994: 153). Although 
Fairbairn kept the term ‘ego’ in his writing, his meaning of the term should be seen as 
referring to the entirety of the psychic self that is inseparable from its impulses, desires, 
and on-going experiencing of reality. “Ego”, in the Fairbairnian system, shapes and 
interacts with external relationships at all developmental levels, actively defining and 
expressing itself through the relationships with which it engages. It has been argued that 
Fairbairn’s ‘ego’ is closer to the contemporary use of the term “self” in self-psychology 
by definition (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 163).  
With regard to psychopathology, Fairbairn agrees with Abraham on the earliest 
oral stage characterized by sucking and later oral stage characterized by biting. His 
disagreement with Abraham relates to Abraham’s view that psychopathology is 
primarily based on the maturation of the bodily zones and the satisfaction of its 
corresponding impulses. Instead, Fairbairn sees living experience with others in life as 
central to the child’s emotional development, and believes that it is the parent’s adequate 
                                                
8 There are debates around whether Fairbairn’s work should be seen as an re-orientation 
of Freud’s drive theory, as his notion of the relation-seeking individual can also be 
interpreted as intrinsically an impulsive being but with different motivational aims. 
However the debate seems be out of the scope of this project and therefore is left 
unaddressed here.  
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responsiveness to the child’s relational needs that predispose her to later mental stability. 
His understanding of the self as inseparable from relationships enables him to 
understand the nature of psychopathology from the object-relations perspective.  
In his paper Endopsychic Structure Considered in Terms of Object-Relationships 
(1944), he suggests that the origin of the endopsychic structure of the person is formed 
universally under the unavoidable circumstances of the early experience with the outer 
objects. In a normal case of infancy, the mother is felt to be satisfying as well as 
frustrating, depending on the immediacy of the infant’s needs being met or not. The 
infant’s subjective experience of the mother being both the satisfying and the frustrating 
object creates an intolerable tension in the psychic reality of the infant, who is in a state 
of “absolute dependence” (1944) on the mother. Fairbairn’s view is that this infantile 
dependence subjects the infant to the most acute internal conflicts and the corresponding 
defences. As the infant is unable to cope with the unsatisfying aspect of the experience, 
she therefore, within her limited capacity, resorts to the defence of splitting the mother 
into two objects, good and bad, and proceeds to internalize the bad object of the mother. 
Splitting, essentially, helps the child to cope with the pain of the ambivalence of the 
mother being both satisfying and frustrating.  
As splitting takes place in the face of the intolerable aspects of the experience, it 
is pushed out of the conscious awareness, and therefore, repressed. Splitting and 
repression are intrinsically inseparable in operation, and they are the key elements to the 
establishment of the endopsychic structure. Fairbairn believes that internalization 
happens as an unconscious effort to control the bad object that represents the unyielding 
outer reality that fails to fulfil the infant’s needs. Internalization serves as a defensive 
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measure, aiding the child to cope with the malicious external circumstances that are 
otherwise intolerably annihilating. By taking the badness inside her, she has control over 
it. In other words, the child preserves the external security, albeit illusory, at the cost of 
his or her internal security (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 171). Fairbairn terms this 
mechanism of internalization “moral defence” (1943: 65).  
 
He famously said that,  
It is better to be a sinner in a world ruled by God than to live in a world ruled by 
the Devil. A sinner in a world ruled by God may be bad; but there is always a 
certain sense of security to be derived from the fact that the world around is good 
(1943: 66-67) 
 
Initially, Fairbairn (1943) suggested that it was the bad/unsatisfying object that 
was subject to internalisation into one’s psychic territory. However in his later work 
(1951), he revised his theory so that not only the bad objects, but also the aspects of the 
ego that yearns for relatedness with those internalized objects, and the aspects that 
expect sadistic deprivation are split-off and repressed too (pp. 168). In other words, not 
only is the exciting part, which arouses intense needs without being able to satisfy the 
ego, and the rejecting part of the objects internalized and repressed, but so too are the 
parts of the self that respond to them. Fairbairn termed these ‘subsidiary selves’, split-off 
from the central self. At its core, what is internalized are not solely ‘objects’, but a series 
of ‘object-relations’ corresponding to the child’s subjective experience of the 
relationships.  
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On the account of internalization, Fairbairn openly and repeatedly disagrees with 
Klein’s view on two grounds. The first is Klein’s view that internalization stems from 
the phantastic impulses to incorporate the object orally; the second is Klein’s 
propositions that both the good and the bad objects are internalized. Fairbairn’s 
argument is that if the internalization happens with the good objects too, then there can 
be no account for why repression should happen (1944: 134; 1949: 154-5). Although, 
notably, Fairbairn did write about the internalization of good objects elsewhere, he sees 
the internalized good object as becoming part of “the central ego”, which is comprised 
of conscious or preconscious elements. This is consistent with his view that the 
internalization of bad objects is always bound to repression (Rubens, 1994: 165).  
As mentioned earlier, Fairbairn sees internal conflicts as inevitable; hence the 
endopsychic situation is a universal phenomenon from the beginning of life. In other 
words, he sees the splitting of the ego as a common psychic organization; however, he 
also sees the repressed endopsychic structure as the root to a realm of psychopathology 
that can develop later in life, depending on the severity of the fixation on, and 
withdrawal into, it (Rubens, 1994:163). The child cannot survive without objects, 
whether good or bad, and this need for others carries on throughout life. Based on the 
view that we are all dependent on objects, Fairbairn (1949) regards separation anxiety as 
the most significant insecurity that exists universally. Separation anxiety derives from 
the state of infantile dependence where the child actively identifies with the objects, on 
whom she depends on and with whom she shares emotional closeness (pp. 266). 
Therefore, it can be said that the child’s need to preserve the object relations internally is 
to avoid the otherwise traumatic experience of separation anxiety. In the attempt to 
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preserve the attachment to the objects, she preserves the bond between the aspects of self, 
or the subsidiary selves in Fairbairn’s term, and their exciting and rejecting counterparts. 
If the external others continue to be experienced as unloving and unsatisfying, the need 
to protect and control the bad objects persists and intensifies, leading to a repetitive 
circle of splitting and repression.  
Although the psychological function of splitting and repression serves as a 
protective measure in emotional crisis, it may crystalize the self’s perception of the 
external world through the filter of the established internal object relations; hence 
preventing the individual from experiencing the depth of ever-changing external reality. 
Fairbairn (1958) calls this maintenance of the internal stasis a “closed system”.  Drawing 
from his own clinical practice, he proposes that the unconscious conservation of the 
closed-system is the ultimate source of resistance to the possibility of change and growth 
in the psychotherapeutic sense (pp. 378). Hence it becomes pathological as opposed to a 
healthy way of coping. The endopsychic structure is at the heart of Fairbairn’s object 
relations theory. 
Rubens (1998) puts forward a revision of Fairbairn’s original view on depression. 
He draws from Fairbairn’s theory of endopsychic structure to argue that at the heart of 
depression is a neurotic manoeuvre of denial, or avoidance, of change, through the very 
primitive defence of retreating into the endopsychic situation formed through the early 
interactions with others. That way she can continue to live out the internal relationships, 
rather than facing the on-going interaction with the external world. The underlying logic 
is simple: if nothing has changed, nothing could have been lost. However as the person 
with depression organizes her subjective world on the ground of her internal object-
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relations, the self can only express and define itself in the patterns of interactions 
established in the closed system. To understand depression, and its psychic functioning, 
it is therefore essential to understand the person’s past relationships between the self and 
her external and internal objects.  
As noted previously, Fairbairn’s developmental theory sees separation anxiety as 
the most primal and detrimental form of anxiety. The separation anxiety derives from 
the infantile dependence, and it intensifies the need to preserve the internalised objects. 
Simply put, the child can bear the bad objects being bad, but not the separation from 
them, or worse, losing them. The person with depression cannot let go of her existing 
endopsychic structure that provides the shelter for her subsidiary selves and the objects, 
as they are internalized exactly out of the fear of losing them in the first place. The 
purpose of depression is therefore to preserve the attachments with the internalized 
objects whilst resisting change, or anything that threatens a sense of change. So it is with 
Fairbairn’s view on other psychopathological states, depression should be studied with 
the relationships between the central self, subsidiary selves and the internalized objects.  
Fairbairn (1944) described a sense of “futility”, and although he saw it as distinct 
from depression9, it has been argued that the sense of futility is what would be 
recognised as the clinical presentations of depression in the cotemporary sense (Rubens, 
1998). Fairbairn explained the phenomenon of futility from his perspective of the 
internalization, that is, of the bad objects, and the inevitable burden this creates on the 
                                                
9 Rubens (1998) argues that, in actual fact, Fairbairn’s differentiation between the sense 
of futility and depression is a result of his own definitional issues; Fairbairn cannot label 
it as depression having assigned depression to a different category. According to Rubens 
this distinction should be revised and the sense of futility should be incorporated into the 
term depression. 
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psychic functioning. His view is that, due to the identification with the internalized 
objects, which made the internalization possible in the first instance, the inferiority the 
individual experienced with the bad objects is covered up by the illusory superiority 
derived from the identification with the internalized objects. The clash between the 
illusory superiority due to identification, and the ever-present inferiority experienced in 
the central ego from the burden of the bad objects, in Fairbairn’s view, damages the 
integrity of the ego (Fairbairn, 1941: 50-51).  This leads to a sense of futility, which was 
described by Fairbairn as 
 
[…] a complete impasse, which reduces the ego to a state of utter impotence. The 
ego becomes quite incapable of expressing itself; and in so far as this is so, its 
very existence becomes compromised (ibid). 
 
It seems that what Fairbairn described as sense of futility, encompassing feelings 
of helplessness, emptiness, and immobilization are commonly associated with what is 
today called depression. It is also obvious that, in his theoretical context, such a sense of 
futility is not a result of aggression towards the loved-object, as Klein suggested, but it 
comes from a paralyzing frustration in which one fails to reconcile one’s unconscious 
inner reality and the outside world,. It is important to note that, Fairbairn (1944) did not 
approve of Freud and Klein’s emphasis on aggression/death instinct as the primary agent 
that contributes to the depressive or melancholic functioning. Rather, he marks down 
aggression and gives it a secondary role, seeing it mainly as a reaction to the frustration 
caused by the objects, rather than the other way round. This is critically different to what 
Klein proposed on the depressive position that it is guilt-triggered in the wake of 
aggressive impulses towards the loved object. It can therefore be postulated that, guilt, in 
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Fairbairn’s view, does not generate as a result to one’s own aggression, but it arises from 
a moral defence of seeing oneself as irredeemably bad (Rubens, 1998).  
Hyperactive self-criticism, as also recognized by Freud, and its related 
phenomenon such as low self-esteem or self-depreciation, has been deemed as a 
common trait underlying the depressive phenomenon. I believe that Fairbairn’s account 
of the internalization of the bad object, or moral defence, as a consequence to inadequate 
parenting, provides one way of explaining self-derogatory thinking and behaviours in 
depression. As noted earlier, Fairbairn sees the endopsychic structure as a defence 
against the intolerable anxiety in the face of one's needs not being met and the 
helplessness that derives from dependence on others whose behaviour is out of one’s 
control. As Fairbairn wrote (1943), through internalization, the individual “take[s] upon 
the burden of badness which appears to reside in his loved objects” (pp. 66); by taking 
on the badness from the objects, the bad objects can be made good again. It provides a 
false justification for the deprivation and the inadequate treatments on the child’s side, ‘I 
am treated this way because I am bad’. However, the internalization of the bad objects 
that originally serves to preserve the relational bond also distorts self-identity and 
diminishes self-importance; the person, thus, experiences herself as fundamentally bad. 
The idealization and excessive investment in the loved-object, as located outside of the 
central ego, inevitably leads to the devaluation of the self. If the mind of a melancholic 
does suffer an engulfment in a harassing sense of injustice, as Freud observed, then it is 
the injustice she inflicts on the self. It seems to me then that to Freud, what the 
melancholic has lost is the narcissistically loved-object, either symbocially or 
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environmentally. However to Fairbairn, what the melancholic has really lost, or more 
accurately,  ‘surrendered’, are the elements of self that feel lovable. 
 
To sum up, like Klein, Fairbairn began his theory of endopsychic structure from 
the limitation of the mothering being both satisfying and frustrating, and upon which the 
baby has no choice but to rely on for survival. The intolerable tension created by 
maternal presence and absence fuels ambivalence with which the infant copes through 
the primal defence of splitting and repression. The purpose of this is two-fold. First of all, 
the infant seeks to control the frustrating object through internalizing it, taking upon the 
badness from the object. Secondly, the infant seeks to preserve the object, either good or 
bad, so as to avoid annihilating separation anxiety. Such psychic functioning, albeit 
defensive by nature, is what Fairbairn sees as the root to a range of psychopathologies, 
including depression. The Fairbairnian baby is essentially one that is wired for 
relatedness with objects, rather than merely seeking the gratification of the libidinal 
drive. The development of the personality and expression of selfhood relies on the 
relationships one has with one’s internal and external objects. On the other hand, if the 
deprivation of love is frequently experienced in the relationships, this results in an 
internal world populated with the bad objects in the service of preserving the emotional 
ties with the objects that needs to be kept as good.  
To Fairbairn, the inability to step out of the closed system of experiencing is the 
greatest resistance to change of all. Such resistance to change certainly marks the key 
element in depressive functioning. Living inevitably involves losing and changing. 
However in the case of depression, change is petrifying as it threatens one with the 
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primal sense of separation anxiety. The reality or possibility of loss is painful, therefore 
the depressive encapsulates herself in her internal world, where her internalized objects, 
the object-relationships, the snippets of the memory of her attachment figures are 
preserved in an effort to deny any separation and loss. Fairbairnian depression is 
essentially a collapse of the integrity of the self, as a result of the desire to maintain 
stasis in a closed system whilst the reality of the external world has changed and now 
comes in conflict with one’s internal world i.e. the original bad/unsatisfying objects are 
no longer there.  
 
As mentioned previously, there had been a marginalization of Fairbairn’s work 
in his day. Fairbairn himself acknowledged this with great disappointment (Scharff & 
Birtles, 1952: xvii). Moreover, the disappointment was magnified by the fact that the 
misinterpretation and dismissal of his work was contributed to by leading figures such as 
Winnicott and Khan (ibid). The lack of acknowledgement and appreciation he 
experienced in his professional life, combined with the years-long unhappiness in his 
married life, must have exacerbated his own sense of isolation as an already solitary 
existence (Rubens, 1998). And that, perhaps, was why his work concerned itself more 
with the schizoid way of coping, which basically was a psychic organization in which an 
individual resorts to internal rupture, i.e. splitting, as a result of the traumatic experience 
of the primitive need to relate to others not being sufficiently met (ibid), rather than 
depression, or the depressive state. 
Many contemporary authors have drawn from object-relations theory in writing 
about depression (c.f. Goldberg, 1975; Gaylin, 1983; Summers, 1994; Lubbe, 2011). 
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However as far as I know, most of these literatures have not given Fairbairn much 
consideration due to his lack of a distinctive theory of depression. I am also aware of the 
fact that Fairbairnian concepts were often neglected in the case illustrations provided. 
Lubbe (2011), for example, in his book Object Relations in Depression: A Return to 
Theory, devoted only a few pages in discussing Fairbairn, whilst the classical theories, 
such as Freudian and Kleinian, enjoy more theoretical engagement. Summers’s (1994) 
work engages with Fairbairn’s theory more. In his book Object Relations Theories and 
Psychopathology: A Comprehensive Text, he made Fairbairn’s theory his first chapter 
and provided a clear account of the Fairbairbian conception of psychopathology. 
However he adopted Fairbairn’s own distinction between schizoid pathology and 
depressive pathology and this is reflected in an imbalance in the amount of discussion in 
his chapter. The minimal amount of a Fairbairnian illustration of depression in the 
existing psychoanalytic literature can be seen as a result of Fairbairn’s dampened 
interest in depression. Notably Fairbairn’s mentions of depression/depressive personality 
in his 1940 and 1941 papers were all he had to say about depression (Rubens, 1998). It 
was unclear why Fairbairn lost interest in depression. His vague differentiation between 
schizoid pathology and depressive pathology was another factor that contributed much 











Virginia Woolf and Depression 
 
In this chapter, I elaborate on the aspects of Virginia Woolf’s life essential to my 
construction of my imaginary Woolf, with whom I will be dialoguing. The chapter is 
divided into two sections: the first will cover Woolf and her relationship with depression, 
looking at her early and later years and drawing on her diary entries and biographical 
information. In the second section I will discuss her relationship with psychoanalysis, 
covering her experience with Freud and Klein, her reflections on psychoanalytic work 
and the absence of an engagement with Fairbairn’s work. 
 
Virginia Woolf and Depression 
 
In the opening line of the chapter “Madness” in her biography of Virginia Woolf, 
Hermione Lee writes:  
Virginia Woolf was a sane woman who had an illness. She was often a patient, 
but she was not a victim. She was not weak, or hysterical, or self-deluding, or 
guilty, or oppressed. On the contrary, she was a person of exceptional courage, 
intelligence and stoicism, who made the best use she could, and came to the 
deepest understanding possible to her, of her own condition. She endured, 
periodically, great agony of mind and severe physical pain, with remarkably little 
self-pity. Her illness is attributable to genetic, environmental and biological 
factors. It was periodic and recurrent (Lee, 1997: 175) 
 
It has been known that Virginia Woolf’s infamous periodic “great agony of mind” 
with which she struggled her whole life was one of many different faces of depression – 
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a debilitating psychological condition, compounded by the physical strains. Woolf 
herself acknowledged her depression and recorded the insufferable depressive episodes 
in her diary, c.f. diary entries 1924 May 26th, 1926 Jan 26th, 1937 Apr 9th in Woolf, 2003 
[1953]. Several writers have adopted a psychoanalytic language in seeking to understand 
Woolf’s mental life (c.f. Panken, 1987; DeSalvo, 1989; Bond, 2000). For example, in 
relating Woolf’s life to her literary creation and the composite of autobiography and 
biography, Panken concurrently detects a daughter in Woolf that desperately longs for 
maternal intimacy and protection, in parallel to her life history in which her mother was 
portrayed as emotionally unavailable. Panken, adopting Baudry’s (1984) approach to 
psychoanalytic literary criticism, argues that the author exists not only in the 
autobiographical accounts of themselves, or in the biographical accounts, but lives also 
in the fictional world of novels, as the extension of their fictional characters that have 
their own ‘conflicts, defences, and attitudes of the real people’ that even the author is not 
aware of (ibid: 8). In her analysis of Woolf’s novels, Panken notices the recurrent 
themes in Woolf’s characters: helplessness and powerlessness, with an undercurrent of 
hostility that seems to be misunderstood and easily dismissed by others. Coming from a 
psychotherapeutic point of view, the repetition of a certain type of character could be 
read as a sign that Woolf sought to work through unconscious conflicts. 
However, Panken and other psychoanalytic writers I have studied, commit to a 
third person perspective in their studies of Virginia Woolf, leaving themselves out to 
maintain an objective perspective. These accounts, which position Virginia Woolf as a 
subject of study, risk losing touch with the true character of Virginia Woolf – she 
rejected being psychoanalysed. A sense of unease in reading those studies alerted me to 
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my own identification with Virginia Woolf in that we both chose a solipsistic route of 
self-analysis as a way to prevent our narratives from being intruded upon. This unease 
made me realize I could not be that omniscient narrator that simply tells the story of 
others, of Virginia Woolf. I found myself, empathetically, calling to mind Woolf’s own 
words that conveyed a strong opposition to the practice of studying a person by coercing 
evidence into some simplistic interpretations, common in the writing of biography or 
psychobiography, 
 
[Those who] write what they call ‘lives’ of other people; that is, they collect a 
number of events, and leave the person to whom it happened unknown”(Woolf, 
2002 [1939]: 83).  
 
I also oppose reducing Virginia Woolf to her depression, as though her 
depression was simply a result of her being on the receiving end of tragic events; as 
though her life was merely a sum of what had happened to her and she had no choice 
and power in being who she was. Letting my Fairbairnian passion guide me in my 
inquiry, I see Virginia Woolf as nothing less than a complete person “of exceptional 
courage, intelligence and stoicism”, as Lee (1997: 175) describes her, who lived through 
her life in the best way she could, who did not claim victimhood but, as an adaptive 
person, always resorted to her psychical resourcefulness in coping with all that imposed 
upon her experiential reality. Depression was a real psychological condition from which 
Woolf suffered, yet I agreed with Lee that “[s]he was often a patient, but she was not a 
victim.” (ibid) 
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Virginia Woolf was vulnerable to recurrent episodes of depression throughout 
her life that never went away but only varied in intensity and, for the most part, 
interfered with her daily functioning and impacted her close relationships (Lee, 1997: 
175). However, her references to depression, or of being depressed, were often 
interchangeable with the more problematic naming of it as “madness” or “mad”, c.f. 
1926 Nov 23rd, 1929 Sep 10th in Woolf, 2003 [1953]. Reading into her view of 
depression as madness alerted me to her fragile edge of self-identity. It communicated a 
sense of alienation between self and others, rather than empathy towards her lived 
experiences of depression. The medical explanations and treatments imposed on her also 
interfered with how she viewed her depression10. This was also a potential consequence 
from having her personhood and psychological experience constantly subsumed under 
the repetitive, derogatory convictions of her depression as a case of “madness” and 
“insanity” by her close others (e.g. Bell, 1972; Glendinning, 2006). In those accounts, 
the intensity of Woolf’s depressive episodes was either described as a result of genetic 
disposition, her writer’s blocks, or a response to the ‘unfortunate’ events that occurred to 
her, whilst leaving the unspoken, psychological side of her narratives largely 
unaddressed. I agree with Lee (1997) that their choice of language (“madness”, 
“insanity”) largely reflected the attitudes of Woolf’s relational circle with regard to her 
depression. It reflected also a self-protective position they adopted in order to safeguard 
                                                
10 Looking into Virginia Woolf’s medical history, she had consulted at least twelve 
doctors for her mental states, and hardly any of them showed sympathetic attitudes 
towards her suffering. The unsympathetic approach culminated at Dr Savage with his 
violent treatments on Virginia Woolf with force-feeding and strict rules of rest in the 
confinement of bed that severely impacted Virginia Woolf’s outlook on depression for 
life (Lee, 1997: 182-3). 
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their own life narratives and shield themselves from Woolf’s painful reality (pp. 180). 
And yet Woolf, on her side, often used a protective and suppressed tone when speaking 
about her close others, such as her family and husband.  
The diminishing of Woolf’s self-esteem and the weakening of hope which 
resounds in her written texts ran in parallel with a lack of a consistently empathetic 
presence who could be there to receive her attentively and non-judgementally. This lack 
was largely manifested in the self-depreciative tone she used, intense and unmistakable 
in her letters and diaries, especially towards the end of her life.  Even though she was 
deemed ‘mad’, she did not shy away from seeing herself as mad. She owned and 
internalized, to the core of her being, those depreciative external judgements. In my 
clinical experience, such insistence of one’s fault, of one’s badness, whilst preserving 
the external others as the good and kind is often seen in the case of depression. This 
idealization of the external others endangers the ability to tell a truthful relational story 
about oneself. Despite her writing talents being widely recognized, Virginia Woolf, 
ironically, deemed herself a failure throughout her life (Cunningham & Lackey, 2014: 
93). 
I quoted Lee (1997) at the opening of this chapter because what she says 
resonates with my view of Woolf’s depression.  Even though she had suffered from it 
for most of her life, it was never the case that she yielded to depression, even in her 
deepest despair. That being said, I, in agreement with Panken (1987: 268), believe that 
the motivation behind Woolf’s suicide was complex, and should never be read as sign of 
her final succumbing to depression. Such a conclusion could not justify the fact that, 
throughout her life, she had never ceased to make active attempts to understand the 
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complexity of her depression, resorting to all the resources within her reach. In her own 
words, she “tried to analyse [her] depression” (D4: 103), to make the best sense of it that 
she possibly could.  
A diary entry on 1926 Feb 27th, following the publication of Mrs Dalloway, 
captured a clear, intense striving to come to a perspective on her life: 
“I enjoy almost everything. Yet I have some restless searcher in me. Why is there 
not a discovery in life? Something one can lay hands on and say “This is it”? My 
depression is a harassed feeling. I’m looking: but that’s not it — that’s not it. 
What is it? And shall I die before I find it (Woolf, 2003 [1953]: 85) 
 
It seems to me that Woolf could be more at ease with expressing her intimate 
feelings only in the privacy of her own diary, and that this now provides us with a 
privileged entrance into her private thoughts. Reading into this diary entry, what she was 
striving to know but could not gain an absolute answer to could be seen as an urgent 
epistemological quest, which was, unmistakably, also a frustrating one for her. Although, 
due to the vagueness of the language, it is not possible to say for certain what exactly the 
nature of her quest was, it is apparent that the quest was intensified, if not triggered, by 
depression. As the purpose of keeping a diary is a means of recording one’s own private 
feelings from moment to moment, and never for public inspection, I can only interpret 
that her quest was evoked by her depression for which she could not identify a particular 
cause (“that’s not it, that’s not it” (ibid))” in the face of the un-answerability of 
depression.  
She went on to remark, in the same diary entry,  
[…] a great astonishing sense of something there, which is 'it'. [...] A sense of my 
own strangeness, walking on the earth is there too: of the infinite oddity of the 
human position. [...] Who am I, what am I, & so on: these questions are always 
floating about in me (ibid) 
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What may seem as a general questioning about the essence of personhood, “who 
am I, and what am I” (ibid), in my view, should not be seen just as a broad philosophical 
contemplation about the meaning of life (as e.g. Warner, 1987: 31 did). Connecting it 
with the earlier quest she was making in relation to depression, the questions she raised 
would intertwine with the personally meaningful explorations in relation to her selfhood 
and the sense of alienation that depression had forced between self and others, 
exacerbating “the sense of [her] own strangeness” (Woolf, 2003 [1953]: 85). Reflecting 
alongside Bollas’ (1987) concept, “the un-thought known”, Woolf’s existential yet 
dissociative enquiry into life could be a sign that there was an intensity of “the un-
thought known” haunting her in the psychic space, like “a deep spell of the uncanny” 
(ibid: 37). With its emotional, pre-verbal origin long forgotten, the existential knowing 
of the “mute, unknown child self” (ibid: 101) does not have the capacity to articulate or 
symbolize her experience in language. The pain remains there, like a fever of unknown 
origin. As the child grows into an adult, who can think, but who has lost touch with her 
child-self’s emotional reality, she can only attribute this intensity of the experiential 
crisis of suffering, to an existential disorientation of the meaning of life itself. The 
unsettling emotional pains of unknown origin thus find expression in the form of a 
pressing concern with  “the nature of [her] being or of life itself” (pp. 281). Using Bollas’ 
idea to elicit the theme relevant to the subject of my study, Woolf’s existential question 
about life, self-identity and personhood “always floating about” (Woolf, 2003 [1953]: 85) 
in her would come into better perspective if understood in terms of the unthought known.  
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As a writer, writing would seem the most natural way for Virginia Woolf to 
evoke the moments of being, known experientially, but insufficiently acknowledged and 
processed at the emotional level. As Abel (1989) argues, looking at the relationship 
between Woolf’s novels and her personal history, Woolf’s novels were often laden with 
the plots about lives in the past (pp. 1). The explicit argument Abel made, that the 
fictional works were fashioned in a complex way by Woolf’s own past (ibid), was met 
by an implicit acknowledgement by Woolf (Woolf, 2002[1939]) herself. In Woolf’s own 
words, “I find that scene-making [in novels] is my natural way of marking the past. 
Always a scene has arranged itself: representative; enduring.” (pp. 122) Following this 
strand, what Woolf herself referred to as the “restless searcher” (Woolf, 2003 [1953]: 85) 
in her, would then actually signify her on-going search into her past where her personal 
history and emotional memories were located, in an effort to make sense of the present 
reality of life. Her intense desire to know life and discover meaning, as recorded here, 
would make more sense if gravitated backwards into her past, into the significant 
emotional impacts carried forward from the past, which she lived through and shaped 
who she was in the present. I believed that underneath her consistent desires to 
understand life was a recurrent, harassing presence of the unthought known. My belief 
remains that it was her need to “mark the past” (Woolf, 2002[1939]): 122) that piqued 
her interest in Freud, whose work she had read but never fully agreed with (Bahun, 2013: 
99-100). 
Virginia Woolf’s connection with psychoanalysis was as complex as it was 
ambivalent. She read and grasped psychoanalytic theory, but never without a certain 
caginess in using it to understand human psychology, including her own. In the next 
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section, her attitude towards psychoanalysis will be further explained as I introduce the 
context of Woolf’s relationships with psychoanalysis (i.e. Freud and Klein), highlighting 
the rationale of this doctoral thesis by making a case for Fairbairn’s object relations 
theory within the frame of depression. 
 
Virginia Woolf in the Context of Psychoanalysis 
As mentioned in Chapter One, I chose Virginia Woolf as the subject of my thesis 
not only because of her intimate experience of depression, which I personally identified 
with, but also, and most importantly, because of her relationship with psychoanalysis. 
She was surrounded by psychoanalysis for most her life due to her social involvement in 
the Bloomsbury circle. Many of her intimates were passionate about psychoanalysis 
(Bahun, 2013). Her brother, Adrian, and Adrian’s wife, Karin, both trained and practiced 
as psychoanalysts (ibid). The Hogarth Press, founded and owned by Virginia Woolf and 
her husband, Leonard Woolf, published psychoanalytic works, largely those of Freud 
(Bahun, 2013: 93-4). However, despite being exposed to the psychoanalytic discussions 
both in personal life and literary engagements, she was never fully converted to 
psychoanalytic thinking, nor had she ever sought psychoanalysis as a treatment for her 
depression (Wolf & Wolf, 1979: 38).  
Several factors have been suggested as explaining why Woolf shunned receiving 
psychoanalysis despite it being readily available. These include her need to preserve her 
creativity as a writer, to protect her own narratives of her illness from intrusive 
psychoanalytic interpretation, which, as Freudian, over-valued sexuality. Her, perception 
was that psychoanalytic language was essentially patricentric, and disregarded her 
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femininity (Pankens, 1987; Abel, 1989; Caramagno, 1992; Bahun, 2013). Her dignity as 
a woman and a writer was reflected in her resistance against analytic intrusion; against 
passing the power to a psychoanalyst, an authoritative other; against risking her own 
autonomous accounts being dismissed, of being force-fed the male-oriented knowledge 
engendered by the psychoanalytic theory of that period. 
Taking into account Woolf’s family history, I also pondered that she must have 
felt the dread of re-enacting the “legacy of [emotional] dependency” (Woolf, 2002 
[1908]: 114) that her father had played out in the family. She was witness to how her 
father subsequently burdened and exhausted her mother and Stella, her substitute mother 
figure, to death. Her resistance to psychoanalysis therefore might signify her need, either 
consciously or unconsciously, to avoid re-enacting this neediness and dependency that 
was imbued with a destructive potential. Perhaps, for Woolf, it was necessary to keep 
the needy part of her personality in check, for it would have been too intimidating to 
come in touch with what had, in the past, brought the death of her beloved ones. The 
therapeutic setting, which invites a full range of emotions including neediness and fears, 
could have been too painful.  
When Virginia Woolf and Freud finally met, in late January in 1939, shortly after 
Freud had escaped from Nazi-occupied Vienna and settled in London (Meisel, 2013: 
332), the impression Freud made on her did not redeem psychoanalysis from her 
criticism. The meeting took place at Freud’s residence. She and Leonard Woolf had 
come to pay their respect to Freud for his acclaimed, revolutionary contribution of 
psychoanalysis (ibid). Notably, this meeting was arranged in the same year she had 
finished writing her autobiographical essay, Sketch of The Past (1939), in which she 
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explored some of her earliest life experiences and memories in more depth than she had 
previously. Moreover, it was the year before her suicide at the age of 57. The timing of 
the meeting made me wonder whether behind Woolf’s motivation to meet Freud, there 
might have been an intensifying need to understand her past from a psychoanalytic 
perspective as she was probing into some of her earliest life moments through the 
writing of her auto-biography. My own speculation is that she had attempted a final cry 
for help in the presence of “the un-thought known” (Bollas, 1987), which was pressing 
and urging her to look into her psyche as her unconscious conflicts and emotional 
tension grew in intensity. Woolf, however, experienced her encounter with Freud, as 
nothing like a celebratory salute that she had expected, but close to an unnerving 
“interview” on her side (D5: 202). During this “difficult talk“ (ibid) with Freud, she 
found herself feeling more like a patient than a guest, and curiously, brought home with 
her a flower of “narcissus” Freud had given her that day (ibid). Why he “gave [her] 
narcissus” (ibid) was left unexplained by Virginia Woolf, but the symbolic meaning of it 
was to unsettle her for days to come. A diary entry written the following day captured a 
sharp edge in the first encounter that had stirred up uneasiness, anger, and a mocking 
pity against Freud as she recollected details of the meeting.  
The meeting did not warm her up to Freud as a person and perhaps fuelled 
further resistance to being psychoanalysed. But Virginia Woolf’s engagement with 
psychoanalysis did not stop there. The meeting with Freud was to prepare her to make a 
more intellectual, and less psychological, engagement with Freud’s work. After Freud’s 
death in September in 1939, Virginia Woolf found herself in a highly inquisitive mood 
once again with regard to Freud’s work. Once again the desire sprang up in her for 
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“gulping up” (D5: 249) Freud’s work. However, we do have to bear in mind how much 
Virginia Woolf had actually read Freud, what papers she had read. How well she, as a 
non-professional, grasped them remains disputed. This dispute is compounded by the 
inconsistency in Woolf’s claim, as late as 1932, that she had never read Freud, when it 
was evident that she had, on several occasions prior to this, made comments about 
Freudian concepts and psychoanalysis (Zwerdling, 1986: 296). Moreover there is no 
evidence to suggest that Virginia Woolf had read Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia 
(1917). We could not be certain what motivated Woolf to take up Freud again after his 
death, but what we can see is that this time her reading of Freud was to be much more in 
depth and extensive compared to her prior engagement, which was limited and narrower 
in subject matter (Bahun, 2013). At this stage of her engagement with Freud’s work, she 
was impressed by some of the insights Freud had made in relation to the two World 
Wars (Zwerdling, 1986: 296), but it was Freud’s views on the matter of human nature 
that she found “upsetting” (D5: 250). 
In her diary, she recorded her disagreement with Freud’s understanding of 
human psychology on the ground of desires and needs,  
Reducing one to whirlpool; & I daresay truly. If we are all instinct, the 
unconscious, what’s this all about civilisation, the whole man, freedom &c? His 
savage against God good. The falseness of loving one’s neighbour. The 
conscience as censor. Hate. […] But I’m too mixed. (ibid)  
 
Here her disapproval of Freud’s instinct theory was evident, but was hardly new. 
One of her earlier essays, Freudian Fiction (1920), readily expressed her objection 
towards Freudianism in a similar vein. Coming from a literary perspective, she argued in 
Freudian Fiction (1920) that the practice of psychoanalysis demolishes the aesthetic 
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values of the characters by reducing the their complexities to clinical cases. In Woolf’s 
view this was compounded by the psychoanalyst’s authoritarian application of the 
doctrinal ‘key’, such as Oedipus, which “simplifies rather than complicates, detracts 
rather than enriches” (pp. 197). This thesis aims to complicate and enrich personal 
meanings, rather than to simplify and detract from the intricacy of our psychological 
world by making them generalized principles. It is clear, then, that psychoanalytic theory 
held a different meaning for Woolf. Furthermore, as a woman, Woolf’s perspective of 
how human beings respond to the world differed greatly from that of Freud’s, which was 
a male-orientated worldview. For Woolf, in a society dominated by men and their 
masculinity, what Freud described as the aggressive instinct was more of the male’s 
habitual mode than females (Zwerdling, 1986: 297); Woolf believed instead that the 
basic elements of masculinity were aggressiveness and possessiveness, and that these 
elements disturbed the peace, caused wars and separated us from each other (ibid). She 
argued that such qualities in men were not prominent in femininity, and that the 
difference between sexes, was left out of Freud’s theory (ibid). It is apparent that, as a 
woman, her way of looking at human nature was different to that of Freud. Her feminine 
perspective was hardly considered in Freudian thought, and so could not be legitimized 
in Freud’s theory. This led to an irreversible resistance to further exploration of herself 
in Freudian terms. 
Despite her difficulty in accepting Freud’s ideas, Woolf’s relationship with 
psychoanalysis was not one-way. Notably, her reproach against psychoanalysis was 
directed mainly at Freud and his followers, and it did not apply to the theoretical views 
proposed by Melanie Klein, who as a woman, de-emphasizes sexuality, credits aesthetic 
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values, and most importantly, in her work calls into question the dominant hierarchy of 
power caused by gender differences (Abel, 1989: 19). Woolf’s intimate, yet troublesome 
association with psychoanalysis caught my attention, as someone who has found 
psychoanalytic theories profoundly helpful in personal reflection and clinical practice. I 
found myself imagining the possibility of a different story. If Woolf was born at a time 
when psychoanalysis had transcended the patricentric and authoritarian Freudianism to 
embrace the more contemporary, humanistic kind of practice that values relationships, 
individuality, personal power and knowledge to which I was fortunate to be introduced 
during my training. If, for example, she had met Klein first, rather than Freud, could she 
have possibly considered making more personal use of psychoanalysis? Klein, as a 
woman, celebrated femininity and worked towards a matricentric framework, who 
earned Woolf’s admiration as a “woman of character & force” (quoted in Bahun, 2013: 
97). And lastly, could there be a different story to be told, if she had had the chance to 
meet Fairbairn, who emphasized the importance of relational meanings and values? 
Would it appeal to her and entice her to make more in-depth theoretical engagements 
than her partial and prejudiced reading of Freud’s work (Bahun, 2013: 97)? We know 
that Freudian theory, and Freud in person, had anguished her, but what we cannot know 
is what her response would have been if she had had the chance to read Fairbairn. 
Perhaps Fairbairn could have changed her mind about psychoanalytic theory and could 
have helped her, as it has helped me to understand the obscured communications of the 
symptoms that hold keys to unravelling the nature of my depression (Philips, 2013: 42). 
Perhaps it would have enabled her to see herself in a better light, not as mad, but as 
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someone who was intensely burdened by the vicissitudes of the unresolved conflicts in 
her inner life? 
Woolf’s personal association with Freud and Klein, whom she had met in person, 
and with whose work she had familiarised herself, led me to anchor my inquiry by using 
their work in my fictional dialogue with her. I introduced Fairbairn after Freud and Klein 
as I believe his work transcends Freud and Klein, yet his work had not had a chance to 
reach Woolf. This is mainly because the psychoanalytic society of Woolf’s time was not 
a welcoming climate for Fairbairn’s work. Being in the central location of London 
where the British Psychoanalytic Society was based, and from which Fairbairn was 
remote, meant that Woolf could not possibly have been introduced to him or his work. 
Fairbairn’s biographer, John Sutherland, has also confirmed the fact that Fairbairn could 
not maintain regular contact with the British Psychoanalytic Group, albeit having 
attended a few meetings, due to this geographical isolation (Sutherland, 1989). Further 
to this fact is that, in my research into the existing literature, I have not been able to 

















“Have patience with everything unresolved in your heart and try to love the 
questions themselves as if they were locked rooms in a foreign language.  
Live the questions now.  
Some day you will live your way into the answers."  
 
















The First Letter 
Woolf’s nephew, Quentin Bell who is best known for his biography of Virginia 
Woolf (Bell 1972), recorded four major mental breakdowns throughout his aunt’s 
lifetime. My starting place is her first mental breakdown into depression, at the age of 13, 
soon after her mother, Julia Prinsep Stephan, died in 1895 from a rheumatic fever (pp. 
44).  
In the aftermath of her mother’s death, 
[She] became painfully excitable and nervous and then intolerably depressed. ... 
She went through a period of morbid self-criticism, blamed herself for being vain 
and egotistical, compared herself unfavourably to Vanessa [her sister] and was at 
the same time intensely irritable (ibid: 45) 
 
My first letter to the imaginary Woolf will be addressed to this period of her life, 
which marked an acute transition point in her life and mental state, and during which she 
can be seen as being in a state of depression. As the psychological difficulties arose from 
the loss of her mother, I believe that this provides possibilities in which the 
Freudian/Abrahamian formulation of depression can be effectively reflected upon. The 













Recently I found myself thinking about what you told me about the untimely loss 
of your mother when you were only 13 years old. How she had been an important 
presence in your life, and how her sudden death was extremely difficult to make sense of 
and to mourn for at such a young age. To some extent it was almost like you could not 
believe the loss had really happened.  
You recounted the moment after her death, “Stella [Virginia’s half-sister] took us 
in, to laugh, secretly, at the nurse crying. She’s pretending, I said, aged 13, and was 
afraid I was not feeling enough” (1983 [1934]: 242). The death did not feel real to you, 
even when seeing the deceased body of your mother. There was an absence of grief as 
the sense of loss could not register in you. This understandably led to difficulties in 
mourning. Yet the loss haunted you after that day, repeatedly and relentlessly. As you 
once said to me, “until I was in my 40’s ... the presence of my mother obsessed me. I 
could hear her voice, see her, imagine what she would do or say as I went about my 
day's doings” (Woolf, 1939: 80-1). The presence of her absence permeated so deeply 
into the on-going experience of your life. Her voice resounded and her image crept into 
so many of the fictional creations you went on to write. 
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 Grief remained inaccessible for you for a long time, as it was immediately 
masked by the exalted fantasy of liberation from the critical glance once cast upon you 
by your mother, who modelled and reinforced the strict Victorian values of proper 
womanhood to which you could not live up. It was not until much later that you realized 
that her death was in fact “the greatest disaster it could happen” (Woolf, 2002 [1908]) to 
you, and to the family.  
From my own personal experience, I can understand why the loss of your mother 
was not one that could be easily mourned. I pondered whether what you experienced as 
a paradoxical mismatch between the experience of loss and your feelings could be 
understood psychoanalytically? Your experience called to my mind what I have learned 
from reflecting upon Freud in understanding a similar emotional response in the 
aftermath of my own loss. Perhaps this might be of interest to you? 
I am aware that you have read some of Freud’s work but avoided any kind of 
Freudian analysis due to your distrust of him and disapproval of his view of human 
psychology. But to my surprise, you have still found some of his ideas, for instance the 
concept of ‘ambivalence’, helpful for you to make sense of your personal experiences 
(Goldstein, 1974: 448-9).  
 I recalled what you shared with me in reflections of your feelings about your 
father,  
 
But in me, … rage alternated with love. It was only the other day when I read 
Freud, for the first time, that I discovered that this violently disturbing conflict of 




Although the object of ambivalence that you spoke of here was unmistakably 
your father, I found myself wondering whether that could be referring to your mother as 
well? I say this because from what I have read in your fictional stories, for example in A 
Room of One’s Own, Mrs Dalloway, and To The Lighthouse, the theme was that of 
ambivalent relationships that were manifested between child and mother, and not the 
father (Hirsch, 1989: 109). Personally I had not previously known you to openly 
acknowledge your mother as an object of ambivalence for you. I assumed this has to do 
with her dying whilst you were still young? If there was a sense of ambivalence it would 
have been more difficult to reflect on, as it could be marked by a powerful longing for 
her in the aftermath of loss. I think that your ambivalence touched upon something 
tremendously important in understanding the unspoken difficulties you had with your 
parents. This also suggested to me that, by reflecting the Freudian idea, you had made a 
change with regards to your attitudes towards Freud? You did not say anything further 
but I have some hope, at this point, that you would be willing to suspend your judgement 
upon reading this, and consider my further contemplations on it and the possibility of the 
connections I am going to make here.  
It seems important to me to start with Freud’s paper Mourning and Melancholia 
(1917) in which he talks about why, in some cases, loss develops into depression. I 
should leave aside the problematic view he has that mourning is either normal or 
pathological (with the latter being linked to depression), and focus instead on what I 
think would be relevant for you, particularly the concepts concerning  ‘the unconscious 
loss’ and the ‘incorporation of the lost-object’. You have not previously mentioned these 
two concepts before, so I thought you might be interested to know more? 
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Freud (1917) suggests the absence of grief in the person who has suffered loss 
and their inability to mourn needs to be comprehended with the concept of ‘ambivalence’ 
– the conflictual polarities of love and hate towards the object that has been lost (pp. 
256). In your case, although it was not apparent to you, the ambivalently loved and hated 
object would be Mrs Stephen, your mother, to whom part of you yearned for attachment, 
from whom another part of you sought detachment. But where did the hate come from? 
How could you possibly have hated her, you would ask. She was by nature the most 
caring and attentive person, with that astonishing beauty that made people hold their 
breath in admiration.  
You remembered her to be, 
intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She was utterly unselfish. 
She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If 
there was chicken, she took the leg; if there was a draught she sat in it--in short 
she was so constituted that she never had a mind or a wish of her own, but 
preferred to sympathize always with the minds and wishes of others (Woolf, 
1931a: 236-8). 
 
She was what you referred to as “the angel of the house” (Woolf, 1931a) in 
motherly form. Yet her motherly care and love was a luxury to which you had only a 
tiny share, being amongst eight children and not her favourite, whilst her idealized 
femininity and nursing talent brought to her the constant burden of demands and 
exploitation by the more needy others, such as sick relatives or your father. Ultimately 
she weakened into physical collapse. “Can I remember ever being alone with her for 
more than a few minutes” (Woolf, 2002 [1939]: 93), I heard you murmur to yourself 
once. She was almost always absent in your childhood, and even when she was around, 
she felt distant and emotionally unavailable. “She was sharp; she disliked affection” 
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(ibid: 94), as you recalled. I did not say this to you at the time but I sensed that you had 
wished to be closer to her and to have her respond to your longing for her more 
generously, but those desires had never been met sufficiently. And that look on her face, 
as you remembered it by her deathbed, when you came to say your final good-bye to her, 
the face that was frozen with severity, iron-cold. You could neither love nor hate her 
fully as a child caught in the paradox of a desire for more of her and being intimidated 
by her reserved presence of discipline and severity. But she was your mother, highly 
praised for being a good woman and mother. I believe that, for a child, just the thought 
of hating one’s mother, even at the age of 13, would indeed be unthinkable. Hate must 
be repressed, in Freud’s thinking, to help keep the intense hateful feelings towards the 
mother at bay. My thought as to why “rage alternated with love” in you in relation to 
your mother centres on her emotional unavailability and frequent absence in your 
childhood. I was dubious when Freud suggested to me that a daughter’s hate towards the 
mother had its origin from the eroticized desires for the father during the oedipal phase11. 
I hope you would agree with me on this.   
For you what seemed to trigger the depressive state was the loss of your mother, 
a good object. Your inability to mourn suggests that her death was not as simple as a 
loss of a loved object. Had it been this simple, the mourning would, in your own opinion 
and that of everyone else been straightforward. But I am assuming that what led to the 
inability to mourn was that underneath there were also an immense ambivalence and an 
                                                
11 Freud’s original view on the origins of ‘repression’ was one-sided and emerged during 
the onset of oedipal phase, where the sexual instincts towards the parent of opposite sex 
and the hostile instincts towards the parent of same sex were met with anxieties in acute 
form: penis envy and castration anxiety. As in the case of Little Hans (Freud, 1909) 
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unconscious loss, that something was lost altogether with actual loss of your mother. 
The loss of an object, either loved or hated one, is catastrophic and the pain insufferable, 
as Freud emphasized, because it not only deprived you of an on-going external 
relationship with her whom you undoubtedly loved, but also because it threatened the 
internal attachment, the object-tie, to her by which the ego came to define itself. The 
meaning of your loss was entangled and complicated in the face of ambivalence. Freud 
(1917) believes that in melancholia there is an unconscious mourning for the 
unconscious. He believes that the great problem lying behind depression is that the 
melancholic ‘knows whom he has lost, but not what he has lost in him’ (pp. 254, italics 
original). In this sense the important question to explore would be what was lost in you, 
at an unconscious level, with your mother’s death. Reflecting Freud, I wondered whether 
what you suffered was not only the loss of your mother, but also an object at which the 
hate, the aggressive libido, could be accurately directed. The hostile impulses thus 
became aimless. You could not expend your fury, as the object that originated hate was 
no longer there. Object-cathexis, as Freud (1917) called it, is a necessary part of the 
normal mourning process so that the ego can finally be freed from the lost-object 
through gradually loosening the libidinal tie to the lost-object (pp. 249). And what 
inhibits this process of cathexis results in a stagnation of the depressive state. 
Freud suggested to me that in the case of depression, apart from losing an object 
where instinctual aims could be directed, there is something else, something more 
profound. This stems from his observation of the depressive’s total withdrawal of libido 
from external reality, and their inability to re-invest their libido beyond the ego, i.e. the 
objects outside of themselves. This commonly finds expressions in the loss of 
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motivation and aims, and a complete retreat from the outside world. I have begun to 
ponder Freud’s views in thinking about your initial numbness to your mother’s death. 
Perhaps it signified a psychological mechanism operating under the surface, and if that 
could be the case, then the psychological meaning of it would be far more complicated 
than what appeared to be shock, or a denial of the death.  
When I consulted Freud on this, he referred to his paper, On Narcissism (1914), 
and pointed out to me that the essential nature of the object-loss in depression is the loss 
of part of the ego due to a narcissistic identification with the lost-object. In other words, 
the danger of losing someone with whom the ego narcissistically identified, through 
death, separation or estrangement etc., is not just the loss of that person, but it also is a 
loss of an aspect of the ego which merged with the narcissistically-identified object 
whose existence depends on the experience of the on-going attachment to the person. 
And, “if the love for the object—a love which cannot be given up though the object 
itself is given up [i.e. due to severe disappointments by the object] - takes refuge in 
narcissistic identification” (Freud, 1917: 251). Through narcissistic identification, the 
ego re-enacts its desire to be the object that one loves and desires (Butler, 1999: 80-2), 
hence avoiding the consequences of a loss of the object. The re-creation of the internal 
object-tie resembling the real object-relations is the melancholic solution to cope with 
this pain of losing the object in reality.  
In depression, there is a regressive attempt to return to the ego-cathexis – 
libidinal investment inside the ego, which characterizes the phase of primary 
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narcissism12 It is through incorporation, a mechanism akin to what Freud described as an 
oral-sadistic impulses of devouring the object, (Freud, 1917: 249-50), that the ego 
reinstates and re-establishes the lost object internally, and can once again maintain the 
internal connection to the lost object. If this was the case for you in the aftermath of the 
death of your mother, the introjected lost loved-object would live on as the ‘forsaken 
object’ (Freud, 1917: 249) in you. The process of incorporating your mother would 
conjure a process of becoming her, the lost object, through an intense identification with 
her. The ego, then, is convinced of nothing ever being lost, or that it can be lost, and the 
unbearable pain of object-loss is obviated.  
I recollected a line you read to me once from your novel The Waves (1931b), 
“Our separate drops are dissolved. […] lost in the abysses of time” (pp. 165). The 
symbolic imaginary you conjured coincides theoretically with the desire for psychical 
merging, which Freud (1914) described as a state of “secondary narcissism”, of the ego 
and its lost loved object. Perhaps, like the way ‘two separate drops are dissolved’, your 
deepest longing was to return to a non-differentiation state where you could re-unite 
with your mother as one and inseparable wholeness. By transferring the external 
relationship into the intra-psychic realm and continuing the investment in the forsaken 
object of your mother, the reality of the loss and of the differentiation could be deterred. 
Mourning could not happen. Freud argued that this constitutes a common psychic 
defence that diminishes the emotional impact of significant loss.  
Depression as a psychical phenomenon in Freud’s view would resemble 
                                                
12 Both of Freud’s conception of ‘introjection’ and ‘incorporation’ are intertwined with 
the idea of ‘identification’. As Sánchez-Pardo (2003) points out, his ambiguous use of 
these terms in his writing makes it hard to further differentiate them (p. 33).  
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an open wound, a black hole, an abyss of dereliction. There is no real object loss 
in melancholia, no mourning; rather there is a pseudo-mourning, which threatens 
the object. The lost object leaves its psychic trace inside - introjection and 
incorporation - and there is a disavowal of object loss. (Sánchez-Pardo, 2003:  51) 
 
However incorporation as triggered by loss has its downside. As it happens, the 
ego reinstates not only the loved aspects of your mother, but also “the shadow of the 
object” (Freud, 1917: 249) as characterised by its destructive aspects that comes to 
burden the ego (ibid). The state of the ego becomes altered by the incorporation and 
‘impoverished’ as a result. By keeping the lost object alive internally, the ego pays the 
price of surrendering unconditionally to the demands by the incorporated object. “[H]ate 
comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer 
and deriving sadistic satisfaction” (Freud, 1917: 251). The idealized femininity of your 
mother became your ego-ideal (superego), and that “intensely sympathetic, charming, 
utterly unselfish” maternal object she represented became an unattainable ‘oppressive 
phantom’ (Woolf, 1931a). The oppressive restraint of the forsaken object, your mother, 
was reincarnated inside you, and found expression in your relentless self-criticism when 
in an acute state of melancholia not long after her death. 
How little use I am in the world! Selfish, vain, egoistical and incompetent. Will 
you think out a training to make me less selfish? It is pathetic to see Adrian 
[Woolf’s younger brother] develops virtues, as my faults grow. (Woolf, 1975 
[1909]: 411) 
 
What struck me was that the very things which you accused of yourself, “selfish, 
vain, egoistical and incompetent’” (ibid) paint a completely contrary picture to ‘the 
angel of the house’ (Woolf, 1931a), the ideal of womanhood you describe as being 
embodied by your mother. I believe that your choice of words was not random, but the 
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doing of the unresolved ambivalence between love and hate that was being internally 
evoked towards your mother. The sense of “vain” and “incompetent” could be the ego’s 
helpless protest in the grip of the potent destructiveness of the introjected mother. Whilst 
the sense of “selfish” and “egoistical” could be the ego’s surrender to a narcissistic love 
for the introjected mother through an on-going libidinal re-investment. You would 
notice that those accusations you had against yourself sharply contrasted to your 
description of your mother as “utterly unselfish” and self-sacrificial, the opposite of 
egoistical. 
 You could not escape your self-criticism and insisted on seeing yourself as 
faulty, as you could not fulfil what the ego-ideal demanded of you. What charmed you 
before now tormented you, restraining and oppressing your ego’s expression of being its 
self (Kristeva, 1989: 5), which is so characteristic of depression. Therefore incorporation 
transforms the loss of the lost-object into ego-loss - loss of the integrity of ego (Freud, 
1917: 249). The fundamental problem at the heart of Freudian depression is thus 
essentially “not knowing how to lose” (Kristeva, 1989: 5).  
 
Early on, I said that your difficulties in mourning after your mother’s death did 
not seem odd to me because I personally experienced a similar scenario. I would like to 
share this with you, and hopefully make Freud’s theory more relevant to both of us. 
My first encounter with depression was after the divorce of my parents, when I 
was twenty-one. After that any contact with my father ceased completely. Like you, I 
was unable to mourn for the loss of an on-going contact with my father or for the loss of 
our integrity as a family, whilst everyone else continued to suggest that I should be 
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heartbroken, devastated, needing some help to get through it. They thought that my 
emotional numbness was only pretence and found it frustrating when I could not display 
some appropriate emotions to confirm their worries. Deep down, apart from a wish that 
people would stop consoling me for the pain they imagined I should be suffering; I was 
genuinely unable to feel even a minute amount of sadness. The conventions of grieving 
repulsed me. God knows how much I could relate to you saying you felt ridiculed by the 
nurses crying by your mother’s deathbed that day (Woolf, 1983 [1934]: 242).  
I could not say it out loud at that time that I had willed it, the divorce, since the 
day I realized what was behind my mother’s failing health. The paternal tyranny that my 
father inflicted on the family was suffocating, and manifested as both incessant financial 
control and emotional oppression. During the years of growing up divorce had seemed 
to me the only way to break free from the paternal control he had on me and on the 
family. I pictured a happier family without him (perhaps mother would stop being ill 
with depression?). Sensing that it was considered inappropriate to celebrate parents’ 
divorce, I could not admit that I found myself feeling an immense relief after the divorce 
as I thought my dream of the Independence Day had come true. And to break the tie 
completely I adopted my mother’s maiden surname instead. I could not meet the 
expectations of my concerned relatives who had defined for me what I should be feeling, 
so I only wished that they would leave me alone and let my life return to normal. I 
thought I was coping fine with being fatherless, so when depression landed its first 
impact on me shortly after, I could not work out a possible cause for it. I had finally got 
what I wished for, hadn’t I? 
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It was not until I consulted Freud that I realized what could have happened to me 
on a psychological level. He thought that my relationship with my father contained 
highly ambivalent feelings of love and hate, in the sense that I had invested both sexual 
and the aggressive energy in my father. The outward symptoms of depression I had were 
explained as sign of an undercurrent of psychic mourning in the unconscious. I hardly 
agreed initially; in contrast to your feelings for your mother where hate was hard to 
justify, my struggle was to figure out how I could love my father in any way. How could 
I mourn, either consciously or unconsciously, for something I wished gone? 
Freud, drawing from his views on Femininity (1933), suggested to me that my 
ambivalence towards my father derived largely from an un-resolved Oedipal complex,13 
and had little to do with my father’s actual behaviours. His explanation was that the 
daughter’s channelling the sexual instincts, or ‘eros’, towards their father happens as a 
natural occurrence in the itinerary of heterosexual psychosexual development in women. 
A daughter’s desire to have a penis, which she does not possess, is transformed into a 
desire for the father 14 . He further explained that my bitterness and resentment, 
symbolizing the feelings of hate, were an unconscious psychological defence at work 
with the purpose of masking my inhibited feelings of love towards my father as the 
                                                
13 Further to this is Freud’s (1933) view of the femininity that the female body is a 
representation of as biological deficiency, i.e. a lack of a penis. This felt incompleteness 
reaches its climax around the Oedipal phase, which spans from the age of 3 to 6 years, 
where the daughter is driven by penis envy, and subsequently she has to give up the 
primary, pre-oedipal bond with the mother in order to achieve heterosexuality. 
14 Jouve (2000) points out that, in Woolf’s time, Freud had abandoned his seduction 
theory, in which he initially thought that the child’s sexual desires were caused by 
parental seduction, and replaced it with his drive theory, in which he believed sexual 
desires derived from the child’s own unconscious drive towards the parents which led to 
the delusion of seduction. Woolf’s close relative, her sister-in-law Karin Stephen held 
this view too (pp. 247).  
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desired Oedipal object. He wanted me to see that my hate had its origin in the face of 
unfilled desires for love from my father, and that the more passionate my love is, the 
more the hate there will be.  
He sees my unconscious conflicts between love and hate starting in the Oedipal 
phase. The realization that the love is one-sided, and therefore cannot be fulfilled, brings 
about not only tremendous pain but also a regressive return to the pre-oedipal bond with 
the mother, whom he deems the universal first sexual object. The shift from the Oedipal 
object to the first sexual object was a psychical manoeuvre to avoid the pain of rejection 
by my father. Love, given its Oedipal roots, has to be repressed, leaving hate a conscious 
and dominating feeling towards my father. He reasoned that my loyalty to my mother 
and the on-going psychological bond I had with her was an evidence of my re-directing 
the sexual instinct from my father to my mother. My attachment towards my mother and 
aggression towards my father was seen as a result of an unsuccessful negotiation of the 
triangular dynamics in which the repressed love was replaced with hatred (1920: 384).  
However I found this both an unsatisfactory explanation and a distressingly 
offensive manoeuvring of my femininity by placing the blame on me for being unable to 
resolve the conflicts of desires, rivalries, and loyalty in the face of Oedipal tension 
between mother and father. His explanation, with an implied accusation that it was my 
problem, deriving from my innate instinctual wishes, and not something caused by the 
environmental others, also re-provoked my anger towards the paternal authority 
exercised by the father(s). However, similar to your experience with Freud, my protests 
on this matter were futile. Freud showed no concession to my disagreements. As we 
could not reach an agreement on what really caused my ambivalence (the unconscious 
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conflicts of love and hate) towards my father, I decided to suspend my disagreement on 
the matter and proceed with a request to have my question answered: why I should 
become depressed at the time of my life when I thought I had finally achieved what I 
always wanted - to live as my own person by breaking from my father, which had 
remained a dream, and a conscious longing all my life?  
Freud corrected me by saying that the loss of my father was only a conscious 
knowing, and what I was really unconsciously mourning for was the invisible loss in me. 
And the loss, he suggested, must have been great so as to cause such a disruption in my 
being. But what could it be? The question left me in confusion as I left Freud. It was not 
until much later when you told me your own experience that I could start putting his 
words to use. Although I remained sceptical about Freud’s emphasis on sexuality in 
shaping our motives (Jacobs, 1992: 42), I found some truth in what he said about the 
unconscious loss.  
I thought about what supported me through all those years in the father’s reign, 
what made me strong enough to survive in my deepest despair. It was not my mother 
who was in her constant battle with depression; it was not the relatives who thought we 
owed our comfortable life to my father and I was only being ungrateful to have any 
complaints; it was not my friends who, well, knew little about my family situation. I 
believe what saved me was my hatred for the father.  The hate that was lived through in 
a revengeful fantasy of defeating my father’s tyranny one day, of having him pay the 
price for what he had done wrong, of envisaging the failures being his final fate. It was 
hate, and an intense one, that had kept me vigorous and alive.  
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On recalling what depression did to me, the first thing that came to my mind was 
a sense of purpose, or a motivation to go on living disappearing until living itself seemed 
meaningless. I felt that I was dying inside, a slow death as depression consumed my 
sense of being, and of ”being itself” (Kristeva, 1989: 5) until I could only see my being 
as a vice, with an ego too ‘impoverished’, to borrow Freud’s term, to feel any self worth. 
To Freud, a loss of interest in life could be translated as a loss of instinctual life. He was 
right. The loss was great indeed in that I lost what I had been holding onto to live. I lost 
a reason for hate to exist, a hate bound to my father, when I made the conscious decision 
to eliminate him from my external reality. To this Freud would argue that I had not lost 
him for real, for he had continued to live as ‘a forsaken object’ in my internal world to 
allow me to maintain the emotional tie and go on hating. And I did, in a form of an 
intense self-hatred that preserved my passionate hatred. This would be, in Freud’s 
explanation, because of the hate being re-directed at the ego that has now incorporated 
the lost object. On the surface it seemed I had achieved what I longed for, an eternal 
break of the external object-tie, but in fact I was only imprisoned with the forsaken 
object resurrected in myself. My relentless attacks directed at it also put myself at the 
risk of being destroyed by my own cruel hatred.  
Virginia, it has seemed that for a long time we have been both haunted by the 
phantoms of the lost objects that could not be put to rest. But mourning only becomes 
possible when we come to see what we have really lost internally. If Freud was right, 
then the unconscious loss must be brought to the open to instigate mourning for what has 
been lost. To admit the loss it must entail the necessary process of ‘killing the dead’ 
(Leader, 2009: 124).  
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I hope that this letter could offer some Freudian insights consistent to what you 
























The Second and Third Letter 
The unresolved feelings towards the death of Woolf’s mother became reinforced 
by the sequential death of her half-sister Stella, two years after in 1897 (Rose, 1978: 16-
7). After her mother’s death, Stella, who inherited many of the characteristics of her 
mother, had slipped into the role of a substitute mother for the Stephen children. She 
brought relief to them by enacting the mother figure for them, making it possible for 
them to attend to their daily lives without being crippled by the lack of a mother (Lee, 
1997: 134). Understandably, Stella’s sudden death was to re-evoke an emotional turmoil 
that had been hidden in Virginia after losing her mother. Similar to her mother’s death, 
Stella’s death was linked to her failing health, exacerbated by an over-exhaustion of 
running the household, taking care of the little Stephen children, and most of all, 
accommodating the neediness of the father who, as a wifeless widower, became 
increasingly demanding of empathetic attention and attentive company from her. A 
tremendous number of domestic duties were imposed upon Stella as the substitute 
mother. At the same time, she enacted those inherited characteristics from the mother as 
a nurturing and self-less carer that Virginia Woolf herself much depended on for 
company and comfort (Lee, 1997: 139).  
Indeed, Stella’s fate was much akin to that of her mother’s, as she gave in to the 
demands made upon Victorian women. Her own happiness, even as a newlywed, was 
prohibited by her father, who was too concerned with his own misfortune (Rose, 1978: 
20-1). Lee (1997) argues that, being a witness to the troubling relationship between her 
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submissive mother, and then later on, her half-sister Stella, and her demanding father 
must have fuelled Woolf’s intense re-evaluation of the “tyranny and hypocrisy” of 
Victorian fatherhood during her establishment of a feministic frameworks in her writings 
and personal values (pp. 138).  
Stella was buried next to her mother, Julia Stephen, in Highgate, but none of the 
Stephen children attended the funeral (Lee, 1997: 140). Despite the scarcity of outward 
expressions of her feelings, Woolf preserved in her diary those emotional difficulties 
brought about by Stella’s death in a fragmented and desolate way (ibid), 
Things are all in a tangle … It is hopeless and strange … Very strange and 
unhappy … Everything is strange & unhappy… Everything is miserable & 
lonely … One day is so like another that I never write about them … And 
another & another & another yet to come. Oh dear they are very long, & I seem 
cowardly throughout when I look at them. Still, courage & plod on. (Woolf, 1990 
[1987]: 115-34) 
 
The passage unquestionably conveys much of the hopelessness experienced by 
Woolf, at only fifteen and a half years old. The death must have been a catastrophe 
indeed, for it was Stella who once relieved the Stephan children “from the conventions 
of sorrow” (Woolf, 2002[1939]: 105), only to re-kindle with her own tragic death “the 
haze of heavy emotion” (ibid: 104) that the mother’s death had left. The death of Stella 
was a second blow to young Virginia, forcing her to acknowledge the tragic loss that she 
previously ignored. The gloomy air in the house of losses and grieving persisted in 
shadowing her early life.  
It was not until nearly three decades later that Woolf could fit these early 
experiences of losses into an artistic whole in To the Lighthouse (Woolf, 2004[1927]). 
During the time of working on To the Lighthouse, her mind was drawn to the earliest 
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moments with her mother, as exclusively to herself as a mother-daughter couple could 
be (Woolf, 2002[1939]: 93). Woolf acknowledged To the Lighthouse as her most 
autobiographical novel as the characters were based on the actual people in her life15. 
The death of Mrs Ramsay and Prue, one of the Ramsay children, in the story, most likely 
represented the death of her own mother and Stella. Notably, the process of working on 
To the Lighthouse took her to as close to experiencing psychoanalysis as she would ever 
allow herself,   
As she described, 
I wrote the book [To the Lighthouse] very quickly; and when it was written, I 
ceased to be obsessed by my mother. I no longer hear her voice; I do not see her. 
I suppose that I did for myself what psycho-analysts do for their patients. I 
expressed some very long felt and deeply felt emotion. And in expressing it I 
explained it and then laid it out to rest. (2002 [1939]: 81) 
 
Woolf compared the psychological meaning of To the Lighthouse for her to an 
“elegy” (Woolf 1980 [1925]: 33) Bearing in mind the significance the novel has to her, 
my second letter will address To the Lighthouse, seeking a Kleinian language to 
reconstruct Virginia Woolf’s past and the origin of her depression. I will attend to the 
narratives of Lily Briscoe as my main interpretive subject16, and situate in the letter the 
controversy between Freud and Klein on the subject of depression.  
                                                
15 As Woolf (1953) herself acknowledges in her writer’s diary, her motivation for the 
novel is “to have father’s characters done complete in it; and mother’s; and St. Ives; and 
childhood, and all the usual things I try to put in— life, death, etc. But the centre is 
father’s character, sitting in a boat, reciting “We perished each alone”, while he crushes 
a dying mackerel (pp. 75) 
 
16The reason of my focusing on Lily has to do with the historical context. During the 




Letter Two – ‘For We Think Back Through Our Mother’ 
 
Dear Virginia  
 
I have recently finished To the Lighthouse, and would like to discuss with you 
some thoughts that were evoked in me from my reading and re-reading of it, in a 
psychoanalytic light.  
The centre of the novel revolves around the character of the father figure, Mr 
Ramsay. (Woolf, 1953: 75). Indeed his character is the most vigorous amongst all; his 
tyrannical presence and the unrestrained emotionalism with which he bears down on the 
family, coupled by his need to dominate those around him (who struggle but comply) 
conjures up a surge of resentment in me as a reader. As I read, I could feel him 
commanding me to attend to him, and quite forcefully so, that it should be him and not 
somebody else who is the thematic focus of the novel and controls the emotional tides of 
my reading experience.  
On my first reading of To the Lighthouse it seemed to me, from the way you 
constructed the patricentric narratives and began the story through a conventional 
Freudian plot of the Oedipal rage in James (the youngest Ramsay child) towards his 
father, Mr Ramsay, that you had finally given into the Freudian theory of patriarchal 
                                                                                                                                           
completed Klein’s London lecture series, visited her, and this, as recorded in Woolf’s 
diary, brought about her creation of Lily Briscoe, (Abel, 1989: 68).  
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dominance. Seemingly the novel was written to affirm the Freudian theory by 
positioning the father at the centre, and perhaps also to cater to an increasingly popular 
trend, concurrent a growing recognition of Freud, that imbues fiction with 
psychoanalytic plots (Dever, 1998: 3). Indeed Leonard (Woolf’s husband) received To 
the Lighthouse with great contentment and pleasure as the result of your explicit use of 
Freudian thought17.  
However, on my re-reading of it I have come to realize that my first impression 
was most likely inaccurate. Could it be your intention, Virginia, to trick us to an 
incorrect conclusion via the Freudian surface plots, whilst blinding us to your real 
arguments? You said to me once that “being read [is] superficial” (Woolf, 1985[1953]: 
75). Were you already hinting to me not to take everything you write at the face value? 
By withholding much of the explanations of your real feelings about psychoanalysis and 
the purpose of your narrative designs, you leave much space for my speculations, and 
now I wish to see if any of it could be closer to your true intention.  
My reading of the novel led me to an impression that Mr Ramsay, the father of 
the Ramsay children, occupies the centre of the plot in the overt narrative. Knowing 
your personal experience with Freud, I wondered whether your portrayal of Mr Ramsay 
in the novel represents not only your father but also, on a deeper level, Freud, the father 
of psychoanalysis, with whose thoughts you disagree but found it futile to openly 
criticise. 
                                                
17 Woolf recorded in her diary that she felt an immense relief after Leonard Woolf read 
To the Lighthouse, praised highly of it and called it a “psychological poem” (Woolf, 
1985[1953]: 102). 
 101 
What he said was true. It was always true. He was incapable of untruth … never 
altered a disagreeable word to suit the pleasure or convenience of any mortal 
being, least of his own children … should be aware from childhood that life is 
difficult; facts uncompromising; and the passage to that fabled land where our 
brightest hopes are extinguished (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 10) 
 
I read this passage as your camouflaged criticism of Freud’s psychoanalytic 
paradigm, which centralised the father and his authoritarian stance, which arrested his 
capacity to consider your feminine perspectives. Freud’s theoretical claims are un-
negotiable; his theory stands for truth, disregarding therefore a subjective account of 
reality. In your case it is a feminine reality that is at the core of your psychological 
narratives as a daughter. His theory of psychosexual development tasks woman to grow 
out of the necessity of separation from the primary loved-object - the mother. Freud is 
uncompromising in how we should develop psychosexually as a daughter, how we 
should overcome the primary bond with the mother and to mature through the Oedipal 
dynamics of implicit prohibitions and eroticized longings (Hirsch, 1989: 99).  Freud sees 
female identity as only emerging fully-grown in the wake of her sexuality. To be a 
Freudian daughter is to surrender to the intervention of the father as a third person who 
breaks up the bond between mother and daughter. This is the only way to be on a 
‘normal’ developmental path. Women have a less evolved super-ego; women are not as 
good as men therefore they should submit themselves to men’s rule. Freud’s judgements 
of woman reflect the reality of the gender prejudices of the post-Victorian era you lived 
in. In his eyes what woman lack is  “the super-ego … so independent of its emotional 
origins as we require it to be in men (Freud, 1925: 257-8)”.  
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Reading To The Lighthouse through a Kleinian lens, I became convinced that the 
“emotional origins” from which Freud believed that men were required to break out, is 
what you hoped to return to - the “fabled land” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 10) that is fertilised 
by the maternal provision that wraps the baby to the breast of milk, of warmth. The 
access to that fabled land, the soothing pre-oedipal encapsulation with the mother, is 
extinguished from the Freudian theory, as it can only be found outside of the patricentric 
construction of ethics, morality, and rationality. On the surface level, To The Lighthouse 
conforms to Freudian theory (perhaps to avoid criticism that could distract the aesthetics 
of the work?), but underneath you skilfully construct an alternative narrative, and 
arguably a Kleinian one, through Lily Briscoe’s symbolic representations in painting. 
Whilst Mr Ramsay occupies the centre of the novel’s narrative texts, Lily’s painting 
gives the centrality to Mrs Ramsay, the mother, indicating the latent theme of the novel.  
By creating a gap between the novel’s overt narrative and the symbolic space of 
Lily’s painting, you allow a transitional space (Winnicott, 1971) where the boundary 
between the objective reality and the internal phantasy is blurred. It seems that Lily 
Briscoe, the un-married woman artist, serves as your vehicle in creating a transitional 
space within the novel and allows you to bridge the external reality of what is happening 
as you portrayed in words, and the internal perception of what is being felt psychically 
and subjectively as captured on Lily’s canvas. By oscillating between the narrative 
presentation and Lily’s painting as the psychic space of the novel, you conserve what 
could not be put to words and so have been left unsaid. In this in-between space, the 
fractured incongruities of thoughts and primitive sense of emotional experiences become 
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open to mediation. This enables you to unburden yourself of the incongruities of what is 
thought and what is felt, and to unhurriedly move forward the story.  
By transferring expression onto Lily’s canvas, you reconfigure a different 
language to give expression for what could not be spoken. What Lily’s painting 
expresses through symbolic language through brush-strokes and colours, is neither clear 
nor absolute. When Lily brings herself to paint, “[s]he was not inventing; she was only 
trying to smooth out something she had been given years ago folded up; something she 
had seen” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 228) If “folded up” could imply repression, Lily’s act of 
painting would imply her searching for the memory underneath the consciousness. 
Rather than creating something new, Lily’s canvas tracks the emotional clues into the 
past, into the primitive registers of those sensory and emotional experiences happened in 
the pre-oedipal attachment with the mother long before language becomes available 
(Abel, 1989: 47). When asked what she was painting, “in that corner, it was bright, here, 
in this, she [Lily] felt the need of darkness. [...] Mother and child then - objects of 
universal veneration” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 64).  
Through painting, Lily silently withdraws from the condescending paternal 
censorship that is represented through the character of Charles Tansley, who whispered 
in Lily’s ear, “woman can’t write, woman can’t paint18” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 60). 
Through painting Lily escapes into the reminiscence of the “fabled land” where her 
“brightest hopes” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 10) once flourished, and beckon us into the 
                                                
18 Non-coincidentally, Charles Tansley’s critical voice against women closely mimics 
that of Freud’s judgement of women, and it was to continually echo in Lily’s mind 
throughout the novel. The interrupting self-doubt and insecurity in Lily’s asserting her 
identity as a painter is a result of, what I would argue to be, an internalization of the 
critical paternal censor in the face of gender prejudices.  
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maternal universe where Lily’s longing for Mrs Ramsay, the surrogate mother, and her 
searching for reunion with Mrs Ramsay in the aftermath of her death, shadows the story 
being told. 
Lily’s attempt to paint comes to symbolise her recognition and tracing of the 
roots of her emotions. This, I believe could be best described in Kleinian term of the 
psychical “phantasy” (1923) that is situated in internal object relations, powered by the 
subjective experience of the presence and absence of the maternal provision. You find 
expressions through Lily Briscoe’s painting to recollect the pre-linguistic experience of 
mother-infant fusion. In a way, Lily’s abstract art echoes your own language of symbolic 
layers (of sea, storm, rock… etc) in conjuring the emotive rhythms of the novel. By 
resorting to a language “not known to men” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 241), you strive to 
keep Lily’s subjective yet elusive experience from falling into the father-centred 
ideology Freudian theory enforced. This, perhaps, is your Kleinian challenge to the 
Freudian condescension to the mother-child bond, the essence of which lies outside the 
logical terms (Abel, 1989: 47).  
As Lily ponders, 
“For how could one express in words these emotions of the body? Express that 
emptiness there? ... It was one's body feeling, not one's mind. … To want and not 
to have sent all up her body a hardness, a hollowness, a strain. And then to want 
and not to have - to want and want - how that wrung the heart, and wrung it again 
and again.” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 241) 
 
What one is aware of, the “emotions of the body” (ibid) that cannot be conveyed 
through words, holds a central space in the Kleinian theory on the infantile experience. 
To Klein, at the beginning of life there is no differentiation between the bodily 
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experience and the psychic experience, as the psychic space is dominated by the somatic 
events of the body, such as the satisfaction and deprivation through the availability of 
the mother’s breast, crucial to its survival. As you aptly put it, “it was one's body feeling, 
not one's mind”, the very origin of our emotional life is founded on how we feel on the 
bodily level, whether one’s bodily needs are satisfied or not. Further to this is that Klein 
(1946) believes that we are born with a readiness to develop object relations through 
differentiating good experience (“want and have”) from the bad experience (“want and 
not to have”) during the primary relationship with the mother. Through the psychical 
mechanism of splitting, we built up a mental constellation of part-object world 
populating itself with the good and the bad objects, symbolizing the gratifying breast 
and the frustrating breast (Klein, 1946: 99). The mother’s breasts sustain the phantasy 
life of the infant; in the same way Mrs Ramsay grounds the novel’s psychic space as 
separate from its overt configuration foregrounding the father.  
 
In Lily there are intense longings for intimacy and a fantasy of merging with Mrs 
Ramsay, as she recollects the moments with her:   
“Could love, as people called it, make her and Mrs Ramsay one? For it was not 
knowledge, but unity that she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that 
could be written in any language known to men, but intimacy itself, which is 
knowledge, she had thought leaning her head on Mrs Ramsay’s knee. Nothing 
happened! Nothing! Nothing!, as she leant her head against Mrs Ramsay’s knee ” 
(Woolf, 2004[1927]: 63; italics added) 
 
Lily’s act of leaning her head on Mrs Ramsay’s knee is an open display of her 
emotional dependence on Mrs Ramsay, thus rendering her an all-powerful mother. But 
Lily’s need for love and intimacy from Mrs Ramsay could not be fulfilled due to her 
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emotional unavailability you so vividly portrayed. The passage also brings to life a real 
sense of Lily’s intense ambivalence towards Mrs Ramsay. As soon as Lily realizes her 
craving for intimacy with Mrs Ramsay, her lying against her knee, is not perceived and 
responded to, her longing is soon replaced by an intense destructive cry of rage towards 
Mrs Ramsay - “Nothing happened! Nothing! Nothing!” Lily’s internal cry induced in me, 
as a reader, powerful sorrow and rage. Like the baby who perceives the mother’s 
inability to understand and respond to her needs, Mrs Ramsay’s emotional unavailability 
has now felt to be the withdrawn breast, the depriving bad-object that threatens the 
infant’s survival. When maternal deprivation threatens, the wilfully destructive impulses 
in the baby are triggered for the purpose of destroying the bad object. She is now the 
hungry infant attacking the bad-breast through oral sadism in her phantasy. I would 
argue that this maternal deprivation so powerfully experienced by Lily was to be 
compounded by the fact of Mrs Ramsay’s death, at which point her maternal nurture 
becomes forever unavailable. Her death would have abolished any humblest wish left in 
Lily for Mrs Ramsay to love her, show her loving affection, and hold her in a most 
motherly way. It must have been a painful realization that none of these could ever be 
granted again, of the access to the fabled land externally lost 
Hirsch (1989) observes that Freudian critics often see the loss of Mrs Ramsay as 
an opportunity for Lily to grow from an infantile wish for a symbiosis with the mother 
and gradually coming to terms with the separation from the mother through the work of 
mourning; in Lily’s case, the essential rupture with Mrs Ramsay is occasioned by her 
death (pp. 111). Thinking back through the mother, therefore, is against the Freudian 
tradition and therefore omitted from the Freudian narrative. Klein, however, initiated 
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mother-centred thinking in her psychoanalysis (Doane & Hodges, 1992: 7). The family 
romance that was once too painful is revisited and recounted, through Lily’s feminine 
voice, in your construction of alternative familial narratives refigured and engulfed by 
the maternal presence and absence, connections and separations. What is deemed as 
pathologically immature to Freud then finds itself a valid ground to be keenly explored 
and validated in Kleinian theory in which you find the space to reverberate what you 
declared, in The Room of One’s Own, that “we think back through our mothers if we are 
woman” (Woolf, 1929). 
 
Lily’s continuous longing after Mrs Ramsay’s death, her impossible desire to re-
unite with her intensifies and cannot cease; “‘Mrs Ramsay! Mrs Ramsay!’ as she cried, 
feeling the old horror come back – to want and want and not to have. Could she inflict 
that still?” (p. 232, italics added). In Kleinian terms, the old horror Mrs Ramsay inflicts 
through her death, would symbolize the unnamed dread originating in the early infantile 
experience of maternal deprivation and abandonment that brings about the most 
annihilating sense of anxiety. Essentially Lily’s relationship with Mrs Ramsay is an 
ambivalent one, with the ambivalence heightened after the death of Mrs Ramsay. 
Virginia, this perhaps parallels your own relational journey with your mother? What 
Klein would say is that Mrs Ramsay’s death deprives Lily of the chance to reconcile 
love and hate, to reconcile the unresolved longing for Mrs Ramsay and an unresolved 
aggression (caused by the deprivation) towards the ambivalently loved and hated object.  
To experience the prolonged maternal deprivation of “want and want and not to have” 
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causes devastating and powerful anxieties in the infant, and the consequences are tragic 
indeed.  
 After Mrs Ramsay’s death, Lily’s longing for her resounds throughout the novel, 
“but nothing happened. The pain increased. […] Heaven be praised, no one had heard 
her cry that ignominious cry, stop pain, stop! She had not obviously taken leave of her 
senses” (p. 208). Mrs Ramsay is now gone, leaving Lily in a state of sheer horror at her 
unfulfilled longings as they can now never gain true satisfaction. And yet, “no one had 
seen her step off her strip of board into the waters of annihilation” (ibid, italics added). 
The annihilation you spoke of here could be heard unmistakably in a Kleinian undertone, 
in my view, as a metaphorical recall of the strong desires tormented but unfulfilled by 
the mother. The annihilation that is compounded by the fact that it could not be 
articulated to others due to its unconscious nature, and would be incomprehensible to 
others should you try to put it into words. I see this passage as marking the transition of 
the state of mind.  
Lily’s aggression and hostility, derived from not getting what she desired from 
Mrs Ramsay, has noticeably subdued to give way to even more overpowering senses of 
powerless vanity and grief. It can be said that the loss of Mrs Ramsay, once it sets in the 
mind as an undeniable reality, alters the ego’s relationship with the lost object of 
fluctuating love-hate ambivalence, from a dominance of hate to a prevalence of love. 
Loss brings about a realization of one’s love for the lost object. As frequently observed 
in the child’s reaction to the loss of an ambivalently loved object, the ego moderates its 
own relation to the lost object in order to psychologically justify the despair, remorse, 
and anxiety in the dissolution of the ambivalently loved object (Klein, 1935: 148). The 
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nature of Lily’s anxiety has transformed. From perceiving the self-generated destructive 
impulses projected onto the bad object, as persecutory and dangerous, who has now been 
lost, to owning19 her destructive impulses as coming from herself in a state of regret that 
it has done real harm to the loved object. In brief, the shift from paranoid anxiety to 
depressive anxiety comes in the wake of an awareness that the bad object and the good 
object are, in fact, the same person. 
Providing an illustration of depressive anxiety, Klein describes, “[a] little child 
which believes, when its mother disappears, that it has eaten her up and destroyed her 
(whether from motives of love or of hate)” (pp. 150) In the same sense, if I could give 
voice to Lily’s unconscious mind in a state of depressive anxiety, could her 
“ignominious cry” be actually crying a remorseful guilt that, “I have destroyed Mrs 
Ramsay by my sadistic, phantastic wishes of her destruction!”20. The psychological shift 
marked by this is a transition into melancholia, a progress of the mental state from the 
paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position. This is marked by anxieties 
generated from within in relation to one’s primary instincts of aggression, and the 
feeling of guilt as a result of the destruction of the loved object.  
Through painting, Lily sinks to an unconscious depth, thus her figurative 
painting allows her to capture the most uncensored psychological phenomenon that she 
cannot consciously call to mind, a method mimicking the psychoanalytic method of free 
association. The origins of her emotions are repressed, as is evidenced in one scene 
                                                
19 It is when the depressive position has been successfully achieved that the individual 
comes to take responsibility for their aggressive, sadistic impulses, and for the damage 
she has done to her objects, either external or internal one (Segal, 1952:  197) 
20 As Klein (1991[1944]) emphasized, the phantastic wishes and impulses are felt to be 
omnipotent in early minds. 
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where she could not answer sensibly to the question coming from the inspecting others 
about “the relations of masses, of lights and shadows” on her canvas because “she could 
not see it even herself” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 65). It would not surprise Klein that Lily 
finds herself lost for words. Klein herself would say that what eludes language are the 
archaic mental contents, the complexities of which cannot be captured within the literary 
order (Likierman, 2001: 112).  
Seeing the canvas as the space of the internal world, the relation of masses, of 
lights and of shadows would articulate the internal object relations repressed and 
unknown to the owner herself21. The contrast of the light and shadow could be the 
separate entities of the good and the bad objects internally created and differentiated by 
means of splitting. But how to bring together the good objects and the bad objects (Klein, 
1935: 172)? As Lily ponders, “how to connect this mass on the right hand with that one 
the left”? Her awareness and anxiety about the danger that ensues in the process of 
connecting them, that “by doing that the unity of the whole might be broken” (Woolf, 
2004[1927]: 65) speaks of a common and necessary anxiety that a Kleinian baby faces 
in the depressive position.  
 
Re-phrasing Lily’s psychical paradox evoked by painting in Klein’s own words, 
                                                
21 Abel’s argument is that Lily’s painting seeks to capture her struggle in the early 
negotiations of the ego-boundaries in the mother-baby dyad (1989: 69). I find this both 
an abstract account and potentially an underappreciation of Klein’s original view where 
the infant is only perceiving and relating to the mother as a part-object through her 
breasts. Further to this is the controversy between Freud and Klein where Freud believed 
the infancy is sheltered in primary narcissism, hence the differentiation between self and 
other is impossible, and did not agree with Klein that the infant could partly recognize 
the mother through her breasts (Likierman, 2001: 105). 
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[H]ow to put the bits together in the right way and at the right time; how to pick 
out the good bits and do away with the bad ones; how to bring the object to life 
when it has been put together; and there is the anxiety of being interfered with in 
this task by bad objects and by one's own hatred, etc. (Klein, 1935: 153) 
 
Lily’s concerns coincide with what Klein sees as the major challenge with which 
a depressive baby is confronted. The question of how to unite the split-off objects, the 
extremely bad and the extremely good, into a whole is essentially concerned with the 
issue of loss. The bad and the good are required to contrast one another, like shadow and 
light, which exist only in contrast to each other. The process of merging the good and 
the bad to a whole inevitably reduces the differentiation between them. The diminishing 
contrast between them conjures up in the infant a painful feeling of loss, from that of the 
absolute perfection of the loved object (Klein, 1935: 149). In this lies the psychological 
work of giving up an unrealistic perception of the ideal object to which one directs one’s 
love, in order to gradually come to terms with the sense of the “real object” – a real 
object that represents the imperfections and the inevitable limitations of life (Likierman, 
2001: 101). To acknowledge and accept the loss of the ideal object of unlimited 
gratification is what Klein sees as an essential step towards overcoming the depressive 
position. 
 Moreover, the loss of the ideal object is not the only loss a depressive infant has 
to bear. In Klein’s view both the good and the bad objects are emotionally indispensable. 
The sharp division between them allows the infant to retain both the feeling of love and 
hate. The realization of the whole object therefore generates the psychical conflicts 
between love and hate, preservation and destruction, as it forces into the infant’s 
awareness that the disappointing bad object is the same one as the good object that she 
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continues to need and rely upon. It is at this moment that she realizes she has lost not 
only a good object, but also a bad one; the bad object that is needed to validate the 
hostility and aggression so powerfully experienced in her phantasy. The original 
ambivalence felt towards the object therefore becomes difficult to maintain, threatened 
by this new gained realization, and the result is an emotional insecurity and the 
unresolved ambivalent tension.  
A Kleinian formulation of the depressive position is one filled with painful 
fragility in the wake of a sense of guilt after several significant losses of part-objects felt 
to be caused by oneself. Instead of seeing separation from the mother as an essential task 
for psychological development, Klein believes instead in the importance of the 
consistency of the maternal provision. Mothering is necessary to aid the infant in 
overcoming the depressive position with its unique emotional difficulties, involving two 
central tasks: mourning and reparation (Klein, 1940, 1946). The losses need to be 
mourned for so that they can be fully acknowledged and accepted; and the good object 
that have been lost needs to be restored to enable a sense of emotional security that the 
goodness of the mother is still available. The mother, the external object, by repeatedly 
returning to the infant, reassures the infant that the wholeness of the mother is unharmed 
and that loss can be regained. The mother’s continual provision of her presence and 
nurture to the baby reassures her that her rage and sadistic attacks are in fact tolerable, 
and that her wish for reparation should be granted.  
With maternal reassurances of unfailing love, the external world will be 
perceived as less dangerous as the baby lessens her need to disown her rage and 
aggression through the primitive mechanism of projection. In Klein’s view, the 
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importance of the external object lies in its neutralizing effect on the internally generated 
anxiety, either paranoid or depressive, so, powerfully experienced in the child (Mitchell, 
1981: 379). This takes place through the process of the child’s building up of the 
internalized goodness from the loved object that strengthens the child’s ego capacity to 
adapt to the imperfect reality of life where frustrations and limitations are inevitable. 
The emotional security needed to be able to love and hate with greater ease is gained 
through successful reparation with the loved object, leading the infant to outgrow her 
depressive anxieties.  
On the other hand, if, owing to the uncertainty of the good object, the split 
between the good and the bad object is too powerful for them to be brought together, to 
synthesize (Klein, 1946), the infant will not be able to mediate her hate with love, and 
the depressive position cannot be worked through (Klein, 1986[1956]: 217). This seems 
to be the case for Lily, as the on-going maternal deprivation that comes by way of the 
death of the mother. Mrs Ramsay was always preoccupied with something else, and was 
never fully present with her children. Lily’s desperate and urgent needs for reparation 
echoes repetitively yet is unanswered throughout To the Lighthouse; lovingly or 
hatefully she was unable to elicit a response from Mrs Ramsay, not by lying against her 
knee like a hungry baby craving for the good breast, nor by crying out to her again and 
again in Mrs Ramsay’s absence after death. No matter how intense her longing is for her, 
she could not revive Mrs Ramsay; the insufficiency of Mrs Ramsay’s maternal provision 
disorients Lily in the labyrinth of the depressive state, only to re-evoke the trauma 
through her death. Mrs Ramsay lured her children into the push and pull between desire 
and fear for she was both “frightening” and “irresistible”, but “always she [Mrs Ramsay] 
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got her own way at the end” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 119), as Lily thought to herself, 
unconvinced of ever being loved.   
It is apparent that Lily’s depressive anxiety is not merely a temporary struggle or 
artistic sentiment. She carries throughout the novel by thinking and by painting an inner 
catastrophe of rage and guilt bound up with the depressive position. It might appear that 
her depression is directly caused by Mrs Ramsay’s death, which is an actual and 
articulable event of loss. But Klein would disagree; she would argue that Lily’s 
depression existed long before Mrs Ramsay’s actual, physical death. She would say that 
Lily’s depression has an infantile origin from the earliest situations of loss, before 
language became available to her, before she could put her feeling of annihilation into 
words. Klein would suggest that Lily’s prolonged struggle with depression was a sign 
that she was overcome by the loss of the loved object and despair at their irreparability 
and that this was already experienced and established as her inner reality. Mrs Ramsay’s 
death tragically re-activated what has not been worked though earlier.  
Like Freud, Klein sees loss also as a pre-condition to depression. However loss is 
more ubiquitous for Klein than for Freud. For her, loss encompasses several, inevitable 
losses such as temporary separation from the good breast, to the most significant event 
of weaning, where the good breast is felt as lost eternally. On the matter of depression, 
Klein makes a significant theoretical divergence from Freud by not only declining to see 
loss as merely a problem of the loss of a libidinal object and object-tie, but also by 
complicating the meanings of loss through elaborating the complex illustrations of “how 
loss follows from rage, and how rage threatens obliteration of the object field” (Butler, 
1998: 180).  
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It was all Mrs Ramsay's doing. She was dead. Here was Lily, at forty-four, 
wasting her time, unable to do a thing … it was all Mrs Ramsay’s fault. She was 
dead. The step where she used to sit was empty. She was dead. (Woolf, 
2004[1927]: 176-7) 
 
A lighthouse, a symbol of hope, warmth and guidance, illuminates a path in the 
dark that brings the ship safely to port, closely resembles the importance of the 
mothering22 that Klein describes in her theory of depression. Never dimming her light, 
the mother prevents the infant from drifting into the potential perils entailed in the dark 
abyss of the depressive state. But if Mrs Ramsay is the lighthouse, her light faded when 
she was irresponsive and diminished further when she was gone; she failed to be the 
lighthouse depended upon as the baby ventures into the fathomless ocean of melancholy. 
Without her, “[Lily] had lost herself and gone under” (Woolf, (2004[1927]: 173).  
Reading through To The Lighthouse, I witnessed a mother, who “with all her astonishing 
power” (Woolf, 2004[1927]: 203), repeatedly triumphed over the baby’s developmental 
needs even in her absence. From the Kleinian perspective, the depressive anxiety that 
could not be worked through without the sufficient assimilation of the external goodness 
in early life contributed to a later depressive tendency in adulthood. Perhaps Klein’s 
theory legitimises Lily at last voicing her inconsolable rage at Mrs Ramsay who had the 
chance, but missed it, of saving her from being lost to depression. Would you agree? 
 
Yours, 
                                                
22 It is important to note that the motherhood discussed in the Kleinian theory should not 
be seen as an actual “social experience” between the mother and the baby, rather it is 

































The previous letter that I wrote you about depression from a Kleinian perspective 
shines a light on your early experience with your mother, the primary object with whom 
the contradictory impulses of love and hate, complicated your inner experience of her, as 
portrayed in Lily’s relationship to Mrs Ramsay in To the Lighthouse. However in the 
process of writing the letter, I found myself recollecting my own experience with my 
mother. Largely identifying myself with Lily Briscoe, my reading of To The Lighthouse 
foregrounded my emotional experience with the mother. Some feelings were stirred up, 
not in smooth waves, but violent tides, where at the centre there was painful sadness and 
anger that I had not realized I was carrying throughout all these years.  
It brought back some of the earliest memories I had of us, mother and I, mother 
lying in her sick bed, which she did then most of the time, for a very long time, and how 
I was often by her side, feeling that intense need in me to revive her. Sometime I seemed 
to manage to do so by telling her how well I had done in school today, all the cheerful 
things that she liked to hear. She would brighten up momentarily in hearing that her 
daughter was a successful and well-liked child. However, her belief in my success was 
achieved by my hiding away the truth of some inevitable challenges in school. Another 
big part of my experience was of impossible dilemmas I was confronted with as a child 
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on overhearing my father speaking softly and sweetly in a lover’s way, over the phone, 
whilst my mother was in her room, sick and listless. I knew at the time that this was 
what adults called ‘affairs’, but I also knew from experience that telling my mother 
about it, most of the time only made her worse. I had seen her working herself up to 
confront my father, yelling at him how could he, until in no time she collapsed into total 
despair for the next few days or weeks. And I would feel like I had made things worse, 
that if I had kept it to myself then she would have been all right. But Klein made me 
realize that underneath my worries and concerns of my natural daughterly love for my 
mother, there was anger, and one that must be intensely felt, towards her. Although I 
would argue, that my anger was, more precisely, towards her long-term illness, which 
was to be later understood as depression. Her being restricted to bed, absorbed by her 
losses and grief, and therefore absent in other areas of my life would represent her as the 
withdrawn breast unable to satisfy the needs of the baby. Indeed whilst she was occupied 
with her illness, my needs were hardly acknowledged and scarcely met. Other children 
had their mothers to watch them play, watch them doing their homework, to take care of 
them, to take them to and pick them up from school (whilst for me this was always done 
by the family’s foreign maid, an experience I remember resenting). But why was my 
mother sick all the time? 
 And all those family holidays being cancelled, because she fell ill again. One 
instance rushes back to my memory now: we were going overseas for a holiday for the 
first time. Everything was planned, and I had been excited about it the whole summer. 
My worst fear was that the trip would be cancelled. It was – because my mother at the 
very last minute received a doctor’s prescription to have regular injections at the hospital, 
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once a day for twelve days. With much disappointment and without much thinking, the 
red mist descended and I said to her, “why don't you just have twelve injections all 
together in one day then we can still go?” Then, of course, by saying that I made her 
very upset. She did not talk to me, a “selfish” child, for the next few days, leaving me 
feeling punished for wanting something for myself, guilty of hurting her feelings. But 
still the trip was cancelled and I knew not to complain about it again.     
As I illustrated in my last letter, the implication of the Kleinian theory of 
depression is the primacy of the mother-child dyad, first of all on a biological basis, then 
transferred onto the psychic ground: how the mother is perceived and experienced by the 
child is what subsequently fuels the content of her internal phantasy world. Klein’s focus 
is on the child’s own phantastic wishes driven by her instinctual desires for, and 
aggressions towards, the maternal object.  
 
Virginia, having read through my account in relation to my mother, did you 
notice a few similarities between our early experiences with the mothers? The 
withdrawn, preoccupied, and unfulfilling mother being the same one for whom one 
desires and longs. Reading it through the lens of Kleinian theory, could one not hear that 
it is the ego being entrapped with “the sorrow and concern about the feared loss of the 
‘good’ objects” (Klein, 1940: 345), which so distinctively underlies the depressive 
position. The years of mother’s passivity in caring for me, her affective withdrawal 
when her concerns for me were replaced by new sources in life’s struggles would 
symbolize the unsatisfying feed. Her goodness, namely her milk, love, warmth, is felt to 
be lost by the baby as the result of her being too greedy and too aggressive against the 
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mother’s breasts (Klein, 1940: 148). Her breasts are almighty, serving both as sources of 
greatest horrors, and deepest comfort; for they are what the baby depends on.  
But her breasts are punitive too for they teach the baby not to want and want and 
want lest she should not have her wanting gratified. As I pondered what Klein said, I 
was reminded of when my mother said to me, ‘you are being selfish’ in response to my 
protest against not getting what I wished for. But her punitive silence and withdrawal 
from me, in my mind, “always fit the crime” (Klein, 1928: 203); the crime of asking too 
much and being ungrateful as a greedy baby. I could never find the emotional security to 
openly express my anger to her. Often that unresolved rage was replaced by powerful 
guilt. Klein would explain my guilt as coming from my fear of destroying the good 
breast completely. After all, mother is good when she is not bad (the good object being 
the same object as the bad object; whole object relating).   
Klein’s theory of depression changed my original thinking that my depression 
took place, as the timing suggests, as a consequence to my parents’ divorce, and led me 
to think that perhaps it had been there all along, latent, waiting for a trigger, and that the 
divorce only brought it to the surface and I finally became aware of it. Klein cast a new 
light on the origin of my depression, which she believes has to be located in the earliest 
moments with my mother. However, it was not without resistance that I brought myself 
to believe that my depression was primarily my mother’s doing, and my father’s only 
secondarily23. When I brought to Klein that this seemed a bit unfair towards my mother, 
                                                
23 Due to Klein’s emphasis on depressive anxiety, characterized by love and hate and 
their consequences, over Freud’s castration anxiety, characterized by lack and desire and 
their consequences, her theory implies the importance of the primary object, i.e. mother, 
over father, the secondary object (Doane & Hodges, 1992: 11). 
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who lived a huge part of her life as a victim too and who, at the very least, tried to care 
for me, Klein in response suggested that the need in me to protect my mother from being 
seen as bad, by myself and by others, came from a place of depressive anxiety where the 
unconscious effort aims towards protecting the good object as it is, from losing its 
goodness, from being under attack by one’s internally derived destructive impulses. 
Could this, I wonder, share some similarities with your own experience where you never 
openly expressed your direct anger towards your mother, only grief and longing for her, 
in your memoir and autobiography, but did express through the voice of Lily Briscoe? 
And yet as much as Klein’s theory illuminated the importance of my experience 
of the mother, which makes some sense to me, I could not stop pondering, what my 
father’s share in this is? If there was anyone to blame, surely most of all it must be father, 
it must be he who caused the family so much torment! But as I pursued further 
clarification, Klein became ambiguous and was unable to give me coherent accounts as 
to how the real external others interfere with the child’s internal object world, whether 
the mother she meant was a real mother, or the internal object brought to life by one’s 
instinctual wanting and the aggression that comes from a lack of needs fulfilment. On 
the matter of mothering, the ambiguity was compounded by the contradictions in her 
never fully resolved theorization of the origin and the nature of the object. She was, on 
one hand, emphasizing the real presence of the mother during the child’s ego 
development, such as in one of her earliest papers Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected 
in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulses, where she wrote: “The presence of the 
real, loving mother diminished the dread of the terrifying mother, whose image is 
introjected into the child’s mind” (Klein, 1929: 442, italics added); however, on the 
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other hand, she openly and consistently refused Winnicottian notions of the 
environmental mother and the real mother in the baby’s external reality24 (Doane & 
Hodges, 1992: 16-17). Does ‘the Klenian mother’ live only in a psychical reality, and 
not in social reality? Addressing my question, Klein went on to argue that internal 
objects are created as a result of the phantasied relationships, instead of the experience 
with the real people (Klein, 1933: 268). She believed the phantasied relationships with 
the internal objects are established at the beginning of life and they continue to shadow 
how we perceive and experience the external others throughout our lifetime (Mitchell, 
1981:  383). What Klein seemed to be suggesting is that the way we interact with others 
is predetermined by our internal relationships founded in phantasy, rather than being 
shaped by the on-going, actual experience with the external others. Her views seem to 
create discrepancies between psychical and external worlds as though they could exist 
independently of each other. 
It would then seem that, 
Although in her case illustrations Klein occasionally mentions some more 
personal or character-logical feature of the parents (a mother's depression, lack of 
warmth, dislike for the child), these features never appear in Klein's formulations 
concerning internal object relations, where the cast of characters is always 
composed of universal images (Mitchell, 1981: 385). 
 
In her theory, Klein often presents the picture of the family made up of universal 
parental imago without fully taking into account the contingent history of the child 
                                                
24 Klein’s ambiguity of what she meant by ‘the mother’ and ‘the mothering’ in her 
theory of ego development, her resistance to endow it with maternal responsibility could 
derive from her personal history where she found resistance to taking up the role of 
mother and being defined by it, and her troubled relationships with her own children 
(Doane & Hodges, 1992: 18). 
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located in the individual family. Whilst Klein, throughout her theory, tends to see the 
bad object as internally derived (projectively) from the child’s own instinctual drives, 
whereas the good object as absorbed from the external others (introjectively) (Mitchell, 
1981:  379), she minimized the pathogenic potential of the external bad object on the 
child’s construction of self or sense of self. The unfortunate negation of real experience 
with real others proved unhelpful in my understanding of the place of the real object in 
the psychical shaping of internal reality. As Mitchell aptly described, and to my full 
agreement, Kleinian theory is one where the root of evil is placed “in the heart of man 
himself, in the instincts” (ibid: 385).  
 
Things are yet unresolved in my heart, Virginia. I feel that I must search on and I 















The Fourth Letter 
Right after what Woolf herself described in her memoir as “the seven unhappy 
years” (Woolf, 2002[1895]: 140), between 1897 to 1904, brought about by the loss of 
Stella, was another long and incessant fight with an increasingly disturbing depression, 
with only temporary recoveries between despairing episodes. Coming to adulthood, the 
period of ten years between 1904 to 1913 proved to be another difficult and emotionally 
demanding stage of life for Virginia Woolf, with its beginning marked by the death of 
her father, Sir Leslie Stephen (Lee, 1989: 178). His death brought immense 
psychological difficulties for Virginia Woolf, who was twenty-two, triggering a severe 
breakdown into depression and her first attempt at suicide. The suicide attempt, by 
leaping from a window that was not high enough to cause her serious injury, was 
unsuccessful (Bell, 1972: 89).  
Her father’s death, in effect, also transformed Virginia Woolf’s depression into 
what is categorized by today’s medical model as bipolar depression, as noted by Quentin 
Bell, “in the breakdown that followed [her father’s death], she entered into a period of 
nightmare in which the symptoms of the preceding months attained frantic intensity. Her 
mistrust of Vanessa, her grief for her father became maniacal, her nurses … became 
fiends ” (ibid: 89-90) The manic side of her depression was revealed, coming to the 
surface.  
In the context of her father’s death, several, mostly unfavourable, changes took 
place against which she was powerless and found hard to take. For one, her brother, 
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Thoby, died unexpectedly at a young age after the Stephen children came back from 
their holiday to Greece. Her sister, Vanessa, accepted a marriage proposal from Clive 
Bell, and the wedding took place the following year in 1907 when Vanessa moved out 
from the household, leaving in Virginia a sense of having been left behind by her 
(Briggs, 2005). At the same time, Virginia was imposed upon to take neuropsychiatric 
treatments whilst the family acted according to the doctor’s prescription for her to be 
sent away from her closest others to be under nursing supervision (Lee, 1989: 184). In 
isolation, she was often enraged and distressed by those forceful treatments and 
arrangements, and by voicing her protests, often made those closely related to her 
anxious and wary of engaging with her (ibid). Her on-going torment during this period 
climaxed with another unsuccessful suicide attempt in 1913 (Lee, 1989: 178), the same 
year her first novel, The Voyage Out, which ends with the death of the heroine, was 
accepted for publications, and a year after she had got married to Leonard Woolf.  
Leonard Woolf became her closest observer after their marriage, and made the 
documenting of her lifelong torments of mental illness one of his life’s occupations. 
However, his accounts of her states of mind were often full of clinical narratives and 
mentioned nothing about the personally meaningful stories behind her suffering; he 
often assumed an observing position and an unemotional tone and dealt pragmatically 
with her outward behaviours, probable causes, and prescribed treatments, whilst making 
no effort in trying to understand what it must be like to be her (Lee, 1989: 180). 
However, Leonard Woolf was not alone in taking a self-protecting and distancing stance 
in relation to Virginia Woolf’s depression; other close relatives of Virginia Woolf had at 








I have begun to think that this lack of understanding of it by others could have 
compounded the hardship of depression. You recalled the stressful time being sent away 
from home for medical treatments after your father’s passing. I could not conceive how 
on earth they would put you through those ‘treatments’. As though depression was not 
horrid enough, they had to double the torment! “[A]ll the eating and drinking and being 
shut in the dark (Woolf, 1975[1910]: 431-2). In isolation, what you craved was 
“intellectual conversations” (ibid), having someone to talk with and listen to.  
Since I last wrote to you, I have at last met this person, Ronald Fairbairn, in 
Edinburgh where he lives and works. We have had a conversation regarding my 
depression; it was intellectual, and then became deeply emotional. This event felt 
significant as it enabled me to understand depression differently from the theories Freud 
and Klein proposed. Fairbairn’s work is “extraordinarily humanistic” (Grotstein, 2014: 
xxi) in outlook. It is unfortunate that Fairbairn is not that well known to psychoanalytic 
circles based in London, and in a way his theory is being pushed to the side for it 
proposes a radical revision to Freud’s theoretical claims. I would not be surprised if you 
have not previously heard of him, but I do believe you would find Fairbairn’s work more 
satisfactory than Freud and, hopefully, as valuable to you as to me in helping me re-
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think my depression. It certainly is bizarre that sometimes what people have set out to 
find and search for afar is much closer to them than they think! 
I told Fairbairn about my journey so far in search of psychoanalytical 
explanations for depression, and my discussions with Freud and Klein. He thought it was 
to be expected that I could not settle fully on either Freudian or Kleinian theory. In his 
view, the instinct theory that was made orthodox “has outworn its usefulness” (Fairbairn, 
1944: 72). By the time we reached the end of our discussion, I became convinced 
Fairbairn made a valid point. It did not take me long to realize that Fairbairn’s work is 
unique and ground breaking. His work contributes towards “a theory of development 
based essentially upon object relations” (Fairbairn, 1941: 31). He insisted consistently 
that the motivation and the central needs of the developing child are that of “establishing 
desired relationships with his objects” (Fairbairn, 1946: 142). He steadily challenged the 
drive theory that emphasizes the instinctual gratification driven by the zonal desires 
(Scharff, 2005: 4). Following this, Fairbairn views psychopathology as developing from 
the disturbances and interferences in the building of the relationships with significant 
others, rather than from the conflicts over pleasure-seeking desires (Greenberg & 
Mitchell, 1983: 156) Fairbairn’s assertion is a fundamental challenge to Freudian 
theory’s centralizing of the instincts and the pleasure principle. I should wish to say 
more about how he differs from Freud on the theory of depression, and to an 
irreconcilable extent, from Klein, whose theory he largely assimilated whilst developing 
his own. 
After consulting with Fairbairn, I have come to accept his view on how we, you 
and I both, could collapse into depression after we were finally freed from our father, 
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you through his death, I through a personal decision. The father is an object that we 
remembered resenting in those growing up years yet feeling so powerless to confront 
and make him stop. All those domestic tyrannies, merciless demands, and melodramatic 
display of emotions were abuses that so forcefully burdened and consumed our mothers, 
until they had both worn out and fallen, yours into an untimely death, mine a chronic 
mental debilitation. I understand all too well when you said the presence of your father 
was a “recurrent horror” (Woolf, 2002[1939]: 147), how your body tightened up in his 
presence, and that “unbounded contempt” (ibid) you had for him. Fathers were our first 
demonstration of human brutality (ibid: 149).  
In his reign, we, as daughters, had been deeply conflicted between a wish to yield, 
to submit to him by virtue of daughterhood, knowing what pleased and how to ease 
things up, and a wish to “fight, to track down, stamp out – tyranny, despotism … making 
people do what they did not want to do, cutting off their right to speak”25 (Woolf, 
2004[1927]: 212). When he lived, we were left little room to embody selfhood as 
daughters. But even at the height of rage, we could only seek rebellion in our own minds 
-  “[to] take a knife and strike him to the heart” (ibid: 211). How we both imagined 
ending the brutality with brutality. Then when it finally came to his death, though mine a 
symbolic death, the fathers were finally gone from our lives for good, I was 21 and you 
22, a transitional phase into adulthood. The tremendous rush of pleasure and relief 
dawned on us, which we knew was the taste of freedom. But pleasure and relief were 
                                                
25 Woolf vividly described the child’s hatred of their father, Mr Ramsay in the form of 
James Ramsay’s inner voice. James’ recognizable longing for freedom from his father, 
as Bond (2000) suggests, portrayed not only Virginia Woolf’s brother, Adrian Stephen, 
who later became a psychoanalyst, and also herself (pp. 51).  
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short-lived. As soon as the exaltation wore away, we spiralled down into the dark abyss 
of depression, struggling to resurface; freedom did not break us free, as we went from 
being imprisoned in the father’s reign, to being imprisoned in our own minds, and we 
could not understand why.  
I told Fairbairn how Freud has attempted to solve for me this seemingly illogical 
link between the loss of the bad object and depression, using Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious loss, of the forsaken object created by virtue of sustaining the aggressive 
instinct that lost its rightful target and is in need of a new one for its fulfilment. 
Propelled by the displaced hate, the knife that was supposed to strike into the father, was 
struck firmly instead into myself. I told Fairbairn how Freud led me to see that losing my 
father had been an unconscious loss of what had sponsored my purpose of living, to hate 
passionately and to overthrow the father the one day. Upon hearing this, Fairbairn 
disagreed.  
He said, “[they’re] always talking about [your] wanting this and that desire 
satisfied; but what [you] want is a father” (Fairbairn, 1946: 137; italics added).  
He then went on to elaborate that the real problem of depression is not simply a 
problem of displaced instincts of hate and aggression that weigh the person down, but of 
the consequences of the bad object relations that the person is forced to manage 
psychically. He troubled the Freudian thinking that a human infant is born impulsively 
seeking tension-reduction (i.e. to actualize catharsis for sexual or aggressive instincts), 
and the objects are only needed in their utility to fulfil the infant’s libidinal needs, with 
no regards to relationships with the objects. Whilst it is Freud’s view that relationships 
are not what are primarily sought for, Fairbairn contends that it is the other way round.  
 130 
Fairbairn did not deny that we have desires that need fulfilling by others, but they 
arise always in the context of what we need from relationships; desires come from a 
primary need to maintain in relational contact with the significant others (Greenberg & 
Mitchell, 1983: 156). From what he said, it sounded to me like he was actually saying 
that our desires are inseparable from our desired objects. They are always bound to a 
particular someone for whom we care and with whom we crave intimacy. By having our 
desires responded to by that person we come to affirm our sense of importance to that 
person, and to feel psychologically secure/safe with the person, to feel loved. The 
relationship becomes strengthened. What Freud and Klein took as the end goal then 
would be actually what Fairbairn saw as the means through which we meet our 
relational needs with our objects. Fairbairn agreed with this by concluding that, “it is not 
the libidinal attitude which determines the object relationship, but the object relationship 
which determines the libidinal attitude” (Fairbairn, 1941: 34, italics added). Fairbairn, in 
disagreement with Freud on his conceptualization of “id”, where wanting is directionless 
and structure-less, believes that any wanting and desires derive from the basic need for 
self-expression in relationship (Rubens, 1994: 163). Needs are, therefore, essentially 
object-related (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 167).  
But, could I really want a father that I had been so eager to rid of? Had I not been 
hating him all my life? After all, father to me is no more than a synonym to anticipated 
pangs of torture. Fairbairn said with conviction that my hatred of him, and aggression 
towards him could not have come from nowhere. He did not believe that aggression is 
an innate human instinct, as Freud and Klein did. Underneath hatred and aggression, 
there must have been a traumatically frustrated child who again and again experienced 
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her relationships with her significant others to be unsatisfactory and her love 
unreciprocated (Kernberg, 2002: 12). In other words, aggression develops secondarily as 
a result of the frustration by the others of the child’s fundamental relational needs. From 
here we can also come to see that the more deprivation from which the child is suffering, 
the higher the need to repress her neediness and frustration, and higher the aggression 
generated in her. If Klein sees the root of evil as lying “in the heart of man himself, in 
the instincts” (Mitchell, 1981:  385), then Fairbairn, who believes that a child is born in 
the state of wholeness and innocence (Grotstein, 1994: 113), certainty would argue the 
real malign nature of humanity being located in the unsatisfactory relationships they 
have with others. So it would be fair to say that, if Freud championed the father, Klein 
the mother, Fairbairn championed the child (Grotstein & Ramsay, 1994: 10). 
Love.  
Could such feeling really ever exist in me for my father? I recounted to Fairbairn 
those insufferable school years when the children in the class were asked to make a card 
for their fathers to celebrate Father’s Day, once a year, and I would dread it, not 
knowing what to say to him, finding it difficult to write down ‘love’. As this memory 
came back I could still feel that old sensation making its presence known to my body, a 
cold pinch at my heart, tighter and tighter; a suffocating feeling in my chest. I got the 
words out and told Fairbairn, “I saw my card in the bin once”. Why I never asked, and 
once a year I still made him a card. Love, if there had been any for him, it was 
unrequited. (At least mother always kept my cards!) Upon hearing this, Fairbairn 
suggested to me that, perhaps, on a deeper level my aggression towards my father had 
been an unconscious defense all along, to repress what felt to be even more painful, the 
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unrequited longings for his fatherly love, for closeness with him, and to repress the part 
of myself that felt so needy and dependent yet knowing my love could never be, and had 
not been, accepted and responded to the way I wished (Scharff, 2005: 10). After all, 
feeling contempt for him is much easier than feeling my love rejected by him.  
 
As opposed to Klein’s view where our psychological life starts in phantasy, 
Fairbairn believes that the human infant is reality-oriented right from the very beginning.  
He criticized Klein’s theory on the ground that  
Melanie Klein has never satisfactorily explained how phantasies of incorporating 
objects orally can give rise to the establishment of internal objects as 
endopsychic structures - and, unless they are such structures, they cannot be 
properly spoken of as internal objects at all, since otherwise they will remain 
mere figments of phantasy (Fairbairn, 1949a: 154). 
 
For Fairbairn, we are born straight into relationships from birth and the content 
of the internal objects are completely based on the real experience with the real external 
objects, albeit often fragmented in reconfiguration (Mitchell, 1981: 285; Greenberg & 
Mitchell, 1983: 157). Furthermore our psychological experience with our primary 
objects, commonly mother, can be divided into either “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory” 
emotional terrains. The satisfactory experience comes from the sense of feeling loved, 
cared about and needs nurtured, contributing to the creation of the “ideal object” 26. An 
                                                
26 As Skolnick (2014) argues, albeit confusingly termed, Fairbairn’s usage of the “ideal 
object” bears no resemblance to the term “idealized object” that often carries a 
pathological meaning in psychoanalytic thinking. Fairbairn’s ideal object however is 
believed to be, by meaning, closer to Winnicott’s “good-enough object” exempt from 
repression. (pp. 251).  
 133 
ideal object is treated as an accepted object and thereafter assimilated27 by the child into 
the Central Ego - the primary, dynamic agency of the “I” that instigates and constructs 
the sub-systems within the psyche based on its own subjective experience with the 
important others (Hoeft, 2009: 75). If the positive interactions are abundantly received in 
the child’s relationships with her caregivers, the positive relational memories of love, 
trust, empathy etc. associated with the ideal objects can develop into a constant source 
from which the Central Ego retrieves for self-soothing and self-reassurance. The 
progressive outcome is a powerful and stable central ego as is developmentally 
appropriate (Celani: 2007 124).    
On the other hand, the unsatisfactory object-relationships are a direct source of 
splitting and repression because they are “too disruptive and threatening to the on-going 
relationship with the object to remain in awareness” (Celani, 2007: 123). Moreover, the 
unsatisfactory object can be split into “exciting” and “rejecting” part-objects (the 
essential part of the object that is recognized as a whole on its own), which are 
fundamentally “bad” objects in Fairbairn’s view. Exciting objects and rejecting objects 
each represent the intolerable elements of the over-exciting and over-rejecting aspects of 
the original object. The exciting object is the aspect of the object that is felt as teasing, 
promising, and alluring, however it over-excites the child without being able to fulfil the 
needs it powerfully aroused. The rejecting object, on the other hand, is the aspect of the 
                                                
27 On the debates as to whether Fairbairnian good object is internalized or not, I adopt 
Rubens (1994) argument that good objects can be internalized but are never repressed 
nor structured into endopsychic structures as are the unsatisfactory bad objects.   
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object that relates to the child in a depriving, abusive, or neglectful manner (Celani, 
2007: 123). Both objects are intolerably frustrating to the child so they are repressed28. 
I particularly appreciate Fairbairn’s pioneering contribution in introducing the 
concept of ego-splitting into psychoanalytic thinking (Padel, 1991: 593). This 
distinguished him from Klein on the matter of repression as Fairbairn believes that 
repression of the bad objects bring about repression of the aspects of the self that 
correspond to, and at the core of its pathological nature, allies with the internalized 
exciting and rejecting bad objects. Fairbairn terms them the “libidinal ego” and “anti-
libidinal ego”, the subsidiary selves split off from the central ego due to its libidinal 
attachment to the internalized bad objects. The libidinal ego is part of the self that 
identifies with and attaches to the exciting object, imprisoned therefore in the 
perpetually desperate pursuit of the exciting object for love, and the reciprocation it was 
once promised. The libidinal ego craves in dependency a painful longing for the exciting 
object, as Gomez (1997) describes, like someone waiting endlessly by the phone for the 
lover who had promised to call, but who they know from experience will not (pp. 62). 
On the other hand, the anti-libidinal ego is the part of the self that identifies with and is 
attached to the rejecting object, which represents the original aggressor, and becomes the 
repository of all the hatred and destructiveness accumulated and stored up as a result of 
the frustration of libidinal longing (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 166). The anti-libidinal 
ego, due to identification with the depriving and withdrawing aspects of the rejecting 
object, berates the intensely needy libidinal ego as pathetic and a wimp, and rejects the 
                                                
28 Repression, in Fairbairn’s (1944) view, “originates primarily as a defense against “bad” 
internalized objects (and not against impulses …)” (pp. 93) 
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seductive exciting object as worthless and undesirable. At the same time the anti-
libidinal ego denies brazenly that she has any needs or desires for others, positioning 
herself as “the enemy to hope, particularly of hope for anything meaningful with other 
people” (ibid). Furthermore, the powerful hate and aggression within the bond of the 
rejecting object and anti-libidinal ego set off a further dynamite of repression, attacking 
the bond of the exciting object and libidinal ego. It is in essence a repression 
(commanded by the subsidiary configurations) on top of another repression (by the 
central ego) - a phenomenon Fairbairn (1944) termed as “secondary repression” (pp. 
108).  
Considering Fairbairn’s concept of “secondary repression”, it would then be 
overly reductionist to see depression as merely a case of anger directed at oneself, at the 
forsaken object inside, when in fact it is a case of aggression being internalized along 
with the bad object relationships into one’s psychic structure, utilized necessarily as a 
fuel towards further repressing the otherwise intolerable resurfacing of the bad objects 
and their corresponding subsidiary selves. The two repressed configurations, that of 
rejecting object paired up with anti-libidinal ego, and exciting object paired up with 
libidinal ego, come to constitute what Fairbairn (1944) termed “endopsychic structures”. 
Endopsychic structures begin as a psychic defence against the unsatisfactory experience 
with the mother that is inevitable due to her normal limitations. However it becomes 
ultimately a pathological process if it crystalizes into the personality and eventuates in a 
constant splitting of the ego in relation to its objects, and repression in keeping with the 
internally established endopsychic structures. As a result, the terror from the early object 
relationships continues to haunt and re-enact itself in every new relationship we form 
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and become involved in later in life, leading to what seems an illogical “repetition 
compulsion” (Fairbairn, 1944: 78), a neurotic attempt to re-create, in later life, earlier 
painful experiences..  
Although Fairbairn used ‘mother’ as a starting point, he did not negate the 
importance of the father. A child, seeking object-relatedness with the mother, seeks it 
with the father too (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 168). Fairbairn complicates the 
meaning of my relationship with my father, and, now seeing my hate only as a derivative 
from the continuous frustration, I began to recollect how I came to deny any needing of 
him as my father, how he could not make me feel like my love was worthy and my value 
outweighed his money, when my wanting this and that was only a child’s way of 
seeking from a rejecting father an alternative reassurance, “how much do you really love 
me”, “how much am I worth to you”.  
Could you think of anything more painful than feeling one’s love deserted by the 
object of love? I agree with Fairbairn that it is one of “intense humiliation” (Fairbairn, 
1944: 113) in the face of feeling unlovable with her loved object. Nevertheless, a 
humiliating connection is still better than no connection at all (Ogden, 2010: 115). But I 
pitied her, the libidinal ego with her love so overriding and unquenchable, till now still 
waiting in vain for her father to fulfil his promise to love her. Yet in me there was a 
presence ruled by fear, an anti-libidinal ego that condemned and controlled with rage the 
desperately needy libidinal ego, believing that devil dwells in wanting and needing and 
therefore she must want no one, and need no one. I pitied the anti-libidinal ego too, for I 
now see that she could only survive under the condition of full obedience to her rejecting 
sovereign reinstated in her internal world through internalization, to dominate 
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continually 29. A child, after all, can never really reject her object, despite it being 
rejecting or neglecting, for what she fears the most is abandonment by the object, whom 
she knows is the same object she needs so helplessly and loves so unconditionally 
(Fairbairm, 1949b: 266). Losing the object, whether good or bad, is indeed unthinkable 
for the child who as a dependent has no choice but to ground herself in the relationships 
available to her.  
 
Virginia, the way you related to your father, the conflicting emotions you 
portrayed having towards him, provided me with the hope that you would find some 
sense in Fairbairn’s theory as well. What you called your father, “the old wretch, the 
dearest of creatures” (cited in Bond, 2000: 158) implied to me so striking a split between 
the conflicting emotions of reproach and love; emotions that were probably sparked by 
the contradictory qualities you experienced in your father’s character. He lured a 
daughterly admiration and love, naturedly as a father, and perhaps as an acclaimed 
writer, a  “genius” and of good reputation, an ideal you sought to become since you were 
young (Lee, 1997: 71-2). Would you recall preferring the father to mother, imitating him 
and his mannerism when you were a child? (Bell, 1956: 33-4; Lee, 1997: 71-2)  
But what he so powerfully excited in you, he could not reciprocate; he was 
constantly preoccupied with his own work, demanding at all times narcissistic 
reassurances of his “genius” from his closest family, and after your mother’s death, 
                                                
29 For Fairbairn, internalization is one of the most primitive psychological defence. The 
child seeks to retain a sense of control and essential attachment to her objects; by 
containing them inside her she makes sure she does not lose touch with them, even when 
the real objects are unavailable (Fairbairm, 1943: 67).  
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indulging in a selfish grief that culminated in a multi-deprivation for the rest of you. 
Your mourning of the mother was suspended as you were restlessly called upon to 
satisfy his exasperating neediness (ibid: 73-4). As I mentioned earlier, Fairbairn’s model 
of the internal world is one engendered by interpersonal conflicts. It seems to me then, 
that the overly exciting and the rejecting elements of your father would justifiably 
induce unconscious motives for repression and internalization. By so doing you could 
manage the on-going frustrating experience with him from which you had no escape, 
while retaining a sense of control and safety by burying what would feel unbearable 
underneath your conscious awareness and transferring those appalling conflicts, which 
you could not possibly resolve with your father, into the internal objects of your 
possession.  
Here, following Fairbairn’s thinking, we come to see a case (in both of us) of the 
depressive impasse (Matos, 2002: 63).  
In the era of the catastrophe of affective deprivation, the self persists to live 
 
in a state of nostalgia for the object of love – a unique, indispensable, 
irreplaceable object, but one that is, at the same time, impossible, … It is also 
impossible because it is damaging – unlovable, captivating (of non-sacrificial 
love), guilty, and devaluating, narcissistic” (ibid: 66, italics added) 
 
This depressive impasse depicts a dilemma resulting from the contradiction of 
the loved object that is simultaneously thought of as an ideal, but experienced as a 
malevolent presence. The dilemma which emerges as a consequence of the child’s 
resistance to admitting that her deepest chords of love from her loved objects are in fact 
impossible, and to acknowledge the loved object as bad. This resistance comes from the 
 139 
psychical maneuverer Fairbairn (1943) termed “moral defence”, which metaphorically 
resembles an act of trading with the devil, by “take[ing] upon the burden of badness” 
from the loved object, therefore preserving any residues of the goodness that seemed to 
reside in the loved object. The child needs attachment to her objects either good or bad 
as she needs to preserve her external security, even in the case of the predominance of 
painful and abusive contacts with her objects, albeit at the great expense of the integrity 
of the ego, of the self. 
Virginia, when I read your Between the Acts, in one of the scenes you depicted I 
almost sensed a complex portrayal of what Fairbairn theorised as “moral defence” – 
“Each is part of the whole. … We act different parts; but are the same. … Love and hate 
– how they tore her asunder! … let us retain whatever made that harmony” (Woolf, 
1941a: 215, 196; italics added). Through a Fairbairnian lens, I heard almost the voice of 
the Central Ego, coercing the subsidiary selves that have split off from her, to keep intact 
what supports that much needed sense of surface harmony with her loved objects, 
through which the goodness of them could feel within reach, and hope, despite being 
illusory, obtained time and again. 
For Fairbairn, all the potential for the psychopathological developments in later 
life befalls as the result of the bad object relationships rooted in the endopsychic 
structure. What I found particularly helpful in Fairbairn’s (1946) model of endopsychic 
structure was that he believed the internal object relationships should be considered in 
terms of a complex dynamic system; it is dynamic due to its being in continual 
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interaction with the person’s external, relational situations 30  (pp. 148). Fairbairn 
criticized Freud’s tripartite structure in that “they are not all inherently dynamic 
structures” (ibid). Depression, decoded in Fairbairn’s dynamic endopsychic structure, 
would yield a much more complex, multi-dimensional clinical presentation beyond the 
Kleinian understanding of depression stipulated in terms of “position”. The subsidiary 
selves always exist in dynamic relationship to their internalized objects. The exact form 
of depression that comes ashore is then determined by the interplay between the 
subsidiary selves and internalized objects under any given external circumstance31. The 
overpowering subsidiary selves or internalized objects achieve the momentum to 
“[sweep] away the central ego and become the dominant ego of the personality” (Celani, 
2007: 124).  
Perhaps, Virginia, the case of our psychological collapse into depression, 
precipitated by the loss of the fathers, could be seen as lending itself to that 
interpretation? When the fathers were there, the rejecting and exciting objects would 
have been more or less compensated by some redeeming goodness in the real person 
(Fairbairn, 1943: 71), realistic or illusory through the triumph of moral defense. This 
would render less power to the “sinister influence” (ibid) of the repressed bad objects on 
their corresponding subsidiary selves. But then the sudden loss of the father would bring 
about a reverse of the dynamic, mainly due to the subsidiary selves that have now 
                                                
30 However it is to great disadvantage that Fairbairn did not generate further theory on 
the dynamic interactions between the subsidiary selves and internalized bad objects, nor 
did he expand upon  how the endopsychic structures play out in dynamic interaction 
with social contexts. 
31 Here I agree with Celani’s (2007: 124) view that the subsidiary selves do not always 
remain repressed, which contradicted Fairbairn’s original view that they do.  
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become “panicky about the possibility of loss” (Celani, 2007: 124). Triggered by 
separation anxiety, the subsidiary selves fall into an urgent state of object seeking as 
their accompanying dependence needs and desires intensify. In desperation to revive the 
bad objects, the libidinal ego at once declares her undying love, and the anti-libidinal 
ego declares her loyalty to their commanding bad objects. The result is not only the 
attenuation of the central ego, but also an over empowerment of the endopsychic 
structures against the Central Ego.  
From Fairbairn’s perspective, our depression, following the loss of fathers 
evidenced a most trenchant difficulty in parting with the bad objects because of the 
“loyalty to bad objects” (Grotstein, 1992: 72). Parting from the external fathers, “left us 
at the mercy of our internalized bad father [both the over-rejecting and over-exciting 
objects], whom we had either to embrace or else [the libidinal self and anti-libidinal self] 
remain objectless and deserted” (Fairbairn, 1943: 71-2). The loss of the bad object 
strikes the psyche with no less than the turmoil of abandonment, it is in nature “bad-
object abandonment”, (Grotstein, 1992) directly energized by dependency needs left 
unmet. Subsequently, the loss of the bad father would stir up a powerful resistance in the 
subsidiary selves, the libidinal ego and anti-libidinal ego, against letting go of the 
rejecting and exciting objects, to which they remain unshakably attached and devoted, 
from whom the self is still yearning for a chance to have her dependency needs met 
(Celani, 2007: 128-9).  
The subsidiary selves require all their bad object counterparts in order to 
maintain existences and survive. The loss of the bad objects would then effect a threat to 
the existence of the subsidiary selves, which identify and seek attachment with the 
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corresponding bad objects. In the aftermath of losing the bad object, the attempt to 
revive the relational tie with the object would then only be achievable by withdrawing 
into internal object relationships, clinging even more assiduously onto the strangling tie 
with internalized bad objects (Fairbairn, 1944: 84). This enables one to take shelter in 
the readily established ensopsychic structure, and any change is resisted. What ensues 
then is a forceful recapitulation of the relational patterns enforced in early relationships 
with the bad external objects which the self then reenacts on herself32. To preserve the 
relationship with her deserting/deserted object, the self becomes her own abuser, her 
own overly rejecting and exciting object, at the cost of her own relationship with herself. 
The consequence that follows then is the central ego being “reduced … to a state of utter 
impotence. The [central] ego becomes quite incapable of expressing itself; and in so far 
as this is so, its very existence becomes compromised” (Fairbairn, 1941: 51). 
Thinking through my depression alongside Fairbairn, what initially seemed 
irrational became eminently comprehensible. For a long time, Virginia, we fell into the 
malevolent grasp of depression, plunged into an in-between state of existence and 
obliteration of the selves after the loss of the father. For me, this was revealed in the 
most intimate form, in having trouble with eating. I now come to see that by embodying 
the powerful impulses between overfeeding and starving myself, as I alternated between 
states of desperate longing for food and rejecting the need for food, I was reenacting the 
exciting and rejecting elements of the bad father that I lost. In your case, could it 
                                                
32 Fairbairn made the clinical observation that the child who grow up with abusive 
parents, is highly likely to repeat the abuse by being in abusive relationships once freed 
from the abusive parents. And even when she is not in an abusive relationship, she 
abuses herself (Seinfeld, 1993: 66).  
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possible have found expression in the swinging between two distinct states of extreme 
excitement when you talked incessantly, craved Leonard’s company intensely, and of 
total despair where you became completely mute, stopped eating and resting, and, at the 
height of it, attempted to end your own life (Lee, 1997: 179)? What seems self-inflicted 
in terms of self-deprivation and over-excitement of one’s needs, to Fairbairn, would be a 
sign that the bad object had made its return, controlling us from inside with a vengeance 
(Fairbairn, 1943: 77). The self-destructiveness that often prevails in depression, which 
Freud and Klein accounted for by using the concept of “death instinct”33, could only 
make sense to Fairbairn when understood as an expression of the powerful and 
uncontrollable attachment to the internalized bad objects persisting to dominate in the 
endopsychic structure.  
 
Here I recall to my mind your novel, The Voyage Out. The heroine of which, the 
coming-of-age, shy and inarticulate Rachel Vinrace, in one scene finding herself, at the 
end of the day, unable to put up with people around her anymore. She exclaimed, “It’s 
intolerable!” (Woolf, 1992[1915]: 300)  
All day long she had been tantalized but put off. … She had now reached one of 
those eminences, the result of some crisis, from which the world is finally 
displayed in its true proportions. She disliked the look of it immensely (ibid)  
 
                                                
33 Unsurprisingly, Fairbairn disregarded the concept of death instinct seeing it as “based 
upon biological not psychological” (Fairbairn, 1930: 122), and in his view the concept 
presented in itself an “ inner contraction” (ibid). He believed that all instincts are 
“essentially expressions of life”, and in that sense, “’all instincts are "life-instincts" in 
the last resort.’” (ibid) 
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To be tantalized then put off is to be promised love, then betrayed. And if, as 
Fairbairn suggested, the sense of self does arise from the relational matrix in which one 
is engrossed (Rubens, 1994), the self would come to experience her needs and desires 
for relatedness with others as painful, her neediness for others as burdening. As much as 
she would feel anger, at her own naivety to have not stopped trusting others and anger at 
their maleficence to have even induced false hopes in her, she would also feel ashamed 
that her love was unworthy and unacceptable. And how did Rachel respond to the series 
of intolerable exploitations weighed upon her? With her eyes dazed by tears, Rachel 
“indulged herself at last in violent abuse of the entire day” (Woolf, 1992[1915]: 300; 
italics added). Such a reaction would make perfect sense only to Fairbairn who 
disagreed with Freud’s Pleasure Principle and instead proposed a Reality Principle 
(Fairbairn, 1944: 78). As it now seems to me, the symptoms of depression indeed 
manifest through such a masochistic indulgence, in the self-abuse of refusing nurturance, 
such as eating and resting; and in berating oneself as unlovable and unworthy whilst 
resisting letting go of the great strain we put on ourselves. I recognized in myself too 
that unshakeable convictions you placed on yourself, that everything is your own fault, 
that you have no one else to blame but yourself (Lee, 1997: 179). From the operation of 
moral defense comes the true nature of self-reproach and self-abasement that so 
characterizes depression. Devils must be kept and contained within oneself, so that 
hopes to be ruled by God, in a world of meaning and redemption, do not die (Fairbairn, 
1943). 
Fairbairn’s theory enables a compelling understanding that, on the deepest level, 
depression represents a defensive bid to preserve one’s existing endopsychic structures 
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within which early object relationships thrive and live on and, in essence, to avoid and 
resist any changes that do not fit into the endopsychic situation (Rubens, 1998: 221). 
From this viewpoint, it is understandable as to why the changes that have the potential to 
trigger an acute state of depression are often those that take place in the direction of 
growth (ibid), for instance, breaking from the bad object(s). As the need to continually 
reminisce early object relationships persists, changes are resisted at full force, and 
denied, as they are registered as a threat to the ties with the internal objects. In a 
psychopathological sense this then leads to a psychic immobilization (Rubens, 1998: 
226), where the person persists living in the stasis of “closed system of the internal 
reality” (Fairbairn, 1958) and shut out the realty of a changing world.  
Virginia, do you remember a short story you wrote, Phyllis and Rosamond 
(1906), not long after your father’s death. In the story, using 1904 as a transitional point, 
the two pairs of ladies in their mid-twenties encounter each other as if through a looking 
glass, judging each other’s strangeness. It was as if you encountered your own later self-
representation from after your father’s death (Lee, 1997: 149-150). In the face of a new 
start where the old obligations at last evaporated (along with the bad object), Phyllis and 
Rosamond paradoxically, came to realize that the long fought-for victory in the end 
failed to stop their suffering but only accentuate it. They condemned themselves, “all 
efforts at freedom were in vain: long captivity had corrupted them both within and 
without” (Woolf, 2003[1906]: 26). In it I sensed a compelling account of a depressive 
maneuver in the Fairbairnian sense, that perhaps suitably describes you and I: the long 
captivity of the bad objects left us in the consequences of mental corruption - the 
strengthening of the endopsychic structure and attenuating of the central ego. Depression 
 146 
carried us towards the entrapment of the endopsyhic structure in order to re-enforce a 
sense of nothing being changed, no loss being occasioned, so that the split-off parts of 
the ego could maintain their attachments to the internalized bad objects.  
I have begun to think, and hope you have too, that perhaps it was not that our 
efforts at freedom were in vain, but it was that the changes were simply denied by 
ourselves, as the real difficulty was in giving up the unconscious bonds with the bad 
father, and in perceiving and experiencing the world in the absence of him. After all, 
without him, what would I do with those painfully felt, shamed, underserving, needy, 
debased, rejected, angry and resentful aspects of myself that he so powerfully and 
intolerably aroused in me? Fairbairn was right to say I had never suspended my wanting 
of my father, for I have now come to see it was indeed to risk a shattering disintegration 
of my sense of self to lose touch with the bad father to whom I had remained engrossed 
for 21 years! As I mentioned earlier, the loss of the bad object could mean a threat to the 
obliteration of parts of the self, it seemed then that only by retreating into the fortressed 
sanctuary of the internal world, the ultimate ‘room of one’s own’ that is wholly private 
to oneself, we could protect the sense of self, to continue to perceive and respond to the 
world in the old fashion. Such would be the characteristic spirit of depression, which can 
best be voiced as, “If nothing can be changed, nothing will change; If I simply cannot 
tolerate what is happening to me, it will not happen … I refuse to live this new 
experience as new” (Rubens, 1998: 226). The common manifestation of the depressive 
pessimism displayed in its inability to change would be a camouflage for its active, by 
nature neurotic, expression in the form of psychical defense against having to deal with 
changes and the possibility of loss accompanying changes.  
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From Freud to Klein to Fairbairn, a Conclusion 
 
How we understand depression informs how we relate to it. Psychoanalytic 
theory, as it has done for me, provides ways of thinking and a language with which to 
speak about the unconscious, inner dynamics of depression. It does not produce a single 
interpretation but allows multiple lenses through which divergent articulations of 
meanings can be expressed. It would not be accurate to say that I had let psychoanalytic 
theory compose a story for me, or on behalf of me, but it was more like the theory, or 
theories, gave me a map and a compass to navigate into the forgotten reality of my past 
without getting lost. Psychoanalytic theory guided me to look into some of the most 
significant earliest moments of life buried under the conscious realm out of fear and 
unsettling vulnerability, directing me to what I should look for and into, and what to give 
importance to. But to travel through the formidable labyrinth of the past, I realized I 
needed a companion too, so that I could feel less alone and unsafe. I was fortunate to 
encounter Virginia Woolf through her published texts, whose needs to make sense of 
depression and familiarity with psychoanalytic language presented her as a suitable 
companion with whom I could dialogue in a psychoanalytic language. She felt real to me 
even though she was the Virginia Woolf of my mental creation brought to life through 
imagination. 
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The significant similarities in our life experiences and also in a familial position 
as a daughter, led to a sense of knowing Woolf, and an identification with her. This 
identification, especially in the shared dimensions of loss, either actual or symbolic loss, 
and severe hardship of depression we had lived through, brought about a feeling of 
genuine connection that deepened, as our dialogue unfolded, into an empathetic bond 
with her. The companionship and empathetic bond my imaginary Woolf offered to me in 
the process of research empowered my voice, so much so that I found the security to 
start looking at, capturing and narrating, the surfacing edge of the emotional turmoil that 
once eluded my thought and speech. Engaging Woolf in a fictional dialogue became a 
process of discovery of hidden aspects of my story as Woolf’s voice strengthened my 
voice, and her story contextualized mine. The we-ness took shape between Woolf and I, 
and a feel of the “relationship” was developed. Unexpectedly, from where we were 
wounded psychologically, we opened up possibilities of storytelling and hearing, 
transforming the dialogue into an unfolding exchange of voices and a collaborative 
venture.  We came together thinking about our depression, witnessing and hearing, and 
telling stories of our lives. This transformation from seeing Woolf as a partner in 
dialogue to experiencing a relationship with her was something I had not expected when 
I first embarked on this research. I may have had a sense of what my dialogue with 
Virginia Woolf would look like, but I never expected the actual ‘experience’ of an 
imaginative dialogue could conjure up so much emotional resonances in which healing 
took place. And I trust that the relational approach embodied in my endeavour to relate 
to Woolf as subject-to-subject, which I integrated in my letters to Woolf, emphasized the 
centrality of relationship that I so value in Fairbairn’s work.  
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Theory affords elaborations of the personal story, as much as the personal story 
gives life to theory. In my case, theory enabled me to think through what I was 
experiencing and aiming to understand during the process of this research. In this thesis I 
portrayed and amplified the explorative processes of subjective interpretations through 
my creative experiencing of psychoanalytic theory. And in turn, I made theory ‘personal’ 
and evoked an emotional depth through the process of engaging with theoretical prose.  
 
Returning to the research questions this thesis raised, which seeks to explore the 
therapeutic relevance of Fairbairn’s object relations theory in understanding depression, 
I would like to provide some conclusive comments on what Freud, Klein, and Fairbairn 
each contributed to my understanding of depression.  
My theoretical dialogue started from Freud, who made the important contribution 
of linking psychopathology to unresolved conflicts in the unconscious inner world. 
Freud led me to see that, in the case of depression, the primary problem to be addressed 
is the unconscious loss occasioned by the object loss in reality. The lowering of the self-
esteem in melancholia signifies that the ego has been impoverished as the result of the 
object loss. The loss of the narcissistically identified object spirals up an acute crisis of 
ambivalence between love and hate, propelling the ego to re-instate the lost object 
internally for the purpose of maintaining the libidinal activities. Underneath the 
victorious display, the loss of the father is a crisis of the unconscious loss of an object-tie, 
which had been sponsoring a libidinal connection where libidinal aims can be fulfilled. 
Through the internal resurrection of the father object I preserved a libidinal target within 
me, towards which I could continue to direct my aggrieved instinct, and to hate. My 
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relentless attack towards the forsaken object of the lost father, like a boomerang, always 
came back at me in the form of a severe self-criticism. Freud’s later addition of the 
concept of super-ego opened up a new landscape that presented melancholia in the 
context of the topographical conflicts between ego, id, and super-ego. To Freud, psychic 
conflicts are fundamentally derived from a tug of war torn between the id and the super-
ego, to which melancholia is particularly vulnerable, being in a state of crushed ego 
(Ogden, 2002: 772). 
Freud offered me an engaging and innovative understanding of depression, but as 
much as I agreed with some aspects of Freud, and the later presentations of his work in a 
contemporary light, such as Leader’s (2009) and Ogden’s (2002), Freud’s fixation on 
drive theory and insistence that psychopathology is always bound to some unmet desires 
from the instinctual energy became insufficient for me, as it provided limited lens into 
the complex interplay between the internalized objects and how such internal dynamics 
shape the expression of personhood. The insufficiency was mainly due to Freud’s view 
of selfhood, which is fundamentally impulsive, and of the human psyche as a mental 
apparatus directed by the libidinal needs. 
Furthermore, the ambiguity in Freud’s concept of object-love that is blurred with 
his definition of the narcissistic-love proved unhelpful in the context of understanding 
internal object relationships, as it suggests that love is only possible where identification 
exists. Therefore there is no such thing as complete object-love in Freudian system, as 
what we love is always the extension of the self (Clewell, 2004: 47) and less the 
uniqueness of the other as a separate and distinct person. In the case of depression, as 
occasioned by the loss of the loved-object, in a Freudian account, marks, to an extent, a 
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signal of an internal disruption to the person’s narcissistic need of the object, rather than 
a disruption to the unique attachment to the object for its uniqueness as a separate person 
experienced relationally. This was a disagreement that Virginia Woolf raised and spoke 
of strongly, as it reduced humans to impulsively driven beings, and so narrows what the 
objects are sought for in human relationships. And the disagreement was compounded 
by Freud’s view of femininity that a daughterly love for the father took a departure from 
the Oedipal origin of sexual desires, depicting, therefore, only one particular type of 
object relationships (Eagle, 2000: 110), and not the whole picture of the internal 
constellation of object relationships. This highlights the main downside of the Freudian 
view in that it gives too much prominence to the libidinal needs of the self, too little 
importance to how these needs were shaped by relational contexts and expressed 
relationally. 
My theoretical dialogue with Freud also provided a doorway into what it was like 
for Virginia Woolf when she first read his work, and later on, met him in person. 
Although his theory offered helpful insights on psychic mechanism, his highly 
authoritative stance limited the space for personal musings and debates, unwelcoming of 
the mutuality and personal agency essential for an unfolding dialogue between 
perspectives. Engaging with Freud, I also experienced a sense of intimidation by his 
language, a feeling that I was confined to being on the receiving end and not talking 
back. This was mainly due to his language, a highly patricentric tone, compounded by 
my transference of a father figure, that spoke in a determined and forceful manner with a 
noticeably significant amount of “must” and “insist”, as if his theory presented the only 
truth (Ogden, 1999: 134). My voice, and in particular my feminine voice, was too feeble 
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to confront the patricentric logic woven in his perspective on femininity as defined by 
the lack of a phallus, and hence inferior. Ultimately his authoritative voice overpowered 
my personal voice as it sought to tell my own story of the intricacy of the psychological 
phenomenon as lived and experienced subjectively by myself. My experience of 
dialoguing with Freud became a helpful reference empathising with Woolf and 
understanding why she shunned receiving Freudian psychoanalysis. Despite my 
disagreements with some aspects of Freud’s theory, reading Freud also started a process 
of reflective awareness that enable me to recognize why and how I disagreed, which 
propelled me to search on. 
What was left uncontained by the Freudian theory drove me to Klein, whose 
view on femininity was not defined by the lack of phallus but the possession of breasts. 
Breasts gave life to Klein’s work as much as it sponsored her original contribution – 
phantasy. Klein believed that the beginning of emotional life starts in infantile phantasy 
wherein dynamics are catalysed by the baby’s direct experiencing of the feeding breast 
and the withdrawn breast as they are linked to comfort and distress, generating in the 
baby the contradictory feelings of love and hate. And unlike Freud, Klein saw the 
ambivalence of love and hate as a crucial part of the emotional development to be 
worked through, even though she recognized ambivalence brought psychic pain. And 
such pain brings about the primitive mechanism of splitting, which enables the baby to 
manage the excessive anxiety generated from the powerful yet contradictory feelings of 
love and hate, whilst she strives for survival.  
Depression, or the depressive position in its primitive form, derives from the 
overcoming of intolerable ambivalence to ‘achieve’, conceptualized by Klein as an 
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psychic development as it were, recognizing the mother as a whole object who is both 
good and bad. To achieve the depressive position signals the capacity for the recognition 
of a whole object and the capacity for guilt. This then leads to a need for reparation with 
the loved object, to ensure that it has not been destroyed in phantasy. The emotional 
development marked by the depressive position is in parallel with what Winnicott terms 
“the capacity for concern” (1963). Even though Klein adheres to what Freud established 
as drive theory, her emphasis on the pre-oedipal phase as the centre of infantile anxieties, 
and early mothering in her theorizing of depression, legitimizes the importance of 
maternal function - a new insight that distinguishes her work from classical Freudian 
depression. 
Virginia Woolf’s To The Lighthouse portrayed Woolf’s own position as a 
daughter in the family dominated by the father. It also portrays Klein’s position as a 
woman in the then patricentric psychoanalytic climate in which, at the cost of 
underplaying some significant theoretical differences, she eagerly established herself as 
a follower to Freud in order to secure a place for her work and influence in the 
psychoanalytic community. Behind the dramas of a father-centred plot constructed in a 
traditional Freudian Oedipus thinking, Woolf preserves a marginal space to illustrate the 
influence of the maternal figure of Mrs Ramsay through the experience of Lily Briscoe, 
the matricentric narrative embodied by the mother-child bond.  
My reading of To The Lighthouse brought about an immediate identification with 
Lily Briscoe, the daughter figure whose longings for Mrs Ramsay were never fully 
satisfied due to Mrs Ramsay’s emotional unavailability that symbolized the breast 
withdrawn from the baby. By being always preoccupied with something else, she failed 
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to attend to the immediate needs of Lily, who in an urgent hunger for maternal provision, 
played out a destructive rage in phantasy. But when Mrs Ramsay disappeared through 
her death, we saw Lily Briscoe acutely collapsed into a melancholic catastrophe. She 
experienced powerful rage as a vengeful phantasy of destroying Mrs Ramsay, who had 
caused her so much pain. The loss of Mrs Ramsay reawakened Lily’s love for her and a 
panicking attempt to bring her back to life for a chance of reparation, but nothing 
happened or could happen anymore. Mrs Ramsay’s death was a final deprivation of 
Lily’s need for reparation. Guilt resounded in Lily’s searching for Mrs Ramsay’s love, 
alternating with a recurrent state of unresolved hate. To The Lighthouse portrayed a 
Kleinian baby lost in the unfathomable abyss of the melancholic ocean, unable to 
navigate a safe way through without the guidance of a lighthouse. Klein’s work provides 
me with a language to conceptualize depression from the perspective of a daughter under 
siege by a depriving mother whom she also loves unconditionally.  
As much as Klein offers new insights to the understanding of depression, her 
insistent attempts to associate her work with Freud unfortunately restricted the potential 
of further going beyond the restraints of Freudian view on how the external environment 
interacts with the internal world in the shaping of our sense of self. In Kleinian theory, 
there is no clear differentiation between the world of internal objects and the real objects 
in reality, i.e. what the baby needs to manage is her own psychical creation of the bad 
object that represents an imaginary object which has emerged out of internal conflicts 
between love and hate, rather than a representation of the actual object in reality.  
Problems of the innateness of the bad objects remain a terrain of dispute in 
Klein’s work. Even though Klein acknowledges the importance of the quality of the 
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mothering, she emphasises phantasy driven by the instinctual impulses, suggesting that 
the psychic process did not necessarily coincide with the real picture of the mother. The 
internal world, in Klein’s (1952) words, “is formed solely on the basis of the 
individual’s own desires towards other persons and of his reactions to them as the 
objects of his desire” (pp. 162). She did not change this view. A philosophical 
undercurrent of idealism that, in brief, is the view that every thing exists only as a 
reflection of the mental representations (as defined by Mautner, 2005: 292) was 
omnipresent in her theory; the only real relationships are those constructed internally. 
The predominant idealist position in her theory curtailed a further development to 
encompass the social and relational aspects of experience in understanding and shaping 
of the inner world in interplay with internalized objects. Depression, examined in the 
Kleinian system, is derived primarily from internal conflicts rooted in one’s inherent 
aggression, unresolved in the aftermath of loss, and less of a creation of the malicious 
external objects. It is apparent that both Freud and Klein’s theories are rooted in the 
proposition of there being a common force of the instincts in the face of internal 
conflicts between love and hate, whilst giving little importance to the place of relational 
experiences between the self and the others. For this reason the nature of the object 
relationship they construed was much narrower than Fairbairn.  
The divergence of relational psychoanalysis from classical psychoanalysis has, 
through a shift from instincts to relationships, clearly marked a different emphasis on the 
aim of defence mechanisms and the main source of the psychic pain. As Merton Gill 
(1995) concludes, “classical theory emphasizes defenses against drive, and relational 
theory emphasizes defenses against altering patterns of interpersonal relationships” 
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(cited in Layton, 2008: 2). Gill’s differentiation between classical theory and relational 
theory on the source of psychic pain, i.e. what are the sources of psychic pain being 
defended against, illuminates a contrasting focus in the classical theory and the relational 
theory in psychoanalysis. In the Freud-Abraham view, psychopathology develops due to 
a fixation at certain libidinal developmental stage, for example schizophrenia at the oral 
sucking stage, manic-depression at the oral biting stage etc. Fairbairn, on the other hand, 
proposed a fundamentally different theory of psychopathology originating not from the 
nature of libidinal impulses, but from the difficulties experienced in the object 
relationships (Guntrip, 1952: 89).  
Clearly in Gill’s (1995) differentiation, Fairbairn’s object relation theory fits into 
the latter paradigm. Fairbairn suggests that the most annihilating pain is the deprivation 
of the relatedness with the significant others, and what needs defended against is the 
edge of a threat that presses to alter the established patterns of the internal object 
relationships. Even though Fairbairn never developed a theory of depression himself, 
rather he took up a Kleinian conceptualization in terms of the positions, the main 
irreconcilabilities there have been in their systems of thinking opened up space for a 
Fairbairnian, as distinguished from a Kleinian understanding of depression to be further 
developed. The main irreconcilability in their theories is the very views they have on the 
nature of the internalized objects. For Klein, the internalized bad object is mainly seen 
as created inwardly through the child’s own split off sadistic aggression; whereas for 
Fairbairn, who sees human beings as fundamentally relational, it is created as a realistic 
representation of the object in reality who could not provide a satisfactory relationship 
for the child, and is therefore internalized and repressed by the child as a way to control 
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the overwhelming badness of it. Internalization to Fairbairn happens as a defence 
mechanism ‘serving’ the child to manage the unbearable experience with the frustrating 
bad object. By manoeuvring unconsciously through identification with the bad object, 
the unbearable badness can be taken inside her, the external object can be preserved as 
good and worthy. The cost of affording, albeit illusory, a sense of safety, and most 
importantly, hope in the on-going relationships with others, is the integrity of the self. 
Reflecting on Fairbairn, a deep resonance permeated my coming to know myself 
and Virginia Woolf. Fairbairn led me to feel a pain so great and so deep within me that I 
had not been able to attend to it, and he gave me a language to start describing the 
intricate yet traumatic relational scenes continually being replayed internally and 
interpersonally, behind the symptoms of depression. Reflecting upon Fairbairn brought a 
deep compassion, which emerged from this new knowing that perhaps it had not been 
me who was irredeemably bad. Perhaps I was only trying to cope with “a set of social 
and psychological circumstances” (Orbach, 2008: 31) that I was born into, desperately 
trying to alchemize chaos into a reality possible for living? And all I had was the 
invisible assets within me that could not be taken away from me - the psychological 
defence of idealization, splitting (and ego-splitting), and repression.  
As I have demonstrated by using Virginia Woolf’s and my own life stories, the 
unsatisfactory relationships with our parents, especially the fathers in our lives as the 
most intolerably bad objects, needed to be transformed into the internal realm so that we 
can continue to take part in the on-going relationships with our fathers from which there 
is no escape as long as we are dependent upon them. Aggression, not seen as an innate 
phenomenon as Klein suggests, is a result of the disappointing relational experience, and 
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partly internalized through identifying with the aggressor in order to justify their failing 
to love. But that was not all. Fairbairn’s view on aggression allowed me to see that 
aggression was turned inwards to sponsor what he called the “internal saboteur”, which 
forcefully attacks the part of self that is still waiting for love to be returned. An internal 
saboteur, outwardly shown as self-hatred, that conspires with the internalized bad object 
to transform the traumatic rejections of not having our love returned into a self-shaming 
belief that our love was unworthy and so deserved desertion. The continual 
disappointment and deprivation (of love) crystalizes the inner world of endopsychic 
structures that preserve the traces of the most painful, therefore repressed, experiences of 
the object relationships.  
It all worked fine until the change happened in a positive direction - the bad 
object in reality becomes lost permanently. The loss triggered an intense need to 
preserve the bond between the aspects of self, or the subsidiary selves in Fairbairn’s 
terms, which have realistically experienced and identified with their intolerably exciting 
and rejecting counterparts of the bad object. Endopsychic structure provides a home for 
the repressed aspects of self that engage with the repressed internalized bad objects; all 
together they constitute a repressed part of the self, therefore any changes in the 
constellation of the object-relationships carry a threat to disintegrate the self-identity and 
the patterns of relating to others so deeply interwoven in the internal relational matrix. 
Following Fairbairn, the very nature of the selfhood no longer equates with a sole 
functional director that seeks to negotiate amongst id, ego, and superego in order to 
eliminate the inner tensions unbearably aroused by love and hate. But the self becomes 
an organizing autonomy that, within her own psychological capacity, seeks to negotiate 
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a sense of relational contacts with the internalized objects that she could not bear to lose 
in the condition of the parental and environmental insufficiency.  
Fairbairnian depression essentially portrays a psychological crisis of a clash 
between the internal world and the external reality in the wake of changes; change alerts 
us to possibilities of loss and intensifies the unconscious desires to maintain the 
endopsychic structure as the way it is, whilst the reality of the external world comes into 
conflict with the internal relational constellations, i.e. the original bad/unsatisfying 
object is lost and can no longer sponsor the dynamics of endopsychic structure. 
Reframing depression from a Fairbairnian perspective, it is essential to validate the 
unconscious effort behind the surface manifestations of the symptoms that the person 
makes for the purpose of avoiding the psychic pain brought about by the loss of the 
object relations. If nothing has changed, nothing could have been lost. The person with 
depression is one who lives in “the stasis in the closed-system of experiencing the world” 
(Rubens, 1998: 222) out of a need to keep intact the inner constellation of internalized 
object relationships. By retreating into the sanctuary of the internal world peopled by the 
internalized objects, the on-going experiences of changes in life are denied and the 
internal object-relations can continue to sponsor the reminiscence of the emotional 
memory with significant others. Depression, therefore, should be understood as an 
organized experience, actively and unconsciously by the person as a defence mechanism 
against changes to the internal object relationships, against disintegration of the sense 
of self and its subsequent psychic pain. And the symptoms of it are of psychosomatic 
nature, which are an unconscious expression of the object relationships that have been 
repressed. 
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Fairbairn’s theory pioneered a radical reformulation in psychoanalytical thinking 
on the fundamental need of selfhood. To understand the internal world and how the self 
relates to her internal objects requires a psychotherapeutic process of “idiosyncratic 
elaboration of actual relational experience” (Layton, 2009: 2). Although Fairbairn did 
not explicitly theorize the dimensions of the psychic growth, it could be postulated that 
the most important element for therapeutic change would lie in the gradual acceptance of 
the change(s) that has been unconsciously denied. It is not a simple task. To achieve the 
genuine acceptance of the changes would mean to gradually let go of the depressive 
defence of taking sanctuary in a closed-system of internalized object relationships. In 
Ogden’s (2010) words, the therapeutic process would encompass “the work of coming to 
terms with the full range of aspects of oneself, including one’s disturbing, infantile, 
split-off identification with one’s unloving, unaccepting mother [or father]” (pp. 114) 
Insofar as Fairbairn provides a useful framework for how our internal object 
relationships guide the way we respond to the external world, he does not elaborate on 
psychic growth and how it can be facilitated in the course of psychotherapeutic process. 
In my view Fairbairn’s theory is a theory of results; the significance of its unique 
formulation on the dynamic psychic structure prompts further research into the 
psychotherapeutic process in working with what transpires in the wake of therapeutic 
changes unconsciously defended against through depression. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to address such issues, it is my hope that further research can be done 
to provide a detailed account of the clinical relevance of a Fairbairnian understanding of 
depression and so make the theory of consequence to practice.  
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In this thesis I have explored the personal relevance of Fairbairn’s object 
relations theory in understanding depression. His work as distinct from other 
psychoanalytic frameworks, such as the better-known Freudian and Kleinian lines of 
thought, provides invaluable insights into understanding the nature of depression as a 
psychic manoeuvring. Treading through the theoretical arguments made by Freud, Klein, 
and Fairbairn, engaging with them personally, subjectively and relationally with 
Virginia Woolf in the form of an imaginative dialogue where personal narratives are 
incorporated, I realized in both of my and Woolf’s life stories Fairbairn was the key that 
made the picture of our depressions complete. My letters to Virginia Woolf were a way 
to illustrate my evolving perspective in my understanding of depression, evoking the 
theory and the uniqueness of Fairbairn’s framework based on object relations theory. 
 
Finally, in closing, I acknowledge the fact that my textual relationship with the 
imaginary Virginia Woolf, who I have come to know and so closely work with in this 
thesis, is undergoing a closure. On reading Virginia Woolf’s last letter she left for the 
world, I wished still that my fictional encounter with her had been real. 
  
[…] I can’t fight any longer. I know that I am spoiling your life, that without me 
you could work. And you will I know. You see I can’t even write this properly. I 
can’t read. What I want to say is I owe all the happiness of my life to you. You 
have been entirely patient with me and incredibly good. I want to say that — 
everybody knows it. If anybody could have saved me it would have been you. 
Everything has gone from me but the certainty of your goodness. I can’t go on 
spoiling your life any longer […] (Woolf, 1941b; italics added). 
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The letter, which was addressed to her husband Leonard Woolf, underscored 
what it had been like for her in the depth of her depression towards the end of her life. It 
allows us to see that she did not change her narrative and insisted on continuing to 
believe that her depression was all her fault and all the badness came from her. This time 
she had made up her mind that she would not let her badness go on “spoiling” others’ 
goodness any more. She ended the letter with one last attempt to reassure herself and her 
husband of his grace, of her unworthiness. Three days later, on March 28, Virginia 
Woolf drowned herself in the River Ouse at the age of 59. In my view, it was the 
atmosphere within psychoanalytic circles where Fairbairn’s work was much 
marginalized that coincided with the incidence of Woolf’s death in her belief of her 
depression as self-generated, an innate sin. I hold an optimistic view that should she 
have read my letters, things would have been different, and she could have lived, 
possibly by realizing that she need not be the mad one, the bad one, anymore.  
Working on this thesis, I witnessed my understanding being transformed by 
reflecting alongside psychoanalytic theories, and saw my life narratives restored to a 
realistic representation of my relational journey. Fairbairn enabled not only the deep, 
personal understanding of depression that I set out to find, and that I am finally at peace 
with, but a different relationship with my past. "Analysis leaves its scars; it cannot cure 
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Who is Virginia Woolf? A Short Biography 
 
 
The biographical information below is taken from the Virginia Woolf Society of Great 
Britain (Clarke & VWSGB, 2000). 
 
[…] Adeline Virginia Stephen was born on 25 January 1882 in London. Her father, 
Leslie Stephen (1832-1904), was a man of letters (and first editor of the Dictionary of 
National Biography) who came from a family distinguished for public service (part of 
the ‘intellectual aristocracy' of Victorian England). Her mother, Julia (1846-95), from 
whom Virginia inherited her looks, was the daughter of one and niece of the other five 
beautiful Pattle sisters (Julia Margaret Cameron was the seventh: not beautiful but the 
only one remembered today). Both parents had been married before: her father to the 
daughter of the novelist, Thackeray, by whom he had a daughter Laura (1870-1945) who 
was intellectually backward; and her mother to a barrister, Herbert Duckworth (1833-70), 
by whom she had three children, George (1868-1934), Stella (1869-97), and Gerald 
(1870-1937). Julia and Leslie Stephen had four children: Vanessa (1879-1961), Thoby 
(1880-1906), Virginia (1882-1941), and Adrian (1883-1948). All eight children lived 
with the parents and a number of servants at 22 Hyde Park Gate, Kensington.  
 
Long summer holidays were spent at Talland House in St Ives, Cornwall, and St Ives 
played a large part in Virginia’s imagination. It was the setting for her novel To the 
Lighthouse, despite its ostensibly being placed on the Isle of Skye. London and/or St 
Ives provided the principal settings of most of her novels. 
 
In 1895 her mother died unexpectedly, and Virginia suffered her first mental breakdown. 
Her half-sister Stella took over the running of the household as well as coping with 
Leslie’s demands for sympathy and emotional support. Stella married Jack Hills in 1897, 
but she too died suddenly on her return from her honeymoon. The household burden 
then fell upon Vanessa. 
 
Virginia was allowed uncensored access to her father’s extensive library, and from an 
early age determined to be a writer. Her education was sketchy and she never went to 
school. Vanessa trained to become a painter. Their two brothers were sent to preparatory 
and public schools, and then to Cambridge. There Thoby made friends with Leonard 
Woolf, Clive Bell, Saxon Sydney-Turner, Lytton Strachey and Maynard Keynes. This 
was the nucleus of the Bloomsbury Group. 
 
Leslie Stephen died in 1904, and Virginia had a second breakdown. While she was sick, 
Vanessa arranged for the four siblings to move from 22 Hyde Park Gate to 46 Gordon 
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Square, Bloomsbury. At the end of the year Virginia started reviewing with a clerical 
paper called the Guardian; in 1905 she started reviewing in the Times Literary 
Supplement and continued writing for that journal for many years. Following a trip to 
Greece in 1906, Thoby died of typhoid and in 1907 Vanessa married Clive Bell. Thoby 
had started ‘Thursday evenings' for his friends to visit, and this kind of arrangement was 
continued after his death by Vanessa and then by Virginia and Adrian when they moved 
to 29 Fitzroy Square. In 1911 Virginia moved to 38 Brunswick Square. Leonard Woolf 
had joined the Ceylon Civil Service in 1904 and returned in 1911 on leave. He soon 
decided that he wanted to marry Virginia, and she eventually agreed. They were married 
in St Pancras Registry Office on 10 August 1912. They decided to earn money by 
writing and journalism. 
 
Since about 1908 Virginia had been writing her first novel The Voyage Out (originally 
to be called Melymbrosia). It was finished by 1913 but, owing to another severe mental 
breakdown after her marriage, it was not published until 1915 by Duckworth & Co. 
(Gerald’s publishing house). The novel was fairly conventional in form. She then began 
writing her second novel Night and Day - if anything even more conventional - which 
was published in 1919, also by Duckworth. 
 
From 1911 Virginia had rented small houses near Lewes in Sussex, most notably 
Asheham House. Her sister Vanessa rented Charleston Farmhouse nearby from 1916 
onwards. In 1919 the Woolfs bought Monks House in the village of Rodmell. This was a 
small weather-boarded house (now owned by the National Trust) which they used 
principally for summer holidays until they were bombed out of their flat in 
Mecklenburgh Square in 1940 when it became their home. 
 
In 1917 the Woolfs had bought a small hand printing-press in order to take up printing 
as a hobby and as therapy for Virginia. By now they were living in Richmond (Surrey) 
and the Hogarth Press was named after their house. Virginia wrote, printed and 
published a couple of experimental short stories, 'The Mark on the Wall' and 'Kew 
Gardens'. The Woolfs continued handprinting until 1932, but in the meantime they 
increasingly became publishers rather than printers. By about 1922 the Hogarth Press 
had become a business. From 1921 Virginia always published with the Press, except for 
a few limited editions. 
 
1921 saw Virginia’s first collection of short stories Monday or Tuesday, most of which 
were experimental in nature. In 1922 her first experimental novel, Jacob’s Room, 
appeared. In 1924 the Woolfs moved back to London, to 52 Tavistock Square. In 1925 
Mrs. Dalloway was published, followed by To the Lighthouse in 1927, and The Waves 
in 1931. These three novels are generally considered to be her greatest claim to fame as 
a modernist writer. Her involvement with the aristocratic novelist and poet Vita 
Sackville-West led to Orlando (1928), a roman à clef inspired by Vita’s life and 
ancestors at Knole in Kent. Two talks to women’s colleges at Cambridge in 1928 led to 
A Room of One’s Own (1929), a discussion of women’s writing and its historical 
economic and social underpinning.  
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This biographical summary of Virginia Woolf’s life is completed with the information 
below, which is taken from Frank Kermode’s (1992) biographical preface to Virginia 
Woolf’s Flush: 
 
The Waves was written and rewritten in 1930 and 1931 (published in October of that 
year). She had already started on Flush, the story of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s pet 
dog – another success with the public – and in 1932 began work on what became The 
Years. This brief account of her work during the first twenty years of her marriage is of 
course incomplete; she had also written and published many shorter works. As well as 
both series of The Common Reader, and A Room of One’s Own. There have been 
accounts of the marriage very hostile to Leonard Woolf, but he can hardly be accused of 
cramping her talent or hindering the development of her career. 
  
The Year proved an agonizingly difficult book to finish, and was completely rewritten at 
least twice. Her friend Roger Fry having died in 1934, she planned to write a biography, 
but illnesses in 1936 delayed the project; towards the end of that year she began instead 
the polemical Three Guineas, published in 1938. The Years had meanwhile appeared in 
1937, by which time she was again at work on the Fry biography, and already sketching 
in her head the book that was to be Between the Acts. Roger Fry was published in the 
terrifying Summer of 1940. By the Autumn of that year many of the familiar 
Bloomsbury houses had been destroyed or badly damaged by bombs. Back at Monk’s 
house, she worked on Between the Acts, and finished it in February 1941. Thereafter her 
mental condition deteriorated alarmingly, and on 28 March, unable to face another bouts 
of insanity, she drowned herself in the River Ouse.  
